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There( is( empirical( evidence( that( corporations,( often( in( collusion( with( states,( are(
involved(in(and(directly(connected(to(a(variety(of(human(rights(violations.(Despite(




omnipresence( in( the( global( political( economy( raises( questions( about( the(
overarching( framework( of( an( international( human( rights( law( that( protects(
corporations( in( analogous( ways( to( physical( persons.( The( extension( of( rights( to(
corporations( reveals( a( human( rights( paradigm( that( holds( private( property( and(
capitalist( accumulation( at( the( core( of( its( value( system.( This( thesis( scrutinises( the(
association( between( human( rights( and( corporations( and( raises( questions( about(
whether(human(rights(law(can(be(used(to(challenge(corporate(power.(
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alternative( uses( of( law( are( illustrative( of( the( potential( to( challenge( the( relative(
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Occupy3 Wall3 Street3 movements3 of3 2011.3 3 3The3 Indignados( movement3 has3embodied3 a3 growing3 dissent3 and3 popular3 disillusionment3 with3 neoliberal3capitalism3over3the3past3few3years.3The3movement3has3provided3fertile3grounds3to3call3into3question3the3power3of3the3corporation3and3expose3a3malaise3with3its3legal3structure3and3 its3 relationship3with3human3 rights3 (see3Chapters333 and35).3 3More3and3 more3 cases3 of3 corporate3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3 are3 surfacing3 –3 not3because3 they3 did3 not3 exist3 before,3 but3 because3 of3 an3 accrued3 interest3 and3commitment3to3exposing3corporate3harms3(Shamir,32004a).333There3is3empirical3evidence3that3corporations,3as3well3as3states,3are3involved3in3a3variety3 of3 human3 rights3 violations3 (see3 for3 examples3 CRED,3 2009).3 It3 is3 the3relative3impunity3with3which3corporations3have3sustained3their3activities3despite3evidence3 of3 transgressions3 that3 has3 inspired3 the3 research3 in3 this3 thesis. 433Examples3 of3 these3 human3 rights3 violations3 include3 analogous3 forms3 of3 slave3labour3 (e.g.3 Unocal3 in3 Burma)5;3 cultural3 genocide,3 ethnic3 discrimination,3 and3
3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333According3 to3Charnock3et(al.3 (2012:34)3 the3 Indignados(movement3began3with3 ¡Democracia(real(
YA!( (Real3 Democracy3 NOW),3 an3 internetHbased3 social3 movement3 platform3 created3 by3 activists3involved3 in3 the3 free3 culture3movement3 and3 the3 struggle3over3 a3new3Spanish3 law3on3 intellectual3property3rights,3which3led3to3demonstrations3that3took3place3all3over3Spain3beginning3in3May320113under3its3slogan3‘Real3Democracy3NOW’.3The3movement3was3inspired3by3the3Arab3Spring3and3the3ensuing3demonstrations3led3to3the3idea3of3occupying3public3spaces3in3Spain,3Greece3(known3as3the3
aganaktismenoi),3and3later3 in3other3cities3across3Europe.3The3Indignados3movement3 later3spread3globally3with3demonstrations3being3held3in3Israel,3Chile3and3the3USA,3in3what3came3to3be3known3in3the3latter3country3as3the3Occupy3Wall3Street3movement3(Kaldor3and3Selchow,32013).3But3the3true3origins3of3the3global3protests3that3began3in32011,3which3challenged3social3and3economic3inequality,3and3 the3 perceived3 greed,3 corruption3 and3 influence3 of3 corporations3 on3 government,3 can3 be3attributed3 to3 French3 resistance3 hero3 and3 public3 intellectual3 Stéphane3 Hessel.3 In3 2010,3 Hessel3published3 a3 32Hpage3 pamphlet3 entitled3 “Time3 for3 Outrage:3 IndignezSvous!”3 (English3 version)3 in3which3he3eloquently3called3for3a3‘peaceful3insurrection’3against3the3inequities3of3global3capitalism.3His3call3to3action,3sold3millions3of3copies3worldwide,3and3he3has3been3called3the3inspiration3for3the3global3youth3uprising3of320113(Willsher,32013).343In3 a3 detailed3 argument3 on3 the3 onHgoing3 impunity3 with3 which3 TNCs3 operate3 globally,3 the3Transnational3 Institute3 (TNI)3 together3 with3 the3 Observatory3 on3 Debt3 and3 Globalisation3 (ODG)3launched3 a3 report3 at3 the3 Vienna+203Civil3 Society3 Conference3 in3 June3 2013.3 The3 report,3 entitled3





violations3 of3 the3 right3 to3 a3 healthy3 environment3 (e.g.3 Texaco3 in3 Ecuador)6;3conspiracy3leading3to3widespread3intimidation3and3murder/death3of3activists3(e.g.3Royal3Dutch3Shell3in3Ogoni,3Nigeria)7;3murder,3extraHjudicial3killings,3kidnapping,3unlawful3 detention,3 and3 torture3 (e.g.3 CocaHCola3 in3 Colombia)8;3 and3 culpable3environmental3 disaster3 and3 wilful3 lack3 of3 observance3 for3 safety3 norms3 in3 the3workplace3(e.g.3Union3Carbide3Bhopal3in3India;93AZFHTotal3in3France10).333
II.!Operating!Across!Borders:! the!Relevance!of! the!TNC! in!Debates!on!















the3term3corporation3denoted3an3association3of3a3particular3economic(nature3with3no3 reference3 to3 its3 legal3 form,3 whereas3 today3 it3 signifies3 an3 association3 of3 a3particular3legal(status3with3few3connotations3as3to3its3economic3form3(see3Chapter33).333Although3the3thesis3will3generally3refer3to3the3 ‘corporation’3 it3will3 in3some3cases3specifically3 reference3 ‘TNCs’.3 TNCs3 operate3 in3 global3 or3 regional3 economic3regimes. 13 3The3 importance3 of3 referring3 to3 the3 TNC3 in3 particular3 is3 that3 it3emphasises3 the3 transnational( nature3 of3 an3 economic3 entity3 operating3 in3 more3than3one3country3and3across3borders3beyond3the3constraints3of3any3one3nation’s3legal3framework.143It3is3a3corporation’s3transnationality3that3often3underlines3the3existing3gap3in3international3law3as3it3applies3to3the3violations3of3human3rights3by3corporations.3 The3 transnationality3 of3 TNCs3 emphasises3 the3 problem3 of3accountability3 for3 corporate3 human3 rights3 violations3 because3 there3 are3 no3international3 binding3 regulations3 on3TNCs3 for3 human3 rights.3David3Weissbrodt,3one3of3the3authors3of3the3UN3Draft(Norms(on(the(Responsibilities(of(Transnational(
33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333133In3its319833Draft(Code(of(Conduct(on(TNCs,3the3UN3defined3a3TNC3as3an3enterprise,33(…)3[C]ompromising3entities3 in3two3or3more3countries,3regardless3of3 the3 legal3 form3and3fields3of3activity3of3these3entities,3which3operate3under3a3system3of3decisionHmaking,3permitting3coherent3policies3 and3 a3 common3 strategy3 through3 one3 or3 more3 decisionHmaking3 centres,3 in3 which3 the3entities3 are3 so3 linked,3 by3 ownership3 or3 otherwise,3 that3 one3 or3 more3 of3 them3 may3 be3 able3 to3exercise3a3significant3influence3over3the3activities3of3others3and,3in3particular,3to3share3knowledge,3resources3and3responsibilities3with3the3others3(UN,31983:3§1.a.)3The3UN3reiterated3its3preference3for3the3term3TNC3in3the3SubHCommission3on3the3Promotion3and3Protection3 of3 Human3 Rights’3 April3 20053 Report3 on3 the3 UN3 Norms( on( the( Responsibilities( of(
Transnational( Corporations( and( Other( Business( Enterprises( with( Regard( to( Human( Rights3 (UN3
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specifically3TNCs,3as3one3of3the3main3obstacles3to3corporate3accountability3(Olivet,32010;3 Nowak,3 2007;3 Nowak3 and3 Kozma,3 2009;3 Scheinin,3 2009),3 an3 issue3 also3raised3during3the3interviews3(see3Chapter37).33










law.3However,3after3a3few3years3of3debate3regarding3the3development3of3a3binding3agreement,3support3for3the3UN3Norms(dissipated3and3the3discussion3was3replaced3by3 a3 different3 agenda.3 In3 2005,3 Ruggie3 began3 a3 three3 year3 mandate,3 which3produced3 the3 “Protect,(Respect,(and(Remedy”(Framework3 (Ruggie,3 2008).3Ruggie3eschewed3the3need3for3new3law3and3placed3emphasis3upon3existing3law,3policies,3corporate3 codes3 of3 conduct3 (CCCs)3 and3 other3 voluntary3 measures. 20 3His(





relevant3 to3 issues3of3 corporate3accountability3or3key3 shifts3 in3human3rights3 law3(see3 Chapter3 7).3 In3 light3 of3 this,3 the3 thesis3 thus3 offers3 an3 inquiry3 into3 the3important3 and3 otherwise3 unexplored3 perspectives3 of3 human3 rights3 judges3with3regards3 to3 the3 legal3 obstacles3 related3 to3 the3 development3 of3 corporate3accountability3for3violations3of3human3rights.333The3 analysis3 of3 the3 interviews,3 in3 Chapter3 7,3 demonstrates3 that3 judges’3perspectives3 can3 offer3 an3 important3 component3 to3 the3 corporate3 accountability3debate.3 In3 this3 respect,3 the3 thesis3does3not3 adopt3a3 strictly3 constructionist3 view3that3the3judge3does3not3make3the3law3but3applies3the3law.3Instead,3it3takes3its3cue3from3Duncan3Kennedy’s3 (1996)3 analysis3 that3 there3 is3 an3 ideological3 element3 in3judicial3 decisionHmaking3whether3 it3 is3 conscious,3 subHconscious3 or3 unconscious3(see3Chapter31).3It3questions3whether3there3is3space3for3corporate3accountability3in3 human3 rights3 Courts3 using3 the3 legal3 imagination3 and3 the3 interpretation3 of3existing3 mechanisms3 (see3 Chapters3 5,3 6,3 and3 7).3 Moreover,3 it3 considers3 the3existing3 obligations3 of3 corporations3 in3 contrast3 with3 its3 legal3 rights3 under3 the3paradigm3 of3 human3 rights.3 In3 what3 follows,3 the3 thesis3 will3 present3 a3 detailed3empirical3 inquiry3 that3 seeks3 to3 assess3 the3 practicalities3 of3 developing3accountability3for3corporations3in3human3rights3law.333
IV.!Outline!of!the!Thesis!






































This3 thesis3will3 examine3 the3 otherwise3 unexplored3 viewpoints3 of3 human3 rights3judges3at3the3ECtHR3and3IACtHR3regarding3the3gap3in3international3human3rights3law3with3respect3to3corporate3violations3of3human3rights.3The3following3questions3were3devised3to3structure3the3aims3of3the3research:33
o To3 what3 extent3 can3 human3 rights3 law3 be3 used3 to3 challenge3 corporate3power?333
o What3role3can3human3rights3Courts3play3 in3using3existing3mechanisms3of3human3rights3law3in3cases3involving3corporate3violations3of3human3rights?33A3 series3 of3 secondary3 research3 questions3 supported3 the3 investigation3 into3 the3primary3questions.333
• How3 do3 the3 IACtHR3 and3 the3 ECtHR3 approach3 the3 relationship3 between3corporations3and3human3rights3law?33
• How3 can3 corporate3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3 be3 addressed3 in3 the3decisions3of3those3Courts?33



























interview3 elites3 stress3 the3 importance3 of3 outlining3 their3 projects3 only3 very3generally3 when3 first3 contacting3 respondents3 (ibid).3 It3 may3 be3 necessary3 to3provide3broad3areas3rather3than3specific3questions3and3highlighting3the3potential3participant’s3 “influential3 role3 within3 (…)”3 whatever3 organization,3 rather3 than3asking3 the3 individual’s3 position3 on3 one3 particular3 subject.3 Specifications3 could3eventually3be3 fitted3 into3 the3 interview3if3 the3subject3appears3receptive3(Lilleker,32003:3 209).3 Also,3 a3 particularity3 of3 elite3 interviews3 is3 that3 “under3 normal3circumstances3you3only3have3one3opportunity3 to3 interview3the3 individual”3(ibid:3210).3And3often,3as3was3the3case3here,3the3time3allotted3for3the3interview3is3limited3and3controlled3by3the3respondent.333For3 this3 thesis,3 the3 project3 was3 only3 briefly3 and3 very3 generally3 outlined3 in3 the3interview3request3letters.3The3letters3were3standardised3with3only3minor3changes3made3 for3 each3 participant’s3 invitation.3 Dexter3 (1970)3 noted3 the3 importance3 of3broadly3 describing3 a3 research3 project3 when3 contacting3 elites3 for3 interviews.3Accordingly,3 when3 contacting3 judges3 at3 the3 ECtHR3 and3 IACtHR,3 the3 thesis3description3 was3 intentionally3 limited3 to3 a3 few3 sentences.3 Indeed,3 the3 letter3 of3request3was3quite3 short,3 including3 the3 strict3minimum3description3of3 the3 thesis3and3the3credentials3of3the3researcher3(e.g.3University3affiliation3and3a3prestigious3research3grant).3In3fourteen3of3the3fifteen3interviews3only3one3participant3granted3a3 followHup3 meeting.3 This3 experience3 confirmed3 Lilleker’s3 (2003)3 point3 that3interviewing3 elites3 can3 often3 result3 in3 only3 one3 chance3 to3 question3 the3respondents.33





their3more3extensive3 case3 law3and3 long3political3 and3 institutional3histories.3The3decision3was3 also3 pragmatic3 since3 accessibility3was3 simplified3 through3 alreadyHexisting3 relationships3 with3 key3 gatekeepers.3 Section3 3.1.3 details3 the3 process3 of3interviewing,3whilst3Section33.2.3focuses3on3the3case3law.33

























































HUDOC(also3 includes3 (1)3 Case3 Law3 Information3 Notes,3 published3monthly3with3summaries3 of3 cases3 of3 particular3 importance3 or3 social3 relevance;3 (2)3Communicated3 Cases,3 which3 includes3 weekly3 lists3 of3 cases3 communicated3 to3respondent3states3and3which3are3considered3of3particular3jurisprudential3interest.3
















3The3IACtHR3has3delivered32593Decisions3and3Judgements3since319883(as3of3March32013).293The3 English3 cases3 are3 all3 translations3 from3 the3 original3 Spanish.3 The3Court3 heard3 the3majority3 of3 the3 cases3more3 than3 once3 either3 on3 the3Merits,3 for3Reparations3and3Costs,3for3the3Interpretation3of3the3Reparations3and3Costs,3or3for3Preliminary3 Objections.3 Since3 its3 inception,3 it3 has3 also3 delivered3 213 Advisory3Opinions3 (available3 in3 English3 and3 Spanish)3 and3 1113 Provisional3 Measures3(available3in3English3and3Spanish).3Some3of3the3cases3in3the3Provisional3Measures3are3 available3 in3 the3 Judgements3 and3 Decisions.3 The3 IACtHR’s3website3 search3engine3 is3 accessible3 by3Decision3 and3Advisory3Opinion,3 searchable3 by3 keyword.3The3IACtHR3and3IACommHR3have3posted3all3relevant3internal3 legal3materials3on3their3respective3websites,3providing3a3comprehensive3collection.3Documents3are3in3English3and/or3Spanish,3however,3unlike3at3the3ECtHR,3the3translations3are3not3always3 precise.3 Thus,3 reading3 in3 the3 original3 language3 made3 a3 significant3difference3in3understanding3the3judges’3emphases3on3certain3points.3Similarly3to3the3ECtHR3search,3queries3were3launched3in3both3English3and3Spanish3to3ensure3the3maximum3number3of3results.333The3comparatively3small3number3of3cases3at3the3IACtHR3also3meant3that3the3task3was3less3daunting3than3at3the3ECtHR.3The3kind3of3sweeping3search3done3with3the3ECtHR3case3law3was3not3possible3at3the3IACtHR3due3to3the3way3its3database3is3set3up.3Given3the3limited3number3of3cases3in3the3history3of3the3IACtHR,3I3was3able3to3go3through3the3results3individually.3The3search3was3done3in3English3and3Spanish.3The3 English3 terms3 used3 were3 ‘corporation’3 (93 results),3 ‘company’3 (143 results),3‘multinational’3 (23 results),3 ‘transnational’3 (13 results),3 and3 later3 ‘enterprise’3 (33results).3 In3 Spanish,3 ‘empresa’3 (313 results),3 ‘sociedad’3 (33 results),3 ‘sociedad(
multinacional’3 (03 results),3 ‘establecimiento3 comercial’3 (23 results),3 ‘sociedad(






Judgement3 and3 By( Country.303Judge’s3 Opinions3 are3 always3 included3 as3 separate3documents.3The3Court3has3an3“Advanced3Search”3option3 that3allows3a3search3by3date3 and3 country,3 which3 is3 more3 efficient3 than3 searching3 by3 one3 of3 the3 above3divisions3 if3 the3 case3 name3 is3 already3 known.3 An3 advanced3 search3 by3 “topic”3 or3“word3in3content”3is3not3available.3The3direction3given3by3the3former3judge3during3the3 preliminary3 interview3 provided3 a3 good3 start3 to3 a3 few3 key3 cases3 that3 then3allowed3 for3 use3 of3 the3 snowballing3 technique.3 The3 IACommHR3 posts3 its3publications3as3Annual3Reports3(since31970),3Country3Reports3(of3which3there3are319),3and3Resolutions3(of3which3there3are311).3133Conducting3 case3 searches3 on3 the3 InterHAmerican3 websites3 was3 slightly3 more3laborious3than3on3the3ECtHR3website3given3the3less3formal3structure3of3its3search3engine,3 as3mentioned3 above.3 Umbrella3 searches3 using3 key3words3were3 used3 to3supplement3these3cases,3for3example3by3simply3typing3in3“company”3as3the3query.3The3main3 themes3 used3 in3 the3 ECtHR3 search3were3 used3 again3 in3 the3 “Advanced3Search”3 for3 the3 IACtHR3 and3 IACommHR3 to3 target3 specific3 cases:3 the3 ‘living3instrument’3 doctrine3 /3 dynamic3 approach3 of3 the3 Convention;3 the3 positive3obligations3doctrine;3the3horizontal3effect3/3publicHprivate3sphere;3ESC3rights;3and3to3a3lesser3extent,3extraterritoriality.3Snowballing3was3also3used3with3reference3to3other3 cases3 cited3 within3 the3 Decisions,3 Judgements,3 Advisory3 Opinions,3 and3Country3 Reports.3 Judges’3 separate3 Opinions3 (i.e.3 Dissenting3 and3 Concurring3Opinions)3 in3alreadyHidentified3cases3gave3further3examples3of3possibly3relevant3case3 law3and3were3used3 to3 connect3with3other3materials3 (see3Appendix32).3The3strategy3of3snowballing3cases3mentioned3during3the3interviews3was3also3applied3to3the3IACtHR3and3were3followed3up3in3the3case3search.33
















Courts3 compels3 further3discussion3on3 issues3of3 legal3pluralism3as3 they3 relate3 to3international3law,3particularly3with3reference3to3the3regional3human3rights3system.3Legal3pluralism3has3been3defined3as3 “the3 idea3 that3 there3 is3more3 than3one3 legal3order3or3mechanism3within3one3socioHpolitical3space,3based3on3different3sources3of3ultimate3validity3and3maintained3by3forms3of3organization3other3than3the3state”3(F.3von3BendaHBeckam,32002:337).3Sally3Merry3Engle3has3described3legal3pluralism3in3her3seminal3article3as,3“a3situation3in3which3two3or3more3legal3systems3coexist3in3 the3 same3 social3 field”3 (1988:3 870).3 In3 other3 words,3 legal3 pluralism3 can3 be3defined3 as3 the3 existence3 of3 overlapping3 normative3 and3 legal3 orders3 within3 the3same3society3or3community.3In3the3case3of3the3ECtHR3and3the3IACtHR,3the3judges3are3 constantly3 faced3 with3 these3 overlapping3 legal3 orders3 since3 they3 are3incontrovertibly3 dealing3 with3 multiHtiered3 laws3 (e.g.3 local,3 national3 and3international3law)3and3juggling3competing3legal3categories3with3human3rights3law3(e.g.3criminal3or3commercial3law3with3human3rights3law)3in3their3decisionHmaking3process;3but3the3judges3are3also3informed3by3other3normative3orders,3foreign3legal3precedents,3 socioHcultural3 evolutions,3 and3 public3 expectations3 (see3 Chapters3 63and3 7).3 These3 elements3 nurture3 both3 the3 subjective3 interpretation3 of3 each3individual3judge3as3well3as3the3general3legal3culture3at3each3Court.33
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powers3 is3 relevant3 because,3 particularly3 in3 the3 last3 decade3 with3 the3 ‘War3 on3Terror’,3 judges3–3and3specifically3human3rights3 judges3–3have3sometimes3played3an3important3role3in3balancing3against3executive3and3legislative3‘counterHterrorist3measures’,3 e.g.3 Saadi( v( Italy3 (2008).35!This3 case3 demonstrates3 the3 potential3 for3human3rights3Courts3to3be3used3by3 individuals3 in3order3to3call3 into3question3the3actions3of3 the3executive3and3 legislative3powers3 (see3Chapter323and3Conclusion).3Taken3in3this3 light,3 judges3may3be3considered3as3part3of3an3 institutional3process3that3 can3 develop3 a3 range3 of3 possibilities3 and3 mechanisms3 for3 counteracting3political3 excesses.3 Nonetheless,3 the3 politicisation3 of3 the3 judiciary3 remains3 a3contested3 and3 contentious3 issue3 (Malleson3 and3 Russel,3 2006).3 The3 liberal3tradition3of3Western3democracies,3 rooted3 in3Montesquieu’s3division3of3power3 in3government3 rests3 on3 the3 threeHpillared3 state,3 including3 the3 independent3 and3‘apolitical’3judge.3Because3of3this,3many3judges3are3not3(explicitly)3willing3to3go3too3far3in3questioning3the3law.333Many3 judges3will3vigorously3maintain3 that3 their3 role3 is3 to3 interpret3 the3 law,3not3reHwrite3 it3 (Lauterpacht,3 1982:3 155).3 Santos3 has3 described3 this3 position3 as3 one3that3 concedes3 that3 “the3 judiciary3 is3 a3 reactive3 institution3 with3 no3 enforcement3powers,3which3must3apply3the3preHexisting3law3when3asked3to3do3so3by3disputing3parties”3(2002b:3337).3 In3a3democratic3society,3 it3 is3 the3role3of3 the3 legislature3to3‘make3law’3and3the3role3of3the3judge3to3enforce3it.3The3assessment3of3a3good3or3bad3law3is3not3for3the3judge3to3make,3a3point3that3was3repeated3enthusiastically3during3the3 interviews.3But3 if3 law3 is3made3by3a3 legislature3within3a3neoliberal3paradigm3(as3is3the3case3for3most3–3if3not3all3–3modern3democracies),3then3the3interpretation3
33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333353In3 this3 Case,3 the3 Grand3 Chamber3 unanimously3 endorsed3 its3 case3 law3 (Chahal( v( UK,3 1996)3reaffirming3its3position3that3deportation3in3the3circumstances3of3the3case3breaches3Article333ECHR3(against3torture3and3inhuman3or3degrading3treatment).3In3both3Saadi(v(Italy3(2008)3and3Chahal(v(





of3 that3 law3 is3 necessarily3 influenced3 by3 capitalism.3 This3 reality3 forces3 us3 to3question3the3impact3this3may3have3on3judicial3decisionHmaking.333
5.1.!Reflections!on!Judicial!Decision1Making!in!Capitalist!Social!Orders!!3The3law,3within3the3neoliberal3state,3has3developed3in3a3way3that3secures3private3property3 rights,3 and3 favours3 the3 rule3 of3 law3 and3 the3 institutions3 of3 freely3functioning3markets3and3free3trade3(Harvey,32006:364).3In3other3words,3neoliberal3law3 has3 developed3 in3 a3 way3 that3 is3 compatible3 with3 and3 ultimately3 seeks3legitimacy3for3capitalist3social3orders3(see3Chapter32).3This3section3will3argue3that3the3rule3of3law3influences3the3process3of3adjudication3since3it3is3a3leading3feature3of3 the3 international3 human3 rights3 framework3 that3 has3 emerged3 as3 part3 of3 an3overarching3and3hegemonic3neoliberal3law.36333Judges3are3expected3to3make3their3judgements3within3this3neoliberal3(and3ultimately3capitalist)3legal3paradigm.3This3context3gives3rise3to3questions3about3whether3 judgeHmade3 law3can3be3explained3as3responsive3to3and3legitimating3the3needs3of3a3market3system3or3the3structural3requirements3of3particular3stages3of3capitalist3development3(Kennedy,31996:3265).333





promulgated,3 equally3 enforced3 and3 independently3 adjudicated,3 and3 which3 are3consistent3with3 international3 human3 rights3 norms3 and3 standards”3 (UN3 Security3Council,32004).3The3rule3of3law3governs3the3interference3of3the3state3in3the3private3sphere3 through3 three3 fundamental3 principles:3 generality,3 certainty3 and3 equality3(Raz,31977).373The3expression3“the3rule3of3law”3has3gained3currency3outside3of3the3legal3sphere3and3is3now3part3of3dominant3political3and3cultural3discourses,3on3the3agendas3of3private3and3public3actors,3and3revered3by3NGOs3and3activists3(Mattei3and3Nader,32008).33Mattei3 and3 Nader3 (2008),3 in3 their3 critique3 of3 the3 rule3 of3 law3 as3 a3 tool3 for3 the3justification3 of3 plunder,3 have3 argued3 that3 it3 is3 a3Western3 legal3 construct3with3 a3dominating3corporate3media3rhetoric3and3is3presented3as3universal3although3it3is3a3culturally3specific3concept.3They3assert3 that3although3the3rule3of3 law3 is3almost3never3carefully3defined3as3a3concept,3it3is3today3inextricably3linked3to3the3notion3of3democracy3 and3 has3 consequently3 become3 “a3 powerful,3 almost3 indisputable,3positively3loaded3ideal”3(Mattei3and3Nader,32008:311).3They3argue3that3the3rule3of3law3 has3 become3 “a3 powerful3 political3 weapon3 (…)3 closely3 connected3 with3 the3diffusion3 of3 Western3 political3 domination”3 (ibid).3 The3 rule3 of3 law3 and3neoliberalism3 have3 become3 wellHacquainted3 bedfellows.3 The3 rule3 of3 law3 is3sponsored3 and3 promoted3 by3 the3 international3 financial3 institutions3 (IFIs)3 as3 a3condition3 of3 their3 loans3 and3 has3 thus3 become3 an3 integral3 feature3 of3 the3 USHled3campaign3to3spread3and3nurture3neoliberal3capitalism.3One3of3the3key3elements3of3the3 rule3 of3 law3 in3 global3 politics3 has3 been3 an3 attempt3 to3 define3 the3 context3 of3legitimacy3and3secure3a3hegemonic3capitalist3social3order3(see3Chapter32).33





David3 Harvey3 explains3 that3 according3 to3 neoliberal3 theory,3 “the3 state3 should3favour3 strong3 individual3 private3 property3 rights,3 the3 rule3 of3 law,3 and3 the3institutions3 of3 freely3 functioning3 markets3 and3 free3 trade”3 (2009:3 64).3 Harvey’s3explanation3 of3 neoliberalism3 reflects3 the3 Weberian3 model3 that3 describes3 the3market3as3a3calculable3sphere3 that3requires3 legal3rationality,3 i.e.3 the3principle3of3certainty3 in3 the3 rule3 of3 law.3 The3 emphasis3 on3 the3 rule3 of3 law3 in3 contemporary3politics3 has3 been3 made3 consistent3 with3 the3 ideals3 of3 neoliberalism,3 a3complementarity3which3was3 described3 by3 Friedrich3 von3Hayek3 in3 his3 assertion3that3the3rule3of3law,33 (…)3 means3 that3 government3 in3 all3 its3 actions3 is3 bound3 by3 rules3 fixed3 and3 announced3beforehand3 –3 rules3 which3 make3 it3 possible3 to3 foresee3 with3 fair3 certainty3 how3 the3authority3will3use3its3coercive3powers3in3given3circumstances3and3to3plan3one’s3individual3affairs3on3the3basis3of3this3knowledge3(2005:3112).33In3other3words,3Hayek3argued3that3the3role3of3the3(neoliberal)3state3is3to3maintain3a3 contract3 with3 its3 citizens3 that3 sets3 out3 certain3 foreseeable3 rules3 that3 ensure3individual3 choice3 rather3 than3 the3 pursuit3 of3 a3 collective3 goal,3 e.g.3 social3 justice,3welfare,3etc.383In3this3way,3the3rule3of3 law3is3a3 limit3to3governmental3and3judicial3power,3but3embraces3economic3 freedom,3which3 is3consistent3with3 the3argument3that3particular3legal3institutions3are3necessary3for3economic3growth3(World3Bank,31996).33In3 Marxism,3 law3 is3 the3 embodiment3 of3 market3 relationships3 (Mandel,3 1986;3Pashukanis,31925)3and3the3liberal3construction3of3the3rule3of3law3reflects3the3logic3of3the3market3as3a3highly3individualised3and3inequitable3paradigm3(see3Chapter33).3According3 to3Marxists,3 there3 is3an3 inherent3contradiction3 in3 the3endorsement3of3the3 rule3 of3 law3 as3 a3 value3 congruent3 with3 freedom3 and3 autonomous3 legal3





individuality3since3these3are3values3that3mirror3commodity3relations.3Gary3Teeple3has3argued3that,333 (…)3given3that3the3law3in3a3capitalist3society3is3the3codification3of3the3property3relations3that3 produce3 enormous3 material3 inequalities,3 the3 principle3 of3 the3 rule3 of3 law3 in3 this3system3[of3liberal3law]3stands3as3another3means3to3perpetuate3that3inequality3(2005:311).333Teeple3explains3that3according3to3Marxism,3law3in3a3capitalist3society3is3inherently3contradictory.3 This3 contradiction3 is3 seen,3 for3 example,3 in3 one3 of3 the3 core3principles3 of3 the3 liberal3 rule3 of3 law,3 which3 is3 ‘equality3 before3 the3 law’.3 This3principle3does3not3take3into3consideration3the3structural3inequalities3inherent3in3a3capitalist3legal3system.33Through3 the3 neoliberal3 development3 model,3 and3 neoliberal3 capitalism3 more3generally,3 the3 relationship3 between3 private3 and3 public3 institutions3 has3 been3reorganised,3 calling3 for3 “a3 new3 legal3 framework3 for3 development3 conducive3 to3trade,3 financing,3 and3 investment”3 (Santos,3 2002b:3 316).393Since3 the3 end3 of3 the3Cold3War,3 there3has3been3a3consensus3of3support3 for3a3new,3ethical3and3morally3committed3 world3 order,3 established3 on3 the3 basis3 of3 protecting3 and3 promoting3human3rights3(Chandler,32006:32).3There3is3an3international3consensus3on3human3rights,3which3has3influenced3and3transformed3the3international3legal3and3political3spheres,3 and3part3of3 this3 transformation3has3been3a3growing3 reliance3on3Courts3and3 judicial3 means3 for3 articulating3 and3 determining3 core3 political3 issues.3 This3reliance3 has3 been3 exacerbated3 by3 a3 concerted3 effort3 from3 Western3 states3 to3uphold3 the3 postH19903 obsession3with3 spreading3 democracy3 globally,3which3 has3included3the3‘universal’3approach3to3human3rights.40333










3There3is3an3assumption3that3judges3within3capitalist3social3orders3will3adjudicate3in3ways3that3are3compatible3with3the3liberal3legal3paradigm3that3today3espouses3a3neoliberal3 ideology.3 Judges3 are3 thus3 in3 a3 certain3 capacity3 limited3 to3 this3 liberal3legal3 paradigm.3 3 In3 other3words,3 the3 judicial3 claim3 to3 impartiality3 is3 not3 always3irrefutable.3Whether3they3want3to3or3not,3judges3are,3to3a3certain3extent,3bound3by3(neoliberal)3law3and3often3declare3and3apply3rules3that3are3not3necessarily3what3they3consider3 to3be3 the3right3rules,3or3at3 least3not3ones3 that3 they3would3enact3 if3they3were3 legislators3 (Kennedy,3 1996:3 275;3 see3 Chapter3 7).3 In3 this3way,3 judges3show3that3 they3are3not3 ‘neutral’3 and3demonstrate3a3 real3difference3between3 the3law3made3by3a3 judge3and3the3 law3made3by3a3 legislator.3What3this3also3reveals3 is3that3 although3 judges3 can3 sometimes3 interpret3 the3 law3 in3 ways3 that3 align3 with3their3ideological3perspectives,3the3law3itself3must3be3considered3within3its3social,3economic,3 and3political3 context.3 In3 this3 thesis,3 the3 context3 refers3 to3 a3neoliberal3framework3 for3 the3 ECtHR3 and3 the3 IACtHR3 generally,3with3 distinct3 regional3 and3national3characteristics3(see3Chapters343and35).33It3can3be3argued3that3judicial3decisionHmaking3framed3within3the3paradigm3of3the3rule3of3 law3creates3a3 social3order3 suitable3 for3 capitalist3 accumulation.413But3 this3brings3 us3 full3 circle3 to3 the3 question3 outlined3 at3 the3 beginning3 of3 this3 Section3regarding3 the3 role3 of3 judgeHmade3 law3 in3 legitimating3 market3 principles.3 The3analysis3of3the3case3law3(Chapter36)3and3the3interviews3(Chapter37)3will3argue3that3it3is3impossible3to3deny3the3contradictions3in3law,3which3can3serve3to3challenge3the3overarching3 structure3of3 neoliberal3 law,3 although3 it3 is3 unlikely3 that3 it3 is3 able3 to3
change3it3fundamentally.3However,3the3optimism3that3is3conveyed3in3a3handful3of3interviews3 in3 Chapter3 73 is3 that3 despite3 the3 existence3 of3 some3 laws3 that3 are3grounded3 in3neoliberal3capitalist3structures3 that3petrify3(or3exacerbate)3existing3inequalities,3there3is3room3to3question3and3even3challenge3them3through3judicial3interpretation3and3public3expectations3for3change.3




















!This3 Chapter3 examines3 the3 relationship3 between3 law,3 neoliberal3 hegemony3 and3human3rights3as3part3of3the3theoretical3framework3of3this3thesis.3The3Chapter3will3critique3the3dominant3discourse3of3human3rights.423The3point3is3not3to3reject3the3





Despite3the3seemingly3defeatist3accounts3in3the3first3three3sections,3the3final3part3of3 the3 Chapter3 will3 raise3 the3 question3 of3 the3 potential3 value3 of3 the3 concept3 of3human3 rights3 for3 counterHhegemonic3 struggles3 in3 Section3 IV.3 One3 way3 of3exploring3 the3 counterHhegemonic3 potential3 of3 human3 rights3 for3 struggles3 that3exist3outside3of3 legal3 institutions3 is3by3exploring3 the3extent3 to3which3hegemony3can3be3challenged3from3within3those3same3institutions.3As3such,3this3Chapter3will3point3out3that3human3rights,3as3a3hegemonic3project,3is3about3a3bid3for3legitimacy3which3 makes3 it3 a3 powerful3 tool3 by3 which3 to3 challenge3 and3 uneven3 undermine3state3legitimacy.33
!
I.!Discourses!of!Legitimacy:!Human!Rights!and!US1led!Hegemony!
!Throughout3the3long3history3of3the3concept3of3rights3there3has3been3a3consistent3association3 of3 the3 notion3 of3 rights3with3 property,3 e.g.3 the3 Roman’s3 ius(naturale3(AlonsoHLasheras,3 2011:3 113),433Locke’s3 (1991)3 notion3 of3 a3 trilogy3 of3 natural3rights,443the3development3of3the3modern3corporation3and3corporate3rights3in3the319thH20th3centuries3(see3Chapters333and35),3and3the3link3between3the3market3and3human3 rights3 espoused3 by3 neoliberal3 capitalism3 (Falk,3 2000:3 46H49).3 As3 such,3rights3 have3 always3 played3 a3 role3 in3 upholding3 a3 particular3 form3 of3 property333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333433The3Western3European3origins3of3the3modern3human3rights3regime3have3had3a3major3impact3on3the3 role3 and3 use3 of3 human3 rights3 in3 international3 politics3 and3 law.3 The3 Roman3 notion3 of3 ius(



























!Litowitz3 (2000)3asserts3 that3hegemony3 is3a3 relevant3concept3 to3analyses3of3 law.3He3 contends3 that3 hegemony3 “deserves3 broader3 consideration3 from3 the3 legal3academy3because3 it3 is3 a3 critical3 tool3 that3 generates3profound3 insights3about3 the3law’s3 ability3 to3 induce3 submission3 to3 a3 dominant3 worldview”3 (Litowitz,3 2000:3516).3Hegemony,3in3the3definition3given3by3Italian3Marxist3Antonio3Gramsci,333(…)3includes3firstly3the3‘spontaneous’3consent3given3by3the3great3masses3of3the3population3and3secondly3the3apparatus3of3state3coercive3power3which3‘legally’3enforces3discipline3on3those3groups3who3do3not3‘consent’3either3actively3or3passively”3(2005:312).333Thus,3 according3 to3 Gramsci,3 hegemony3 requires3 both3 consent3 from3 the3 general3population3as3well3as3the3coercive3power3of3the3state.3Evans,3inspired3by3Gramsci,3has3defined3discipline523as333(…)3a3mode3of3social3organisation3that3operates3without3the3need3for3coercion.3(…)3It3is3a3modernist3power3 that3 imbues3 the3 individual3with3particular3ways3of3 thinking,3knowing,3and3 behaving,3 thus3 instilling3 modes3 of3 social3 consciousness3 that3 make3 social3 action3predictable3(2005a:31054).333In3 this3way,3discipline3determines3or3moulds3commonsense53,3 further3discussed3below.333










includes3 the3 Church,3 trade3 unions,3 schools,3 mass3 media,3 (political)3 parties,3 but3also3through3the3pervasive3role3of3intellectuals.3For3Gramsci,3333 (…)3[the]3juridical3problem3is3a3problem3of3education3of3the3masses.3This3is3precisely3the3function3of3the3law3in3the3State3and3in3society;3through3‘law’3the3State3renders3the3ruling3group3‘homogenous’,3and3tends3to3create3a3social3conformism3which3is3useful3to3the3ruling3group’s3line3of3development.3(…)3The3general3activity3of3law3(…)3involve[s]3directing3civil3society,3 in3those3zones3which3the3technicians3of3 law3call3 legally3neutral3–3 i.e.3 in3morality3and3in3custom3generally.3In3practice,3this3problem3is3the3correspondence3‘spontaneously3and3freely3accepted’3between3the3acts3and3the3admissions3of3each3individual,3between3the3conduct3 of3 each3 individual3 and3 the3 ends3 which3 society3 sets3 itself3 as3 necessary3 –3 a3correspondence3which3 is3 coercive3 in3 the3 sphere3of3positive3 law3 technically3understood,3and3is3spontaneous3and3free3(more3strictly3ethical)3 in3those3zones3 in3which3 ‘coercion’3 is3not3a3State3affair3but3is3effected3by3public3opinion,3moral3climate,3etc.3(1971:3195H196).33Maureen3Cain3(1983)3expands3on3Gramsci’s3brief3discussion3of3law,3arguing3that3hegemony3 transpires3 with3 the3 achievement3 by3 the3 dominant3 class3 of3 both3political3 and3 ideological3 control.3 She3 explains3 that,3 “Political3 control3 is3 not3 by(





way,3 the3 discourse3 of3 human3 rights3 has3 been3 a3 source3 of3 legitimacy3 for3 USHled3hegemony.3As3we3have3seen,3any3attempt3to3establish3hegemony3in3the3Gramscian3sense3 requires3 not3 only3 coercive3 force3 but3 also3 a3 legitimation3 of3 rule3 through3popular3 consent.3 However,3 the3 concept3 of3 human3 rights3 remains3 a3 disputed3notion,3 exemplified3 by3 discordant3 and3 competing3 understandings3 of3 rights,3 e.g.3collective3rights3demanded3by3Indigenous3populations3(see3for3example3Newman,32007).333There3are3oppositions3to3the3doctrine3of3human3rights3defined3by3elites3who3are3often3far3removed3from3the3general3population.3These3competing3understandings3of3 rights3may3offer3 the3possibility3 for3 counterHhegemonic3 struggles3 to3 challenge3the3 bids3 for3 hegemony3 from3what3 Sklair3 (2002:3 144)3 calls3 the3 “transnationalist3capitalist3 class”3 (see3 Section3 IV).563Khoury3 and3Whyte3 (forthcoming)3 argue3 that3despite3 the3 appearance3 of3 this3 “transnational3 capitalist3 class”3 that3 is3 capable3 of3developing3 bids3 for3 hegemony,3 it3 still3 does3 not3 have3 the3 structure3 that3 is3necessary3for3securing3popular3consent.3This3deficiency,3they3argue,3indicates3that3power3is3reproduced3by3elites3in3fora3at3the3international3level3that3are3relatively3separate3 from3 other3 sections3 of3 civil3 society3 and3 are3 certainly3 operating3 in3spheres3removed3from3the3general3population3(see3for3example3Section3III3on3the3Ruggie3Process).333The3next3Section3further3explores3the3connection3between3human3rights3and3USHled3hegemony.3 It3briefly3examines3the3 impact3of3 the3end3of3 the3Cold3War3on3the3theory3 and3 practice3 of3 human3 rights3 and3 reviews3 the3 evolution3 of3 the3 legal3paradigm3of3human3rights3from3a3set3of3moral3principles3to3a3vehicle3of3neoliberal3hegemony.33
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1.2.( Human( Rights:( The( Legitimation( of( UScled( Neoliberal(






During3 the3 20th3 century,3 human3 rights3 gained3 political3 purchase3 as3 a3 source3 of3legitimacy3 for3 global3 expansion3 and3 became3 the3 crux3 of3 ideological3 power3struggles.3During3the3Cold3War,3the3capitalist3West3reified3human3rights.3Western3definitions3 of3 human3 rights3 became3 synonymous3with3democracy3 and3 freedom.3The3Soviets3argued3that3human3rights3served3a3Western3capitalist3and3imperialist3agenda.573With3the3dissolution3of3the3Soviet3Union3in319903there3was3a3transfer3of3the3 ideological3 ‘truth’3 of3 human3 rights3 to3 the3Western3 credo3 of3 democracy3 and3freedom.3Costas3Douzinas3argues3that3the3disintegration3of3the3Soviet3bloc3and3the3‘triumph’3of3Western3democracy3has3meant3that,3“human3rights3have3become3the3symbol3of3superiority3of3Western3states,3a3kind3of3mantra,3the3repetition3of3which3soothes3the3painful3memory3of3past3 infamies3and3the3guilt3of3present3 injustices”3(2000:3153H54).3The3development3of3a3global3human3rights3regime3coincided3with3the3 global3 expansion3 in3 the3 1990s3 of3 the3 neoliberal3 framework3 known3 as3 ‘the3Washington3 Consensus’.583The3 values3 of3 human3 rights3 law3 manifest3 significant3contradictions3 since,3 as3 some3 critics3 point3 out,3 these3 are3 values3 espoused3 and3promoted3 by3 the3 same3 states3 and3 organisations3 that3 perpetrate3 human3 rights3violations3(Chomsky,31999;3Santos,32007b;3Teeple,32005).333The3emblematisation3of3human3rights3as3a3product3of3the3new3democratic3world3order3enabled3the3dissemination3of3the3neoliberal3zeitgeist3of3equality,3rationality,3individuality,3 liberty,3 and3 private3 property,3 which3 has3 allowed3 for3 an3accommodation3 of3 capitalist3 values3 above3 any3 other.593Neoliberals3 champion3 a3




















The3next3Section3explores3 in3more3detail3 the3 correlation3between3human3rights3and3 neoliberal3 capitalism.3 It3will3 argue3 that3 the3 contradictions3 in3 human3 rights3law3 are3 attributable3 to3 the3 position3 of3 human3 rights3 within3 the3 context3 of3neoliberal3capitalism3defined3by3market3discipline.3
!
II.! The! Intimate! Association! of! Human! Rights! Law! and! Neoliberal!
Capitalism!
!The3 dominant3 human3 rights3 regime3 upholds3 the3 principles3 of3 equality,3 liberty,3individuality,3and3private3property.3These3principles3are3manifested3through3civil3and3political3rights3and3have3been3operationalized3through3human3rights3 law3 in3ways3 that3 support3 the3private3 accumulation3of3 capital.3 This3 Section3 argues3 that3there3 has3 been3 a3 deliberate3 construction3 of3 human3 rights3 law3 to3 complement3capitalist3social3orders.3PostH19453there3was3an3ideological3struggle3between3the3liberal3West3and3the3Soviet3bloc.3This3struggle3manifested3at3the3UN3as3a3campaign3to3define3rights3and3came3to3a3head3with3the3“hierarchization”3of3rights663along3the3lines3 of3 a3 private/public3 sphere3 divide,3 explored3 in3 Section3 2.1.3 The3institutionalisation3of3 the3hierarchy3of3 rights3 is3 critiqued3within3 the3purview3of3the3normalisation3of3a3neoliberal3human3rights3discourse3discussed3in3Section32.2.3
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2.1.(Constructing(a(Hierarchy(of(Rights(










and3 political3 discourses3 of3 rights.3 Thus,3 as3 Evans3 (2005b)3 explains,3 the3international3human3rights3regime3eschews3the3possibility3to3problematize3rights3by3 confining3 disagreements3 within3 a3 framework3 that3 seldom3 attracts3 critique.3Evans3points3out3that3the3result3of3this3is3that3“inasmuch3as3the3politics3of3rights3is3considered3at3all,3what3passes3for3politics3is3framed3within3a3set3of3rules3that3are3incontrovertibly3 accepted,3 while3 the3 framework3 itself3 remains3 unquestioned”3(ibid:3 49).3 Elsewhere,3 Evans3 has3 argued3 that3 “the3 move3 to3 a3 global3 political3economy,3which3is3in3part3legitimated3by3a3particular3conception3of3human3rights,3has3seen3the3creation3of3a3regime3for3supporting3rights3associated3with3particular3interests3rather3than3the3interests3of3all”3(2011:318).333The3privileging3of3civil3and3political3rights3over3ESC3rights3by3the3dominant3states,3i.e.3 Western,3 USHled3 liberal3 democracies,3 is3 symptomatic3 of3 an3 international3human3 rights3 regime3 that3 supports3 market3 discipline3 and3 the3 expansion3 of3corporate3rights3(see3Chapter35).3This3hierarchization3of3rights3has3provided3the3structure3 in3 which3 human3 rights3 law3 can3 be3 used3 to3 legitimately3 promote3 a3market3 perspective3 that3 offers3 moral3 and3 normative3 justifications3 within3 the3current3 global3 political3 economy3 (Evans,3 2011:3 52).3 Human3 rights3 law3 is3promoted3 as3 the3 solution3 to3 violations3 but3 it3 does3 not3 call3 into3 question3 the3systemic3causes3of3those3transgressions.3The3silence3of3human3rights3 law3on3the3causes3of3violations3is3part3of3the3normalisation3of3a3specific3discourse3of3human3rights.3 The3 next3 Section3 addresses3 the3 consequences3 of3 the3 normalisation3 of3human3rights3within3a3neoliberal3paradigm.3
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represent3 them3 as3 the3 only3 rational,3 universally3 valid3 ones”3 (Marx3 and3 Engels,31999:365H66).3Thus,3the3normalisation3of3the3discourse3of3human3rights3fulfils3its3role3in3the3legitimation3of3USHled3hegemony3by3constituting3a3body3of3norms3that3the3 dominant3 states3 have3 attempted3 to3 make3 commonsense.3 Legal3 discourse3normalises3the3status3quo3by3promoting3the3belief3that3the3momentary3disruption,3i.e.3 the3violation,3can3be3resolved3through3the3law;3by3so3doing,3 it3obfuscates3the3





3In3this3way,3the3international3human3rights3regime3masks3structural3inequalities3characteristic3of3market3discipline.723Critics3argue3that3the3subjugation3of3human3rights3 to3 market3 discipline3 poses3 a3 dilemma3 for3 guaranteeing3 human3 dignity3(Evans,32005b;3Falk,32000).3The3argument3 is3 that3although3 international3human3rights3 law3 may3 have3 the3 capacity3 to3 redress3 some3 consequences,3 it3 cannot3address3 the3 causes3 of3 violations3 (Evans,3 2005b:3 53;3 see3 also3 Chinkin,3 1998;3Tomaševski,3 1993).3 Evans3 argues3 that,3 “this3 suggests3 that3 we3 should3 exercise3caution3 if3we3are3 to3 avoid3 confusing3 the3 ‘sites’3 of3 violations3with3 the3 ‘causes’3 of3violations,3 a3 confusion3 that3 the3 dominant3 legal3 discourse3 of3 rights3 encourages”3(2005b:353).3In3sum,3Evans3contends3that3the3dominance3of3a3neoliberal3discourse3of3human3rights3law3acts3as3a3barrier3to3investigating3the3causes3of3human3rights3violations,3many3of3which3are3attributable3to3market3discipline.3The3next3Section3will3explore3the3limitations3of3the3international3human3rights3regime.3It3will3pay3particular3attention3 to3 the3CSR3movement3(Section33.1.)3and3the3Ruggie3Process3(Sections33.2.3and33.3.)33
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III.!The!Limits!of!Human!Rights!Law:!Neoliberal!Hegemony!and!CSR!






with3a3dynamic3international3system;3and,3v)3the3failure3to3confront3the3tensions3between3 universal3 and3 particular3 claims.3 This3 section3 will3 argue3 that3 the3contemporary3 CSR3 movement3 generally3 accepts3 the3 tenets3 of3 the3 neoliberal3agenda,3 which3 has3 crippled3 its3 capacity3 to3 challenge3 corporate3 power.3 3 It3 will3analyse3the3compatibility3and3consequences3of3the3Ruggie3Process3to3this3effect.33










than3regulated3by3 the3state.37733 Section33.2.3will3 return3 to3 the3 issue3of3 consensus3with3a3discussion3on3the3Ruggie3Process.333In3 his3 analysis3 of3 the3 impacts3 of3 neoliberalism3 in3 occupied3 Iraq,3 David3 Whyte3maintains,3“A3key3effect3of3neoliberal3hegemony3building3is3the3subjugation3of3the3norms3of3 international3 law3to3the3norms3and3values3of3 the3 ‘free’3market”3(2007:3191).783This3 statement3 resonates3 in3 the3 context3 of3 the3 CSR3 movement3 where3corporate3 strategies3 have3 used3 international3 debates3 on3 CSR3 to3 stay3 the3development3 of3 law3 3 (Shamir,3 2004a;3 see3 also3 Glasbeek,3 1987;3 Utting,3 2005).3Shamir3insists3that,333 Capitalism3 (…)3 has3 always3 relied3 on3 critiques3 of3 the3 status3 quo3 to3 alert3 it3 to3 any3untrammelled3development3of3its3current3forms3and3to3discover3the3antidotes3required3to3neutralize3 opposition3 to3 the3 system3 and3 increase3 the3 level3 of3 profitability3 within3 it3(Boltanski3and3Chiapello3in3Shamir32004a:3670)33The3success3of3 the3corporate3 ‘regulatory3capture’793of3CSR3 is3a3 strategy3 that3has3influenced3international3public3policy3debates3against3the3development3of3law3in3support3of3voluntary3mechanisms;3Section3IV3will3return3to3the3issue3of3‘capture’.3The3success3of3 this3corporate3strategy3at3 the3 international3 level3 is3 illustrative3of3international3 law’s3 subjection3 to3 the3 norms3 of3 the3 nationHstate.3 3 As3 such,3 some3authors3have3argued3that,3“we3must3shift3the3problem3of3changing3the3world3order3back3 from3 international3 institutions3 to3 national3 societies”3 (Cox,3 1993:3 64;3 for3 a3discussion3see3Khoury3and3Whyte,3forthcoming).33





Ireland3 and3 Pillay3 reinforce3 this3 perspective3 in3 their3 analysis3 of3 CSR3 in3 a3neoliberal3age.3They3convincingly3argue3that,33(…)3 while3 the3 contemporary3 CSR3 movement’s3 general3 acceptance3 of3 the3 tenets3 of3 the3neoliberal3orthodoxy3enhances3its3political3acceptability3both3to3states3and3corporations,3it3also3limits3what3it3is3likely3to3achieve3(Ireland3and3Pillay,32010:378).33The3 underlying3 notion3 embedded3 in3 the3 contemporary3 CSR3 movement3 that3corporations3are3capable3of3policing3themselves3has3gained3currency3with3policyHmakers.3Consequently,3rather3than3moving3towards3binding3regulations,3there3has3been3a3 rise3 in3 the3 institutional3endorsement3of3voluntarism3at3 the3 international3level.3Shamir3(2007)3argues3that3underlying3voluntarism3and3the3complementary3soft3law3approaches3to3corporate3responsibility3is3a3motivation3to3reconfigure3the3regulative3role3of3the3state.3He3contends3that3the3state3becomes3the3“facilitator3of3a3multiHstakeholder3 approach3 to3 regulation3 (…)3 involving3 civic3 and3 commercial3players3 alongside3 stateHbased3 organs3 and3 international3 bodies”3 (Shamir,3 2007:333).803333Shamir3 (2004a)3 calls3 attention3 to3 what3 he3 identifies3 as3 a3 “remedial3 gap”.3 He3highlights3the3fact3that3whilst3international3law3has3provided3the3framework3and3enabled3regulatory3structures3for3corporate3advantages3(e.g.3TRIPS3agreement3of3the3 WTO3 protecting3 intellectual3 property3 rights3 in3 all3 member3 states),3 it3 has3proven3 incapable3 of3 stipulating3 the3 human3 rights3 obligations3 of3 corporations3(Shamir,32004a:3672).3International3law3has3thus3failed3to3provide3the3necessary3regulatory3 mechanisms3 for3 corporate3 conduct3 in3 the3 field3 of3 human3 rights.3Examples3 include3 the3 International3 Labour3 Organisation’s3 (ILO)3 Tripartite(
Declaration( of( Principles( Concerning( Multinational( Enterprises( and( Social( Policy3(1977);813the3UN3Draft(Code(of(Conduct(on(Transnational(Corporations3 (1983);823






Enterprises3 (1976),3 and3 the3more3 recent3Guidelines(for(Multinational(Enterprises((2000);843as3well3as3the3European3Union’s3(EU)3Promoting(a(European(Framework(
for( Corporate( Social( Responsibility( –( European( Commission( Green( Paper3 (2001)3(see3 UN,3 2005).853All3 of3 these3 proposals,3 declarations3 and3 frameworks3 cite3 the3recognition3of3the3importance3of3social3and3environmental3sustainability,3but3they33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333The3principles3laid3down3in3this3universal3instrument3offer3guidelines3to3MNEs,3governments,3and3employers’3and3workers’3organizations3in3such3areas3as3employment,3training,3conditions3of3work3and3 life,3 and3 industrial3 relations.3 Its3 provisions3 are3 reinforced3 by3 certain3 international3 labour3Conventions3 and3 Recommendations,3 which3 the3 social3 partners3 are3 urged3 to3 bear3 in3 mind3 and3apply,3 to3 the3greatest3 extent3possible.3 (…)3Today,3 the3prominent3 role3of3MNEs3 in3 the3process3of3social3and3economic3globalization3renders3the3application3of3the3principles3of3the3MNE3Declaration3as3 timely3 and3 necessary3 as3 they3 were3 at3 the3 time3 of3 adoption.3 As3 efforts3 to3 attract3 and3 boost3foreign3 direct3 investment3 gather3 momentum3 within3 and3 across3 many3 parts3 of3 the3 world,3 the3parties3concerned3have3a3new3opportunity3to3use3the3principles3of3 the3Declaration3as3guidelines3for3enhancing3the3positive3social3and3labour3effects3of3the3operations3of3MNEs3(ILO,32012).3823Although3it3was3never3adopted,3the3purpose3of3the3Draft3Code3of3Conduct3was3to3provide3either3mandatory3 requirements3 or3 voluntary3 guidelines3 for3 transnational3 corporations.3 It3 sought3 to3encourage3 contribution3 to3 the3development3 goals3 and3objectives3of3 the3 countries3 in3which3 they3operated.3The3Code3also3attempted3to3facilitate3interHstate3coHoperation3on3issues3relating3to3TNCs3and3 to3 address3 difficulties3 derived3 from3 the3 international3 character3 of3 TNCs3 and3 the3 resulting3diversity3of3laws3and3cultures.3Even3in3this3early3document,3particular3attention3was3given3to3the3rights3 of3 corporations3 especially3 so3 that3 the3 eventual3 obligations3 would3 not3 undermine3 their3economic3capacities3(see3U.N.31983).3833The3UN3advertises3its3Global3Compact3as3“(…)3a3strategic3policy3initiative3for3businesses3that3are3committed3to3aligning3their3operations3and3strategies3with3ten3universally3accepted3principles3in3the3 areas3 of3 human3 rights,3 labour,3 environment3 and3 antiHcorruption”.3 It3 claims,3 “by3 doing3 so,3business,3 as3 a3 primary3 driver3 of3 globalization,3 can3 help3 ensure3 that3 markets,3 commerce,3technology3and3 finance3advance3 in3ways3 that3benefit3economies3and3societies3everywhere”3(UN,32011).3It3boasts3as3the3largest3voluntary3initiative3in3the3world.3
843The3 19763 Declaration3 is3 “a3 policy3 commitment3 by3 the3 governments3 of3 OECD3 countries3 on3International3 Investment3 and3 Multinational3 Enterprises3 to:3 improve3 the3 investment3 climate;3encourage3 the3positive3 contribution3multinational3 enterprises3 can3make3 to3 economic3 and3 social3progress;3 minimise3 and3 resolve3 difficulties3 which3 may3 arise3 from3 their3 operations”3 (OECD,32012a).3The320003Guidelines3“are3recommendations3addressed3by3governments3to3multinational3enterprises3 operating3 in3 or3 from3 adhering3 countries.3 They3 provide3 voluntary3 principles3 and3standards3for3responsible3business3conduct3in3areas3such3as3employment3and3industrial3relations,3human3 rights,3 environment,3 information3 disclosure,3 combating3 bribery,3 consumer3 interests,3science3and3technology,3competition,3and3taxation”3(OECD,32012b).3





also3 share3 something3 indicative3 of3 the3 correlation3 between3 CSR3 and3 neoliberal3hegemony.3The3contemporary3CSR3movement3is3a3nonScoercive3strategy3that3has3integrated3 nonHstate3 actors3 (e.g.3 commercial3 and3 civic3 entities)3 into3 shaping3policy.3Social3and3environmental3norm3making3was3heretofore3the3public3domain3of3 the3 state.3 As3 a3 result,3 Shamir3 (2011)3 argues,3 private3 nonHstate3 actors,3 and3specifically3 corporations,3 increasingly3perform3 tasks3 that3were3once3 considered3reserved3for3the3state,3e.g.3human3rights,3labour,3the3environment,3social3welfare,3etc.3333Most3 recently,3 the3 accommodation3 of3 capital3 has3 transpired3 with3 the3 definite3failure3of3the3UN3Norms3(2003),3discussed3in3the3Introduction3to3this3thesis.3The3UN3Norms3 were3 drafted3 by3 the3Working3 Group3 (WG)3 on3 the3Working3Methods3and3 Activities3 of3 Transnational3 Corporations3 commissioned3 by3 the3 UN3 SubHCommission3 on3Human3Rights3 to,3 “contribute3 to3 the3 drafting3 of3 relevant3 norms3concerning3 human3 rights3 and3 transnational3 corporations3 and3 other3 economic3units3 whose3 activities3 have3 an3 impact3 on3 human3 rights”3 3 (UN,3 2001).3 The3WG3drafted3 the3 UN3 Norms3 advocating3 direct3 and3 indirect3 responsibility3 on3 a3 nonS





neoliberalism3 within3 the3 UN3 and3 the3 global3 political3 system3 (see3 Khoury3 and3Whyte,3forthcoming).33
3.2.(The(Ruggie(Process:(Entrenching(Neoliberal(Human(Rights(3Ruggie3began3his3 first3mandate3(2005H2008)3 in3the3wake3of3 the3UN3Norms,3with3intense3 opposition3 from3 the3 business3 community3 and3 strong3 NGO3 support.3 His3aim3was3to3“build3meaningful3consensus3amongst3all3stakeholders”3(UN,3243March32011).3NGOs3requested3that3the3UN3elaborate3a3“universal3normative3framework3(…)3that3also3 identifies3the3direct3obligations3of3business3with3respect3to3human3rights3 (…)3 in3 all3 countries”3 (GermanWatch,3 2006:3 2),3 to3 “move3 beyond3 existing3frameworks”3 and3 consider3 the3 question3 “’what3 the3 law3 should3 be’3 (…)”3 and3“elaborate3 legal3 standards”3 (ibid:3 1).3 In3 response,3 the3 SRSG3 affirmed3 the3 status3quo3at3the3end3of3his3first3mandate.333In32008,3he3proposed3the3“Protect,(Respect,(Remedy”(Framework(for(Business(and(





the3 UN3 Norms3 and3 promoted3 instead3 a3 consensual3 framework3 that3 would3integrate3 the3 interests3and3outlooks3of3all3 stakeholders,3 including3Business.3The3opposition3 from3 the3 business3 community3 dissipated.3 The3 Ruggie3 Process3 was3amenable3 to3 business3 leaders3who3 voiced3 their3 support3 for3 the3UN’s3 approach.3The3HRC3 adopted3 the3Framework3 and3 extended3Ruggie’s3mandate3 (2008H2011)3charging3 him3 with3 the3 task3 of3 determining3 how3 best3 to3 operationalize3 the3
Framework.333In32011,3Ruggie3culminated3his3mandate3with3 the3Guiding(Principles(on(Business(
and(Human(Rights((Guiding3Principles),3which3 focused3on3 the3 implementation3of3the320083Framework.3The3Guiding(Principles3outline3what3steps3states3should3take3to3foster3business3respect3for3human3rights.3Its3aim3was3to3provide3a3blueprint3for3corporations3to3know3and3show3that3 they3respect3human3rights,3and3reduce3the3risk3of3causing3or3contributing3to3human3rights3harm.3In3other3words,3the3Guiding(
Principles3 constitute3 a3 set3 of3 benchmarks3 for3 stakeholders3 to3 assess3 business’3respect3for3human3rights.3Like3the3Framework,3the3Guiding(Principles(emphasised3a3 restatement3 of3 existing3 law3 rather3 than3 the3 creation3 of3 new3 law.3 The3 draft3






The3business3community3and3states,3on3the3other3hand,3applauded3the3success3of3Ruggie’s3mandate3and3the3triumph3of3establishing3consensus.3333Ruggie’s3 rejection3 of3 the3 UN3 Norms3 and3 advocacy3 for3 voluntary3 norms3 and3existing3law3for3corporate3accountability3has3reinforced3the3neoliberal3hegemony3of3 how3 law3 is3 deployed3 on3 a3 global3 scale.3 Ruggie3 redirected3 the3 emerging3international3consensus3on3corporate3accountability3implied3in3the3UN3Norms3to3a3corporate3 compromise3 on3 the3 limits3 of3 international3 law.3 The3 Ruggie3 Process’3emphasis3on3voluntary3agreements3and3CCCs3placed3the3corporate3accountability3debate3 outside3 of3 the3 immediate3 scope3 of3 human3 rights3 Courts.3 Ruggie3 did3 not3address3 the3 ‘remedial3 gap’3 in3 international3 law,3 but3 rather3 contributed3 to3anchoring3a3neoliberal3 approach3 to3 international3human3 rights3marked3by3 “soft3law”3and3private3selfHregulation.3In3this3way,3the3Ruggie3Process3has3contributed3to3 the3 elision3 of3 the3 economic3 sphere3with3 the3 social3 sphere,3 a3 key3 element3 of3neoliberalism3 (Lemke,3 2001).3 Furthermore,3 the3 outcome3 of3 the3 Ruggie3 Process3has3ultimately3 been3 the3 legitimation3of3 the3 global3 political3 role3 of3 corporations,3and3 the3 business3 community3 more3 generally,3 from3 within3 the3 UN.3 In3 short,3Ruggie’s3 mandate3 has3 skilfully3 accommodated3 the3 international3 corporate3responsibility3movement3to3the3hegemony3of3global3capital.33
3.3.(Accommodating(Capital:(The(Effects(of(the(Ruggie(Process(3Although,3 it3 is3 still3 too3 early3 to3 know3 what3 the3 exact3 impact3 of3 the3 Guiding(





Without3legal3obligations3empowering3authorities3to3investigate3allegations3of3corporate3wrongdoing,3issue3punishments3and/or3remedies,3and3independent3verification3to3ensure3that3corporations3amend3their3policies3and3practices3accordingly,3corporate3promises3are3easy,3noHcost3gestures3(2013:3182).33Thus,3 the3 facility3 with3 which3 Ruggie’s3 Framework3 was3 adopted3 and3 accepted,3particularly3 by3 the3 private3 sector,3 is3 not3 surprising3 given3 that3 his3recommendations3 sought3 to3 establish3 agreement3 between3 the3 international3community3of3states3and3the3business3community.33A3precarious3aftereffect3of3Ruggie’s3enthusiasm3for3consensus3building3is3that3his3mandate3 has3 consolidated3 a3 formal3 means3 for3 corporations3 to3 act3 politically3within3 the3 international3 human3 rights3 regime.3 Corporations3 and3 the3 business3community3have3been3welcomed3into3the3fold3of3the3UN3as3integral3‘stakeholders’,3formalising3and3legitimizing3a3capitalist3logic3of3human3rights.3The3contradictions3of3this3process3have3been3ignored,3and3by3inviting3corporations3to3participate3in3the3policyHmaking3of3 their3 human3 rights3 responsibilities3 there3 is3 a3 conflict3with3the3 objective3 of3 those3 policies.3Moreover,3 the3 prerogative3 of3 states3 to3 negotiate3binding3 regulations3 is3unduly3 thwarted3by3 the3 importance3placed3on3 consensus3with3 private3 market3 actors.3 Another3 weakness3 of3 Ruggie’s3 work3 is3 that3 the3





accountability.3 Ireland3 and3Pillay3 eloquently3 summarise3 this3 point,3 commenting3that3 “the3 ‘soft’3 law3 of3 CSR3 is3 no3 match3 for3 the3 ‘hard(er)’3 law3 protecting3shareholder3interest”3(2010:379).33Despite3this3seemingly3defeatist3overview,3it3 is3worth3remembering3that,3“whilst3there3 has3 been3 a3 growth3 in3 the3 structural3 power3 of3 capital,3 its3 contradictory3consequences3mean3 that3 neoliberalism3has3 failed3 to3 gain3more3 than3 temporary3dominance3 over3 our3 societies”3 (Gill,3 1995a:3 401H2).3 The3 contradictions3 in3neoliberalism3 create3 spaces3 for3 counterHhegemonic3 struggle.3 The3 next3 section3considers3the3impact3of3counterHhegemonic3challenges3to3the3neoliberal3discourse3of3human3rights.33





which3helps3 create3 the3moral3 climate3necessary3 to3underline3 the3 contradictions3within3 the3 neoliberal3 definition3 of3 human3 rights.893In3 what3 follows,3 the3 Section3will3raise3questions3about3whether3a3reimagined3concept3of3human3rights3can3be3counterHhegemonic.3It3will3suggest3that3a3reconceptualised3notion3of3human3rights3can3be3useful3in3abrading3“the3ideology3and3coercive3institutions3that3sustain3and3naturalise3 the3 hegemony3 of3 the3 dominant3 global3 social3 order”3 (Santos3 and3RodriguezHGaravito,32005:318).333
4.1.(Human(Rights:(the(Potential(for(an(Emancipatory(Discourse(3A3notable3paradox3of3human3rights3is3that3it3is3at3once3a3site3of3domination3and3a3site3 of3 empowerment3 (Evans,3 2005b).3 The3 idea3 of3 human3 rights3 retains3 an3important3relevance3in3both3local3and3global3struggles.3It3continues3to3be3invoked3in3the3struggles3of3social3movements3and3can3provide3a3focus3for3victims.3In3this3way,3 multiple3 and3 intersecting3 groups3 condemn3 the3 dominant3 discourse3 of3human3rights3 for3 its3hegemonic3 structure,3but3also3appeal3 to3 the3 idea3of3human3rights3 in3 counterHhegemonic3 struggles3 and3 strategies.3 Some3 scholars3 argue3 that3there3is3a3valuable3potential3for3human3rights3to3be3counterHhegemonic,3or3at3least3to3be3used3counterHhegemonically3(Rajagopal,32006:3781;3Santos,32002b,32007b).3Santos3asserts3that3human3rights3can3be3nonHhegemonic3if3it3is,333 (…)3radically3different3 from3the3hegemonic3 liberal3 [framework]3 (…)3 [and]3only3 if3 such3a3politics3[of3human3rights]3is3conceived3as3part3of3a3broader3constellation3of3struggles3and3discourses3of3 resistance3 and3emancipation3 rather3 than3as3 the3 sole3politics3of3 resistance3against3oppression3(2007b:33).333
















conservative3 agenda3 and3 indeed,3 how3 to3 do3 it3 so3 as3 to3 combat3 the3 latter3more3efficiently”3(2002b:3441).3What3Santos3(2002b)3proposes3is3to3reimagine3human3rights3 in3 ways3 that3 will3 complement3 a3 postHcapitalist3 world.3 The3 question3 that3concerns3us3in3this3thesis3is3whether3human3rights3can3be3reimagined3in3ways3that3can3challenge3corporate3power.33
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corporation.3Section3 II3will3address3 the3specific3developments3 in3 law3that3 led3 to3the3 “anthropomorphisation”3 of3 the3 corporation3 when3 it3 was3 granted3 a3 distinct3legal3personality.3Informed3primarily3by3the3works3of3Paddy3Ireland3(1996,31999,32010)3 and3 Harry3 Glasbeek3 (2002,3 2003b,3 2007),3 the3 section3 will3 argue3 that3corporations3 are3 legal3 sites3 of3 irresponsibility.3 Section3 III3 scrutinises3 the3development3of3 international3human3rights3with3regards3to3the3corporation3and3the3 impact3 that3 the3 doctrine3 of3 corporate3 personality3 has3 had3 on3 human3 rights3law.3 The3 Chapter3 concludes3 with3 some3 reflections3 on3 the3 role3 of3 law3 in3buttressing3capitalism3through3the3corporate3form.3
!
I.!Marxism!and!Law!3It3 would3 be3 impossible3 to3 construct3 a3 comprehensive3 Marxist3 theory3 of3 law3because3 there3 are3 too3many3 interpretations3 of3Marx’s3work.3 Consequently,3 this3section3 does3 not3 provide3 an3 expansive3 overview3 of3 Marx’s3 own3 writings3 or3Marxist3 writings3 on3 law.3 It3 will3 instead3 outline3 a3 few3 selected3 themes.3 The3objective3 is3 to3outline3a3workable3Marxist3 theory3of3 law3 in3order3 to3develop3the3analysis3of3the3evolution3of3the3modern3corporation3–3and3a(fortiori(capitalism3–3





3The3method3and3content3of3a3Marxist3theory3of3law,3as3Hunt3points3out,3seeks3to3explore3the3role3of3law3in3these3three3areas.3Thus,3a3Marxist3theory3of3law3informs3this3 thesis3 in3 its3 critical3 analysis3 of3 the3 relationship3 between3 human3 rights3 law3and3corporations.33Hunt3 describes3Marxism3 as3 “a3 rigorously3 sociological3 theory3 in3 that3 its3 general3focus3 of3 attention3 is3 on3 social3 relations”3 (2010:3 356).3 Law3 is3 a3 specific3 form3 of3social3 relation943and3 as3 such3 various3 versions3 of3 Marxist3 theory3 of3 law3 seek3 to3determine3 the3 role3 of3 law3 in3 the3 reproduction3 of3 structural3 inequalities3 that3characterise3 capitalist3 societies3 (Hunt,3 2010).3 Marxist3 theory3 of3 law3 has3 thus,3Hunt3 (ibid)3 explains,3 been3 used3 “oppositionally”3 to3 provide3 a3 critique3 of3 liberal3legal3thought.953This3Section3will3discuss3a3Marxist3theory3of3law3and3its3relevance3in3the3analysis3of3corporate3violations3of3human3rights3and3law.33
1.1.!Outline!of!a!Marxist!Theory!of!Law!3Marx’s3writings3on3law3deal3with3relations3of3production,3i.e.3economic3relations,3





and3 class3 relations. 96 3Relations3 of3 production3 are3 linked3 to3 the3 concept3 of3
historical(materialism97,3which3is3the3theory3that3“an3analysis3of3the3world3we3live3in3 must3 be3 grounded3 in3 the3 way3 in3 which3 human3 beings3 have3 organised3production3 and3 reproduction3 of3 their3material3 lives”3 (Overbeek,3 2000:3 178).3 In3other3 words,3 historical3 materialism3 is3 the3 theory3 that3 socioeconomic3developments3 are3 contingent3 on3 material3 conditions.3 Marx3 described3 the3relations3of3production3in3his3Preface(to3a(Contribution(to(the(Critique(of(Political(


























social3 orders.3A3Marxist3 theory3of3 law3 thus3 informs3 the3 following3discussion3on3the3 rise3 of3 the3 corporation3 in3 the3 19th3 and3 20th3 centuries3 and3 especially3 the3subsequent3anthropomorphisation3of3the3corporation3(see3also3Chapter35).333
II.!The!Corporation:!A!Vehicle!for!Capitalism!3This3section3will3show3that3the3modern3corporation3was3developed3as3a3means3for3capitalist3 accumulation.3 It3 will3 develop3 a3 brief3 genealogy3 of3 the3 modern3corporation3 in3 section3 2.1.,3 followed3 by3 an3 analysis3 of3 the3 development3 of3 the3legal3personality3in3section32.2.3The3concept3of3the3legal3personality3continues3to3shape3 the3 development3 of3 modern3 law3 and3 continues,3 “to3 profoundly3 affect3everyday3perceptions3of3the3nature3of3companies”3(Ireland,31996:369).3Section32.3.3will3 address3 the3 legal3 sanctioning3 of3 the3 architecture3 of3 impunity3 of3 the3corporation3in3an3examination3of3shareholder3primacy.3It3will3link3this3discussion3to3the3critique3of3human3rights3by3scrutinising3the3effects3of3shareholder3primacy3in3human3rights3law.333
2.1.! The! Origins! of! the! Modern! Corporation:! From! Societas! to!






lex( mercatoria.103(Early3 English3 mercantile3 Courts3 recognized3 the3 old3 societas,3which3 existed3 for3 the3 purpose3 of3 profit.3 The3 medieval3 mercantile3 societas3provided3 the3 possibility3 for3 a3 legally3 binding3 partnership3 between3 its3 business3collaborators,3 instituting3 individual3 partner3 liability3 for3 the3 partnership's3 debts3and3obligations3(Black,31984:337).1043Although3initially3each3merchant3traded3with3his3own3stock,3this3would3later3change3with3the3emergence3of3the3JSC,3discussed3below.333It3 can3 be3 argued3 that3 lex(mercatoria3 facilitated3 European3 trade3 by3 establishing3common3 standards,3 evidenced3 by3 prosperous3 commercial3 activity3 in3 Europe3throughout3the3Medieval3period.3At3the3same3time,3the3trade3guilds3were3granted3charters3 by3 the3 sovereign,3 although3 the3 guilds’3 operations3 were3 limited3 to3particular3 localities3within3 the3 state3 (Cawston3&3Keaton,31968:31;3Weber,31978:31023).3During3 times3of3uncertainty3and3regular3wars,3 the3Crown3benefited3 from3the3 services3 and3 money3 grants3 of3 the3 chartered3 guilds,3 giving3 them3 various3privileges,3 immunities,3and3monopolies3in3return3(Cawston3&3Keaton,3 ibid:32).1053With3the3arrival3of3Europeans3in3the3Americas3in3the315th3century3and3the3frenetic3propulsion3 towards3 colonisation,3 European3 sovereigns3 extended3 some3 charters3
33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333103 3For3 a3 critique3 and3 nuanced3 genealogy3 of3 lex( mercatoria3 see3 Hatzimihail3 (2008).3 For3 a3discussion3 on3 contemporary3 applications3 of3 lex(mercatoria3 see3 for3 example3 Dezalay3 and3 Garth3(1996),3Santos3(2002),3Teubner3(2002).31043It3 is3 generally3 speculated3 that3 the3 origins3 of3 the3modern3 corporation3 and3 the3 concept3 of3 the3legal3personality3date3back3to3the3Roman3societas(or3partnerships((Ireland,31999;3Von3Gierke3and3Maitland,3 1958;3 Williston,3 1888)3 and3 for3 some3 commentators3 more3 specifically3 the3 societas(
















!This3section3is3divided3into3two3parts3that3outline3and3explain3the3central3tenets3of3the3modern3corporation,3corporate3personality3and3limited3liability.3Section32.2.1.3focuses3on3the3doctrine3of3the3corporate3personality3and3its3development3through3the3 19th3 century.3 Section3 2.2.2.3 scrutinises3 limited3 liability3 and3 relates3 it3 to3 the3legal3fiction3of3corporate3personhood.3By3so3doing,3this3section3serves3to3link3the3discussion3to3the3Chapter’s3overarching3analysis3of3the3granting3of3human3rights3to3corporations.333
2.2.1.!Legal!Personality:!The!Anthropomorphisation!of!the!Corporation!
in!the!19th!Century!3This3section3provides3a3brief3history3and3analysis3of3how319th3century3Courts3and3legislatures3propelled3 the3corporation3 from3 financial3 institution3 to3 legal3person.33The3 doctrine3 of3 the3 corporate3 personality3 refers3 to3 the3 separation3 of3 the3corporation3from3its3members.3However,3it3is3more3than3a3simple3separation,3it3is3the3development3of3the3nonHstate3entity3into3a3legal(person;3or3in3other3words,3the3anthropomorphisation3 of3 the3 corporation.3 Legal3 personhood3 gave3 rise3 to3 the3creation3 of3 a3 new3 body3 of3 law3 that3would3 be3more3 aptly3 suited3 to3 support3 the3function3of3the3modern3corporation3in3society.333By3the3end3of3the319th3century,3legal3academics3such3as3Samuel3Williston3observed3that3 “regarding3 the3 conception3 of3 the3 business3 corporation,3 the3 law3 has3 been3formed3 very3 largely3 since3 1800”3 (1888a:3 113).3 Thus,3 Williston3 asserted,3 “old3doctrines3 that3 earlier3 applied3 to3 all3 corporations,3 though3 in3 reality3 were3 only3suited3to3the3kinds3of3corporations3then3existing,3had3to3be3discarded3or3adapted3to3 the3 changing3 conditions3 of3 the3 new3 legal3 capacity3 of3 the3 corporation”3 (ibid).3Paddy3 Ireland3 (1984;3 see3 also31996,3 2010;3 Ireland3et(al.,3 1987;3 Picciotto,3 2011:3108H121)3 has3 detailed3 the3 19th3 century3 evolution3 of3 the3 JSC3 from3 a3 purely3















century3and3even3 in3some3 international3 law3(see3Chapter35).311433 In3 the3USA,3 the3courts3 radically3 enforced3 the3 notion3 of3 corporate3 personhood3 by3 granting3corporations3 protection3 under3 the3 equal3 protection3 clause3 of3 the3 Fourteenth3Amendment3 of3 the3 Constitution.1153In3 the3 landmark3 case3 Santa( Clara( County( v(
Southern(Pacific(Railroad(Company3(1886)3the3Supreme3Court3was3asked3to3judge3whether3 the3 due3 process3 clause3 barred3 the3 State3 of3 California3 from3 taxing3 the3property3 of3 a3 railroad3 corporation3differently3 from3 that3 of3 individuals.1163In3 the3
obiter( dictum3 of3 the3 Santa( Clara( County3 judgement,3 the3 Court3 asserted3 the3property3rights3of3the3corporation3as3its3own3legal3entity,3its3own3person.11733333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333331143Ireland3et(al.((1987)3 convincingly3 argue3 that3what3 the3 legal3 developments3over3 the3past3 two3hundred3 years3 indicate3 is3 a3major3 change3 in3 the3 nature3 of3 property,3which3 evolved3 from3being3necessarily3 tied3 to3 physical3 assets3 to3 the3 legal3 recognition3 of3 shares:3 abstract,3 intangible,3autonomous3 forms3of3 property.3 They3 go3 on3 to3 analyse3 this3 new3 form3of3 property3 in3 relation3 to3Marx’s3analysis3of3fictitious3capital3(Ireland3et(al.,31987).3They3explain3that3in3the3UK3in3the3early319th3 century3 shares3 were3 intimately3 linked3 to3 the3 owners3 of3 the3 shares,3 who3 were3 in3 turn3identified3with3 the3 company.3 However,3 by3 the3midH19th3 century3 the3 legal3 nature3 of3 shares3was3being3 reconceptualised3 (Ireland3 et( al.,3 1987).3 In3Bligh( v( Brent3 (1837),3 the3 Court3 had3 to3 decide3whether3the3waterworks3company’s3shares3were3realty3or3not.3The3Court3rejected3the3argument3that3 the3 company’s3 shares3 as3 property3 depended3 on3 the3 nature3 of3 the3 company’s3 assets,3 and3focussed3 instead3 on3 the3 nature3 of3 the3 interest3 of3 each3 shareholder3 (Ireland( et( al.,3 1987:3 152).3Ireland3 et( al.( (1987)3 explain3 that3 the3 Court3 decided3 that3 the3 interest3 of3 shareholders3 in3incorporated3 joint3 stock3 companies3was3 in3 the3profits3of3 the3 companies3 and3not3 in3 their3 assets,3and3thus3shares3were3judged3as3personalty,3irrespective3of3the3nature3of3the3company’s3property.3Ireland3et(al.3(1987:3152H153)3note3that3for3some3years3after3Bligh(v(Brent(uncertainties3remained3regarding3 the3 nature3 of3 shares3 of3 unincorporated3 companies3 and3 in3 companies3 closely3 related3with3 land.3They3explain3that3 these3uncertainties3dissipated3 in3 the3case3Watson(v(Spratley((1854)3regarding3 the3 natures3 of3 the3 shares3 of3 an3 unincorporated3mining3 company3 in3which3 the3 Court3declared3 that3 shares3 were3 interests3 only3 in3 the3 profits3 of3 the3 company3 and3 thus3 shareholders3thereafter3 had,3 by3 law,3 no3 interest3 in3 the3 physical3 assets3 of3 the3 company.3 Thus,3 as3 of3 the3midH1850s,3in3the3UK,3shares3were3legally3an3entirely3separate3form3of3property.31153The3relevant3text3of3the3Fourteenth3Amendment3of3the3USA3Constitution3reads:33Section3 1.3 All3 persons3 born3 or3 naturalized3 in3 the3 United3 States,3 and3 subject3 to3 the3 jurisdiction3thereof,3are3citizens3of3the3United3States3and3of3the3State3wherein3they3reside.3No3State3shall3make3or3 enforce3 any3 law3 which3 shall3 abridge3 the3 privileges3 or3 immunities3 of3 citizens3 of3 the3 United3States;3nor3shall3any3State3deprive3any3person3of3life,3liberty,3or3property,3without3due3process3of3law;3nor3deny3to3any3person3within3its3jurisdiction3the3equal3protection3of3the3laws.31163Schwelb3 (1964:3 ftnt3 8)3 comments3 on3 the3 meaning3 of3 the3 word3 “person”3 in3 the3 Fifth3 and3Fourteenth3Amendments3of3the3USA3Constitution.3He3observes3that3the3unanimous3ruling3by3the3Supreme3Court3in3the3Santa(Clara(County(case,33(…)3remained3uncontested3until319383when3Justice3Black3challenged3it3in3a3dissenting3opinion3in3





3Legal3 personality,3 as3 a3 separation3 of3 the3 owners3 from3 the3 corporation3 was3entrenched3in3law3at3the3end3of3the319th3century3in3the3Salomon3and3Santa(Clara(cases.3However,3 it3would3be3 incorrect3 to3attribute3 the3rise3of3 the3corporation3 to3this3 legal3 contrivance.3 The3 modern3 corporate3 form3 emerged3 at3 a3 specific3historical3moment,3i.e.3the319th3century’s3Industrial3Revolution,3when3the3growing3accumulation3 of3 capital3 required3 a3 structure3 that3 could3 act3 as3 a3 vessel3 for3 that3accumulation3and3a3motor3for3 its3expansion.3As3a3result,3 the3 legal3recognition3of3the3 alreadyHexisting3 reality3 of3 collective3 capital3 in3 the3 19th3 century3 was3 the3progression3of3 capitalism3as3a3 system3of3private3property.3The3 corporation3was3thus3a3reflection3of3the3socialisation3of3productive3forces3within3a3capitalist3mode3of3 production,3 i.e.3 socialised3 capital.3 It3 represented3 the3 transformation3 of3 preHcapitalist3 individual3 private3 property3 into3 fullHfledged3 aggregate3 capital3 in3 the3form3of3shares.3In3this3way,3the3JSC3was3a3way3for3capital,3as3a3social3relation,3to3expand3 under3 changing3 conditions3 of3 accumulation.3 The3 aggregate3 capital3 of3shares3 represented3 disparate3 shareholders,3 no3 one3 of3 which3 had3 the3 exclusive3right3 to3 manage.3 The3 separation3 of3 managers3 from3 shareholders3 was3 thus3 the3response3to3allow3for3the3expansion3of3this3new,3organised,3collective3capital.33
!
2.2.2.!Corporate!Personhood!and!Limited!Liability!3The3exact3dates3of3the3emergence3of3the3LLC3are3obscure,3although3it3is3relatively3certain3 that3 by3 the3 end3 of3 the3 18th3 century3 direct3 shareholder3 liability3 was3 no3longer3 applied3 (Blumberg,3 1986:3 579H580).3 Nonetheless,3 it3 is3 conventionally3accepted3that3the3modern3concept3of3limited3liability3–3that3protects3the3investor3from3 the3 liabilities3 of3 the3 corporation3 in3 excess3 of3 the3 amount3 s/he3 invests3 –3emerged3in3the3UK3in3the3midH19th3with3the3Limited3Liability3Act3(1855)3followed3by3 a3 second3 Joint3 Stock3 Companies3 Act3 (1856)3 (Ireland,3 1984).1183The3 scope3 of3
333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333331183Ireland3 (1984)3 explains3 that3 in3 the3 19th3 century3 a3 first3 legislation3 was3 passed3 in3 the3 UK3concerning3economic(JSCs(entitled3Joint3Stock3Companies3Act3(1844).3He3comments3that,3Their3 size3 and3 impersonality,3 and3 the3 free3 transferability3 of3 their3 shares3 enabled3 them3 to3 be3fraudulently3 exploited3 and3 created3 considerable3 legal3 problems3 for3 those3 that3 were3




















infractions3 committed3 by3 the3 corporation3 in3 its3 quest3 for3 profits3 on3 behalf3 of3shareholders3cannot3be3attributed3 to3 the3shareholders3since3 they3are3neither3 in3control3of3the3dayHtoHday3decisions3of3the3corporation3nor3its3managers.33In3other3words,3 the3 corporate3 veil3 has3 provided3 a3 legal3 defence3 for3 the3 negligence3 of3shareholders3(Glasbeek,32003b;3Sjoberg,32009).3333Corporate3personhood3and3limited3liability3are3thus3the3fundamental3components3of3the3corporation3as3an3institutional3form3of3capital.3The3role3of3law3has3been3to3endorse3and3advance3the3corporation3as3the3vehicle3for3accumulated3capital3and3private3 property.3 The3 significance3 of3 the3 law’s3 role3 in3 corporate3 capital3 is3therefore3 not3 in3 creating3 the3 corporation3 as3 such3 since,3 as3 it3 has3 already3 been3argued,3the3corporation3was3the3reflection3of3the3transition3to3capitalist3forms3of3private3 property.3 Rather,3 the3 law’s3 role3 has3 been3 to3 formally3 legitimise3 a3particular3 form3of3economic3relation3 through3the3corporation,3 thus3bringing3 the3corporation3into3the3scope3of3commonsense.3In3other3words,3the3legal3recognition3of3 corporate3 personhood3 and3 limited3 liability3 has3 resulted3 in3 the3 social3legitimation3of3the3power3of3private3property.33This3section3has3argued3that3corporate3personhood3was3 the3 legal3 recognition3of3the3 capitalist3 development3 of3 collective3 capital3 in3 the3 19th3 century.3 This3development3was3expanded3upon3in3the320th3century3with3the3rise3of3TNCs.3It3has3shown3that3the3central3tenets3of3the3corporation,3i.e.3legal3personality3and3limited3liability,3 produced3 a3 site3 of3 irresponsibility3 that3 insulates3 shareholders3 from3liability.3However,3the3corporation’s3structural3potential3for3harm3came3to3a3head3in3 the3 Second3 World3 War,3 when3 corporations3 actively3 participated3 in3 crimes3against3humanity.1243Public3outcry3 required3 that3 the3actions3of3 the3 corporations3that3 participated3 in3 the3 Nazi3 regime3 be3 addressed;3 and,3 although3 shareholders3remain3 untouchable,3 Section3 III3 will3 outline3 the3 developments3 in3 international3






III.!Legal!Subjectivity!and!International!Law!3The3role3of3corporations3 in3the3Second3World3War,3and3more3specifically3within3the3Nazi3regime,1253sparked3debates3in3the3aftermath3of3the3War3on3what,3 if3any,3law3 would3 or3 could3 respond3 to3 the3 corporate3 crimes3 against3 humanity.3 These3debates3 raised3 questions3 regarding3 the3 definition3 of3 a3 legal3 subject3 under3international,3 a3 status3 traditionally3 reserved3 for3 states3 (Acquaviva,3 2005;3 Deva,32003;3Menon,31992).3The3most3significant3legal3discussion3in3the3postHwar3years3regarding3 the3 role3 of3 German3 corporations3 during3 the3war3 and3 the3 subsequent3debate3 on3 corporate3 legal3 subjectivity3 took3 place3 at3 the3 Nuremberg3 and3 Tokyo3International3Military3Tribunals3(N&TIMT)3(Bratton,32001).1263The3N&TIMT3was3perhaps3 the3 first3 international3 forum3 to3 discuss3 corporate3 responsibility.3 The3outcome3of3the3N&TIMT,3within3the3context3of3the3discussion3here,3was3that3the3structure3 of3 international3 public3 law3 obscured3 the3 possibility3 of3 prosecuting3corporations3directly,3because3it3was3decided3that3corporations3were3not3subjects(of3 international3 law. 127 3Nonetheless,3 the3 N&TIMT3 established3 individual3responsibility3 for3crimes3against3humanity3 including3 for3state3executive3officials3and3corporate3directors3and3managers.33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333331253The3focus3of3this3discussion3is3on3the3debate3that3ensued3postH19453with3relation3to3the3role3of3corporations3 in3 Nazi3 Germany.3 However,3 it3 is3 worth3 noting3 that3 decades3 later,3 new3 debates3regarding3American3 industrial3 and3 financial3 links3 to3 the3 rise3 of3 the3Third3Reich,3 e.g.3 JP3Morgan,3Ford3 and3 GM3 have3 emerged3 (Dobbs,3 1998;3 for3 details3 see3 for3 example3 Higham,3 2007;3 Sutton,32010).3331263During3 the3Nuremberg3Military3Tribunal,3 the3accountability3of3 the3directors3of3 a3 corporation3was3 invoked3 for3 their3 individual3 involvement3 not3 as3 representatives3 of3 the3 corporations.3 The3Tribunal3 related3 corporate3 accountability3 to3 individual3 responsibility,3 which3 according3 to3 the3respondents3 who3 raised3 this3 point3 defined3 the3 appropriate3 forum3 for3 corporate3 violations3 as3being3a3criminal3or3civil/torts3Court.3A3human3rights3Court,3 according3 to3 these3respondents3 is3a3





The3debates3over3the3trials3of3the3German3corporations3leading3up3to3the3N&TIMT3raised3important3questions3about3the3changing3context3of3international3relations.3Until3 1945,3 international3 law3 implemented3 WestphalianHinspired3 notions3 of3power3 and3 influence,3 considering3 only3 states3 and3 the3 Holy3 See3 as3 ‘subjects3 of3international3 law’.1283However,3postH1945,3questions3about3 the3 role3of3nonHstate3actors3during3war3and3their3status3under3international3law3became3unavoidable.3In3the3Reparations(for(Injuries(Case3(1949),3the3International3Court3of3Justice3(ICJ)3widened3the3scope3of3the3definition3of3an3international3legal3subject3by3defining3a3subject3of3 law3as3an3entity3capable3of3possessing3international3rights3and3duties,3and3having3the3capacity3to3maintain3 its3rights3by3bringing3forth3 its3 international3claims3(see3Brownlie,31999:357;3Clapham,32006:364).333The3ICJ’s3purpose3was3to3recognise3the3legal3subjectivity3of3the3UN3–3a3nonHstate3actor3 –3but3 the3outcome3has3had3 significant3 influence3on3debates3 regarding3 the3international3 legal3 status3 of3 other3 nonHstate3 actors,3 including3 corporations.3However,3 it3would3 appear3 that3 the3 ICJ3was3 aware3 of3 the3 potential3 effects3 of3 its3decision3and3sought3to3minimise3the3extension3of3subjectivity3to3other3nonHstate3actors.3 Andrew3 Clapham3 points3 out3 that3 whilst3 the3 ICJ3 acknowledged3 the3 legal3subjectivity3of3some3nonHstate3actors,3such3as3the3UN,3it3was3careful3to3emphasise3that3the3possession3of3international3personality3did3not3imply3the3same3rights3and3duties3as3 those3of3states3(2006:368).1293Consequently,3while3 the3 ICJ3accepted3 the3subjectivity3of3 the3UN,3 it3 is3yet3 to3recognise3corporations3directly3(Malanczuk3 in3Clapham,32006:378).1303333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333331283Philip3 C.3 Jessup3 emphasises3 the3 restrictedness3 of3 legal3 subjectivity3 as3 the3 basic3 rule3 of3international3 law3 (1947:3 343).3 This3 traditional3 restrictedness3 is3 not3 limited3 to3 the3 fact3 that3international3 legal3 subjects3have3 rights3 and3duties3but3 rather3 that3 they3have3 the3 competence3 to3create3 law3 (Portmann,3 2010:3 8).3 The3 association3 of3 legal3 subjectivity3 and3 law3making3 is3 made3because3of3the3lack3of3a3centralised3legislator3at3the3international3level3(ibid;3see3Brownlie,31999).3In3the3same3vein,3although3acknowledging3the3 limited3attribution3of3subjectivity3 in3 international3law,3 Emeka3Duruigbo3 (2008)3 draws3 attention3 to3 the3 fact3 that3 it3 does3 not3 exclude3 the3 reality3 of3interactions3 on3 the3 international3 stage.3 See3 Duruigbo3 (2008)3 for3 a3 discussion3 of3 the3 legal3subjectivity3of3corporations.331293For3 the3 classification3 of3 international3 organisations3 as3 subjects3 of3 international3 law3 see3





3Some3legal3scholars3have3criticised3international3law’s3“conceptual3helplessness”3(Klabbers,32003)3and3argue3 that3 the3system3of3 international3 law3 is3 riddled3with3ambivalence3and3is3incapable3of3dealing3with3entities3other3than3states.3Klabbers3(2003)3 contends3 that3 the3 system3of3 international3 law3 is3quite3 simply3outHdated,3which3he3suggests3is3evidenced3by3its3failure3to3incorporate3nonHstate3entities3into3its3 framework.1313Still3other3authors,3such3as3Forsythe3(2000)3and3Jägers3(1999)3attempt3 to3 negotiate3 the3 doctrine3 of3 legal3 subjectivity,3 suggesting3 that3 although3TNCs3 are3 not3 formally3 subjects3 of3 international3 law3 they3 can3 have3 derivative3subjectivity3 through3 the3 intermediary3 of3 the3 state.3 They3 propose3 that3international3 legal3subjectivity3has3in3fact3expanded3to3include3corporations3and3individuals3in3some3cases.3Nonetheless,3these3legal3debates3do3not3change3the3fact3that3 although3whilst3 it3may3be3 true3 that3 “human3 rights3 theory3 rejects3 efforts3 to3limit3dutyHholders3 to3states3or3 to3 those3carrying3out3state3policy”3 (Ratner32001:3461,3emphasis3added;3see3also3Weissbrodt,32005:360),3human3rights3law(remains3intransigent3on3the3matter;3the3only3international3legal3subjects3are3states.1323
3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333necessary3 to3address3corporations3directly,3and3congruently3with3states,3 in3order3 to3achieve3 the3treaties’3 objectives.3 Kamminga3 (2004:4)3 deduces3 that,3 “there3 are3 no3 reasons3 of3 principle3 why3companies3cannot3have3direct3obligations3under3 international3 law”.3Ultimately,3he3suggests,3 it3 is3not3whether3 it3 is3possible3 for3companies3 to3have3direct3obligations3under3 international3 law,3but3rather3whether3 or3 not3 it3 is3 appropriate3 in3 specific3 instances.3 Thus,3 it3 is3 a3matter3 of3 choice3 and3interpretation3 of3 the3 circumstances.3 Examples3 of3 direct3 responsibility3 include3 International(
Convention(on(Civil(Liability(for(Oil(Pollution(Damage3 (1969),3which3provides3that3 the3owner3of3a3ship3 (natural3 or3 legal3 person)3may3 be3 directly3 liable3 for3 environmental3 damage3 caused3 by3 the3ship’s3operations.3The3UN3Convention(on(the(Law(of(the(Sea3 (1982)3prohibits3not3only3States3but3also3natural3and3juridical3persons3from3appropriating3parts3of3the3seabed3or3its3minerals.3The3case3
Doe(v(Unocal3 (1997),3 filed3under3the3United3States’3Alien(Torts(Claims(Act3 (ATCA)3(1789).3 In3this3case,3Muchlinksi3 (2001)3 clarifies3 it3 was3 held3 for3 the3 first3 time3 that3 TNCs3 could,3 in3 principle3 be3directly3 liable3 for3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3 under3 the3 ATCA.3 Other3 cases3 filed3 under3 ATCA3against3 corporate3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3 include3 the3 violence3 against3 the3 Ogoni3 people3 in3Nigeria.3These3cases3are3Wiwa(v(Royal(Dutch(Petroleum3(2000)3against3the3Royal3Dutch3Petroleum3Company3 and3 Shell3 Transport3 and3 Trading3 Company3 (Royal3 Dutch/Shell);3 Wiwa( v( Anderson3(2001),3 the3 head3 of3 its3 Nigerian3 operation,3 Brian3 Anderson;3 and,3 Wiwa( v( Shell( Petroleum(





3Nonetheless,3 discussions3 of3 legal3 subjectivity3 retain3 their3 relevance3 for3 human3rights3 law3 in3 light3 of3 the3 internationalisation3 of3 organisations,3 transnational3agreements,3and3globalisation.3Despite3the3changes3in3international3context3since31945,3 states3 have3 remained3 the3 only3 indictable3 subjects3 before3 international3human3 rights3 Courts.1333Clapham3 (2006)3 suggests3 that3 international3 law3 ought3extend3legal3subjectivity3to3some3actors3already3performing3paraHstatal3activities.3He3qualifies3this3extension3as,333(…)3 attributing3 legal3 subjectivity3 to3 de3 facto3 regimes,3 insurgents3 recognised3 as3belligerents,3 national3 liberation3 movements3 representing3 peoples3 struggling3 for3 selfHdetermination,3 even3 the3 Order3 of3 Malta,3 as3 well3 as3 interHstate3 organisations,3 e.g.3 the3United3 Nations”3 (Clapham,3 2006:3 59;3 also3 Jägers3 20063 for3 an3 analogous3 discussion3 on3NGOs).333The3 paraHstatal3 activities3 of3 corporations3 (e.g.3 the3 privatisation3 of3 functions3previously3performed3by3the3State)1343are3evidence3of3their3 impact3within3states3and3 in3 the3 global3 context.3 Corporations3 can3 be3 applicants3 at3 international33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333Though3corporations3are3capable3of3 interfering3with3 the3enjoyment3of3a3broad3range3of3human3rights,3international3law3has3failed3both3to3articulate3the3human3rights3obligations3of3corporations3and3to3provide3mechanisms3for3regulating3corporate3conduct3in3the3field3of3 human3 rights.3 Since3 the3 nineteenth3 century,3 international3 law3 has3 addressed3 almost3exclusively3the3conduct3of3States.3Traditionally,3States3were3viewed3as3the3only3“subjects”3of3international3law,3the3only3entities3capable3of3bearing3legal3rights3and3duties.3Over3the3last3fifty3years,3though,3the3gradual3establishment3of3an3elaborate3regime3of3international3human3rights3 law3and3 international3 criminal3 law3has3begun3 to3 redefine3 the3 individual’s3role3 under3 international3 law.3 It3 is3 now3 generally3 accepted3 that3 individuals3 have3 rights3under3 international3human3rights3 law3and3obligations3under3 international3criminal3 law.3This3redefinition,3however,3has3occurred3only3partially3with3respect3to3legal3persons3such3as3corporations:3international3law3views3corporations3as3possessing3certain3human3rights,3but3 it( generally( does( not( recognize( corporations( as( bearers( of( legal( obligations3 under3international3criminal3law3(2001:32030H31,3emphasis3added).3The3 article3 goes3 on3 to3 state3 that3 “international3 law3 is3 virtually3 silent3with3 respect3 to3 corporate3liability3for3violations3of3human3rights”3and3“has3neither3articulated3the3human3rights3obligations3of3 corporations3 nor3 provided3 mechanisms3 to3 enforce3 such3 obligations”3 (quoted3 in3 Duruigbo,32008:3223).331333The3 ICJ3 launched3 the3 concept3 of3 erga( omnes3 obligations3 in3 the3 landmark3 case3 Barcelona(










“Legality3and3legitimacy3are,3more3than3ever,3privileged3instruments3to3be3used3by3counterHhegemonic3 forces3 in3 their3 struggles3 for3 a3 more3 decent3 and3 balanced3international3community”3(2005:3279).3This3argument3supports3a3nonHessentialist3belief3 in3the3emancipatory3potential3of3 law3if3 it3 is3 included3in3a3broader3political3mobilisation3 strong3 enough3 to3 allow3 struggles3 to3 be3 politicised3 before3 they3 are3legalised3(ibid:3268;3see3also3Santos32002b;3Santos3and3RodriguezHGaravito,32005).333An3important3critique3of3the3debates3of3the3Rome(Statute3for3the3purposes3here3is3that3 there3was3no3consideration3of3 the3structure3of3 the3corporation.3This3can3be3explained3 by3 the3 logic3 of3 capitalist3 social3 orders3 wherein3 the3 role3 of3 law3 is3 to3ensure3 the3 private3 accumulation3 of3 capital.3 Therefore,3 capitalist3 law3 cannot3fundamentally3weaken3 the3 corporation,3 as3 a3 vehicle3 for3 capitalist3 accumulation3and3the3institutionalisation3of3aggregate3capital.3Thus,3it3is3unlikely3that3any3legal3reform3 of3 capitalist3 neoliberal3 law3 will3 or3 can3 control3 the3 corporation3 in3 any3significant3way.3 Any3 real3 change3will3 require3 imagining3 a3 different3 relationship3with3property.3Fundamentally,3the3draft3Article3did3not3actually3seek3to3challenge3corporations3through3international3law.33
Conclusion!3This3Chapter3has3used3a3Marxist3theory3of3law3to3explore3how3a3particular3form3of3corporate3 personality3 is3 constructed3 hegemonically3 through3 law.3 The3 legal3creativity3of3the318th3and319th3centuries3gave3rise3to3the3architecture3of3domestic3legal3 systems3 that3 gave3 corporations3 –3 and3 their3 shareholders3 –3 immense3protections.3 These3 protections3 also3 provided3 for3 their3 equally3 extensive3





















Introduction!3The3ECtHR3and3the3IACtHR3draw3upon3multiple3sources3of3law,3including3various3state3laws3(e.g.3civil3and3common3law3systems;3different3types3of3law3such3as3tax,3criminal,3 etc.)3 and3 various3 international3 laws3 (e.g.3 treaties,3 conventions,3declarations,3 etc.)3 when3 formulating3 their3 judicial3 decisions.3 The3 Courts3 also3consult3 norms3 created3by3nonHstate3 entities.3An3 example3of3 the3Courts3drawing3upon3 these3 norms3 includes3 customary3 Indigenous3 law3 in3 the3 case3 Comunidad(





Indigenous3rights;3whilst3challenges3confronting3the3ECtHR3have3included,3but3of3course3are3in3not3limited3to,3the3abolition3of3the3death3penalty,3the3length3of3preHtrial3detention,3prison3conditions,3and3the3protection3of3private3property.3In3other3words3 historically,3 the3 European3 system3 has3 regulated3 “democratic”3 countries,3whilst3the3InterHAmerican3system3has3had3to3contend3with3military3dictatorships3throughout3the3region3(Harris,31998:32).33The3procedural3differences3of3 the3Courts3are3 in3 large3part3due3 to3 their3makeup.3The3composition3of3the3IACtHR3is3such3that3it3has3only3a3fraction3of3the3number3of3judges3as3its3European3counterpart3(seven3commissioners3and3seven3judges3in3the3former3 compared3 to3 fortyHseven3 judges3 in3 the3 latter).1403Whereas3 in3 the3 IACtHR3and3 the3 IACommHR,3 the3 judges3 and3 commissioners3 are3meant3 to3 represent3 the3OAS,3in3the3ECtHR3each3judge3represents3his/her3member3state3but3is3assumed3to3retain3 judicial3 independence. 141 33 Other3 differences3 include3 the3 list3 of3 nonHderogable3rights3for3each3human3rights3system.3In3the3IACtHR3and3the3IACommHR,3these3nonHderogable3rights3were3the3outgrowth3of3attempted3responses3to3states3of3emergency3called3under3military3regimes,3which3suspended3Convention3rights.3At3 the3 ECtHR,3 the3 suspension3 of3 nonHderogable3 rights3 has3 been3 qualified,3 and3despite3a3 ‘margin3of3appreciation’1423–3what3is3essentially3the3arbitrary3decisionHmaking3 of3 states3 in3 international3 law3 –3 any3 derogation3 is3 subject3 to3 European3supervision3 (see3 Ireland( v( UK,3 19783 §78H9).3 The3 margin3 of3 appreciation3 is3 an3indication3 of3 the3 recognition3 of3 the3 legal3 cultural3 differences3 between3member3states3since3 it3allows3the3Court3to3give3a3ruling3but3provides3wiggleHroom3to3the3state3in3its3discretion3in3how3to3fulfil3its3obligations.33





Section3 I3of3 this3 chapter3highlights3 the3relevant3similarities3and3differences3 that3may3 affect3 how3 these3 Courts3 consider3 corporate3 responsibility3 for3 violations3 of3human3 rights.3 Section3 II3will3 examine3 the3 InterHAmerican3human3 rights3 system,3followed3by3the3examination3of3the3European3human3rights3system3in3Section3III.3Section3 IV3 will3 briefly3 highlight3 the3 major3 differences3 between3 the3 Courts3approaches3to3ESC3rights.3The3purpose3of3juxtaposing3the3two3regional3Courts3is3to3 consider3 how3 similar3 legal3 principles3 work3 differently3 in3 diverse3 contexts.33Given3the3very3different3historical,3 social,3political3and3economic3contexts3of3 the3IACtHR3and3the3ECtHR3this3thesis3does3not3seek3to3construct3a3strict3comparison.3However,3 the3circumstantial3differences3between3the3Courts3makes3 it3 important3to3 bear3 in3 mind3 that3 law3 is3 constantly3 constructed3 by3 the3 struggle3 between3various3 normHgenerating3 communities3 –3 both3 by3 government3 and3 nonHgovernment3 sources3 (see3 Santos3 and3 RodriguezHGaravito,3 20053 on3 legal3pluralism;3 see3 also3Chapter31)143.3By3acknowledging3 the3differences,3 it3 becomes3possible3to3think3about3the3legal3contradictions3at3each3Court,3and3what3these3may3reveal3 in3 terms3 of3 possibilities3 to3 apply3 human3 rights3 law3 in3 the3 debate3 on3corporate3accountability.3In3other3words,3it3is3valuable3to3do3this3because3it3opens3up3possibilities3 to3 think3about3 the3potential3 for3 legal3 concepts3and3principles3 to3take3different3or3alternative3paths3of3development.33










The3 deliberate3 integration3 of3 human3 rights3 into3 the3 projects3 of3 the3 regional3organisations3 is3 indicative3 of3 the3 construction3 of3 a3 hegemonic3 law3 relying3 on3societyHwide3recognition.33
1.1.!The!OAS!!3The3OAS3has3a3much3longer3history3than3the3CoE.3Its3early3establishment3can3be3linked3to3strong3panHAmericanism3since3the31820s.3The3SpanishHAmerican3states3established3political3and3military3solidarity3mainly3to3protect3themselves3against3European3 interventions.3 It3was3 only3 after3 the3 American3 Civil3War3 that3 the3USA3became3interested3in3Latin3America.3In31889,3the3government3of3the3USA3invited3other3 American3 states3 to3Washington,3 D.C.,3 a3 meeting3 that3 shifted3 the3 focus3 of3panHAmericanism3from3security3to3trade.3The3meeting3was3held,33 (…)3 For3 the3 purpose3 of3 discussing3 (…)3 some3 plan3 of3 arbitration3 for3 the3 settlement3 of3disagreements3(…)3and3for3considering3questions3relating3to3the3improvement3of3business3intercourse3 (…)3 and3 to3 encourage3 (…)3 reciprocal3 commercial3 relations3 (…)3 and3 to3 secure(
















the3IACtHR3(see3Chapter37).3The3states3that3do3not3accept3the3jurisdiction3of3the3Court3do3not3want3it3scrutinising3their3actions3or3inactions3(e.g.3see3Kirk,319913on3the3USA).333Despite3their3refusal3to3accept3the3jurisdiction3of3the3Court,3states3such3as3the3USA3and3 Canada,3 are3 active3 and3 influential3 members3 of3 the3 OAS.3 The3 treaties,3conventions,3 summits,3 and3 other3 political3 charters3 that3 are3 established3 and3promulgated3by3the3OAS3impact3the3Court.3However,3as3is3the3case3with3a3number3of3 other3 treaties3 that3 these3 countries3 (the3USA3 in3particular)1473have3 signed3but3not3ratified,3the3human3rights3system3maintains3some3political3force3within3these3circles3 if3 only3 in3 providing3 a3 forum3 to3 raise3 consciousness3 about3 human3 rights3violations.1483The3 impact3 of3 not3 ratifying3 the3 Convention3 is3 that3 those3 states3nonetheless3maintain3 a3 stake3 in3 the3 discussions3 or3 policy3 debates3 but3 preclude3any3 possibility3 of3 the3 treaties3 having3 an3 effect3 on3 domestic3 law.3 That3 said3 it3 is3worth3 noting3 that3 the3 IACommHR3 has3 more3 consensual3 support.3 All3 member3states3 of3 the3 OAS3 participate3 and3 recognise3 the3 jurisdiction3 of3 the3 IACommHR,3which3can3only3make3recommendations3or3deliver3Reports.33















the3Court3has3 its3own3set3of3problems,3particularly3 its3 large3caseload,3which3has3expanded3exponentially3over3 the3past3 twenty3years.3The3success3of3 the3Court3 is3therefore3 also3 the3 thorn3 in3 its3 side,3 and3 the3 Court3 risks3 losing3 legitimacy3 if3 it3cannot3 cope3 with3 the3 case3 law,3 an3 issue3 raised3 by3 the3 respondents3 during3 the3interviews3(see3Chapter37).33By3 1979,3 the3 Cold3War3 was3 well3 underway.3 The3 political3 and3 economic3 global3order3had3bifurcated3into3liberal3democracies3and3the3Communist3bloc.3The3social3context3 had3 radically3 changed3 since3 1949.3 Former3 colonies3 had3 broken3 the3shackles3of3empire;3the3GH773was3inaugurated3in319643challenging3the3dominant3powers3 and3 later3 proposing3 a3 New3 International3 Economic3 Order3 (NIEO)3 to3counter3the3Bretton3Woods3system;3and3the3ideology3of3neoliberalism3had3begun3to3embed3itself3and3fortify3the3market3economy.3TNCs3were3by3this3time3a3growing3force,3addressed3by3the3UN3in3the3midH1970s.3In31977,3the3GH773proposed3a3Draft3Code3 of3 Conduct 153 3at3 the3 UN,3 in3 an3 attempt3 to3 introduce3 regulations3 for3‘corporate3 social3 responsibility’3 through3 intergovernmental3 codes3 (see3 also3Introduction3 Chapter).154 3Notwithstanding3 these3 efforts,3 the3 corporation3 was3meanwhile3benefitting3from3its3position3as3rightsHholder,3further3explored3in3the3next3Chapter.33
1.3.!The!Life!of!an!Application!3The3role3of3the3judiciary3at3both3Courts3is3not3to3interpret3national3laws3but3rather3to3ensure3that3domestic3Courts3apply3legislation3in3ways3that3are3compatible3with3their3 respective3 human3 rights3 Conventions.3 Admissibility3 to3 these3 Courts3 is3governed3by3a3strict3procedure3(see3Appendix33).3In3the3case3of3the3ECtHR3there3are3 four3 admissibility3 rules3 that3 apply3 to3 individual3 applicants.3 Firstly,3 the3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333331533This3was3debated3in3the3UN3for3over3a3decade3before3dissipating3in31992.3The3Code3of3Conduct3was3followed3by3the3UN3Global3Compact3in31999,3which3was3prorogued.3The3latest3attempt3by3the3UN3 to3 address3 corporate3 responsibility3 has3 been3 the3 UN3Draft3Norms3 on( the(Responsibilities( of(










IACtHR3 –3 if3 the3 state3 has3 ratified3 the3 Convention3 –3 for3 a3 new3 evaluation3 and3eventual3judgement3with3possible3monetary3ramifications.3
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actor3 violations3 in3 order3 to3 apply3 human3 rights3 law,3 i.e.3 the3 horizontal3 effect3discussed3in3Chapter36).333










‘evolutive3 approach’3 or3 ‘dynamic3 interpretation’3 of3 the3 Convention3 as3 a3 ‘living3instrument’3to3support3the3positive3obligations3doctrine3(explored3in3detail3in3the3analysis3in3Chapters353and36).3This3doctrine3has,3according3to3some,3been3critical3to3the3reform3and3improvement3of3the3Convention3(Wildhaber,32004:386).333The3Court3has3continually3affirmed3the3principle3of3subsidiarity,31593which3invests3the3member3state3–3and3primarily3its3judiciary3–3with3the3effective3safeguarding3of3the3human3rights3set3forth3in3the3Convention3(Ryssdal,31997:348).3It3is3a3principle3that3 seeks3 to3 resolve3 cases3 before3 they3 reach3 Strasbourg,3 or3 otherwise3 dismiss3them3on3procedural3grounds3once3they3reach3the3admissibility3hearing.3The3Court3therefore3 sets3 a3 standard3 and3 ensures3 that3 human3 rights3 principles3 reflect3 the3changes3 in3 national3 contexts,3 but3 the3 state3 is3 effectively3 responsible3 for3 its3implementation.3 In3 this3 way,3 Wildhaber3 (2004:3 90)3 suggests,3 the3 Court3 has3illustrated3its3‘public3policy3intention’.333The3 principle3 of3 subsidiarity3 is3 intended3 to3 ensure3 that3 the3 Court’s3 mission3remains3that3of3setting3a3principle3to3be3 followed3by3member3states3rather3than3individual3 justice.3 The3 principle3 of3 subsidiarity3 remains3 a3 distinctive3 feature3 of3the3ECtHR,3however3in3an3Opinion3submitted3to3the3Committee3of3Ministers3at3the3Izmir3 Conference3 in3 April3 2011,3 the3 Court3 raised3 some3 concerns.3 The3 ECtHR3emphasised3 that3 although3 subsidiarity3 is3 the3 hallmark3 of3 the3 CoE’s3 system,3 it3“cannot3be3unconditional3and3unilateral”.3This3statement3suggests3the3recognition3by3the3ECtHR3that3subsidiarity3cannot3act3in3a3vacuum3since3it3may3result3in3states3paying3 lip3 service3 to3 national3 protection3without3 necessarily3 following3 through3with3substantive3human3rights3protection,3such3as3corporate3violations3of3human3










According3to3Wildhaber,3“(…)3[copycat3cases]3would3undermine3the3credibility3of3the3Court3for3it3to3continue3to3issue3findings3of3violations3with3no3apparent3effect.3The3 inflow3 of3 thousands3 of3 sameHissueHcases3would3 clog3 up3 the3 system3 almost3irremediably”3(2004:390).3Thus,3although3the3Court3is3considered3a3success3story3as3 far3 as3 human3 rights3 tribunals3 go,3 the3 number3 of3 copycat3 cases3 it3 receives3 is3testament3to3a3failure3of3change3to3structural3human3rights3issues3within3member3states.3 In3 other3 words,3 there3 is3 a3 failure3 from3 member3 states3 to3 make3 the3necessary3changes3within3their3domestic3law3to3align3with3the3Judgements3of3the3Court.3 This3 has3 repercussions3 on3 the3 potential3 for3 the3 ECtHR3 to3 consider3corporate3accountability3for3reasons3discussed3in3Chapter37.33
IV.!ESC!Rights!at!the!Regional!Courts!3The3 InterHAmerican3 system3adopted3 the3Protocol(to(the(American(Convention(on(





and3 the3 OAS’3 approach3 to3 ESC3 rights3 has3 ultimately3 resulted3 in3 a3 twoHtiered3system3similar3to3the3CoE’s,3discussed3in3the3next3Section.3During3the3interviews3(see3 Chapter3 7),3 the3 respondents3 from3 the3 IACtHR3 attributed3 the3 limited3justiciability3of3the3PSS3to3the3lack3of3importance3given3by3the3states3to3ESC3rights.3Nonetheless,3 the3 IACtHR3 judges3 have3 invoked3 some3 of3 the3 nonHjusticiable3 PSS3provisions3by3way3of3Article3263ACHR1643(see3Acevedo(Buendía(et(al.(v.(Peru,(20093discussed3at3Chapter36).1653Article3263requires3the3“progressive3development”3of3the3 economic,3 social,3 educational,3 and3 cultural3 standards3 set3 out3 in3 the3 OAS3Charter.3These3kinds3of3 interpretations3by3the3Court3 indicate3that3there3 is3space3within3 the3 law3 for3 the3 judge3 to3 make3 a3 subjective3 reading3 (re:3 Chapter3 1;3 see3Chapter36).333In3 the3European3human3rights3 system,3ESC3 rights3were3enshrined3 in3a3 separate3declaration3known3as3the3European3Social3Charter3in31961,3revised3in31996.3The3CoE3claims3the3Social3Charter3is3the3ECHR’s3“natural3complement”166,3however3the3marginal3importance3of3ESC3can3be3summed3up3in3the3membership3requirements3of3 the3 CoE;3 the3 ratification3 of3 the3 ECHR3 is3 mandatory3 for3 membership,3 the3ratification3 of3 the3 Social3 Charter3 is3 not.3 Moreover,3 the3 Social3 Charter3 does3 not3have3a3 legal3supervisory3mechanism3(see3Appendix35).1673Concretely,3this3means3that3 although3 it3 may3 have3 symbolic3 value,3 there3 are3 problems3 with3 its3enforcement. 168 3Insofar3 as3 human3 rights3 have3 been3 constructed3 as3 a3 legal(3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333





discourse3 (Evans,3 2005a,3 2005b;3 see3Chapter32),3 the3 lack3of3 a3 legal3 supervisory3mechanism3 means3 that3 in3 practice3 states3 have3 little3 incentive3 to3 achieve3 ESC3rights.3 3 Nonetheless,3 innovative3 interpretations3 can3 also3 be3 seen3 in3 the3 ECtHR,3where3 some3 judges3 have3 also3 widened3 the3 scope3 of3 the3 Convention3 by3interpreting3 social3 rights3 through3 certain3 Articles3 (see3 Demir( and( Baykara( v(
Turkey,32008;3see3Chapter36).16933
Conclusion!3This3 Chapter3 has3 examined3 the3 origins3 of3 the3 InterHAmerican3 and3 European3human3rights3 systems3by3 tracing3 them3 to3 the3primarily3economic3beginnings3of3the3OAS3and3the3CoE.3The3juxtaposition3of3the3two3regional3Courts3allowed3for3the3consideration3 of3 how3 similar3 legal3 principles3work3 differently3 according3 to3 the3specific3context.3The3Chapter3explored3how3the3introduction3of3human3rights3into3the3 objectives3 of3 both3 the3 OAS3 and3 the3 CoE3 played3 a3 strategic3 role3 in3 the3development3of3the3regional3economies3and3trade.3In3the3InterHAmerican3context,3the3 introduction3of3human3rights3as3a3goal3of3 the3OAS3diffused3 the3discourse3on3power3 and3 interests,3 seeking3 to3 mask3 the3 production3 of3 hegemony3 across3 the3Americas.3 In3 the3 European3 context,3 the3 end3 of3 the3 Second3World3War3 and3 the3emergence3 of3 the3 Cold3War3 heavily3 influenced3 the3 development3 of3 the3 human3rights3project3at3the3CoE3as3an3ideological3weapon.3The3ECHR3was3an3expression3





of3Western3liberal3democracy3and3of3a3capitalist3economic3system,3illustrated3by3the3rapid3adoption3of3property3rights3and3the3abstention3from3social3rights.17033The3 comparative3 approach3 in3 this3 Chapter3 has3 allowed3 for3 a3 discussion3 of3 the3differences3and3the3similarities3of3the3Courts.3The3institutional3similarities3of3the3Courts3are3juxtaposed3with3the3differences3in3support3of3their3 jurisdiction.3More3importantly,3 the3 circumstantial3 differences3 between3 the3 Courts3 reinforce3 the3argument3 that3 law3 is3 constantly3 constructed3 by3 the3 struggle3 between3 various3normHgenerating3 communities.3 The3 Chapter3 has3 thus3 fulfilled3 its3 purpose3 by3acknowledging3 the3 differences3 between3 the3 Courts3 in3 order3 to3 think3 about3 the3legal3 contradictions3 within3 them.3 The3 recognition3 of3 the3 legal3 contradictions3emphasises3 the3 need3 to3 consider3 what3 they3 might3 reveal3 in3 terms3 of3 applying3human3 rights3 law3 to3 the3 debate3 on3 corporate3 accountability.3 The3 next3 Chapter3proceeds3to3develop3the3comparative3approach3to3the3Courts3in3order3to3illustrate3how3the3corporation’s3legal3personality3has3been3addressed3at3the3IACtHR3and3the3ECtHR.333

















I.! Legal! Persons! and! ‘Human’! Rights! Conventions:! Protection! for!
Whom?!3This3 section3 explores3 the3 impact3 of3 the3 evolutions3 of3 corporate3 personhood3 on3the3 ECHR3 and3 the3 ACHR.3 The3 CoE3 granted3 access3 to3 legal3 persons3 by3 way3 of3Article3 1,3 Protocol3 13 (P1H1)3 ECHR,3 adopted3 in3 1952.3 P1H13 has3 had3 significant3ramifications3on3the3conception3of3human3rights3and3human3rights3law3in3Europe,3particularly3 encouraged3 by3 a3 marketHdriven3 ideology.3 In3 his3 critique3 of3 the3prioritisation3of3property3rights3in3the3ECHR,3Tim3Allen3argues3that,3“Increasingly,3the3free3market3represents3the3norm3for3judging3all3State3action3affecting3property,3and3 the3Court3cannot3even3conceptualise3an3alternative3perspective3on3property”3(2010:31056).3Conversely,3when3drafting3the3ACHR3in31969,3 the3OAS3specifically3rejected3the3explicit3endowment3of3rights3onto3legal3persons.3The3ACHR3reserved3the3 Convention3 for3 individual3 human3 beings.3 Despite3 this,3 the3 ACHR3 has3 been3used3 to3 protect3 corporate3 interest3 by3 guaranteeing3 a3 prerogative3 to3 corporate3shareholders.3Section31.1.3explores3the3development3of3corporate3human(rights3at3the3ECtHR3and3the3use3of3 the3Court3by3corporations.3Section31.2.3 focuses3on3 the3rejection3of3the3corporation3as3beneficiary3of3the3ACHR,3but3reveals3a3supportive3relationship3of3the3corporation3through3the3interpretation3of3 law3that3ultimately3serves3 to3 benefit3 corporate3 shareholders.3 In3 this3 way,3 it3 draws3 on3 earlier3discussions3 in3 Chapter3 33 to3 raise3 questions3 about3 the3 legal3 architecture3 of3 the3corporation.3
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1.1.!Human!Rights! in!Post1war!Europe:!Market!Discipline!and!the!New!





UDHR.3In31949,3the3CoE3appointed3a3Consultative3Assembly3with3the3mandate3to3draft3 the3 ECHR.3 In3 its3 cahier( de( charge,3 or3 guidelines,3 the3 Assembly3 was3 given3instructions3to3include3the3right3to3property3as3per3the3UDHR’s3Article317.1723The3founding3members3included3several3socialist3democracies3(e.g.3Norway,3Sweden,3the3UK)3that3initially3argued3against3the3inclusion3of3property3in3the3ECHR.3After3several3drafts,3the3subHcommittee3of3the3Committee3of3Experts3drafted3a3text3that3was3readily3considered3to3have3“found3a3formula3reconciling3the3Aristotelian3view3that3 property3 is3 [both]3 an3 extension3 of3 human3 personality3 and3 the3 socialist3concept3of3property3(i.e.3collective/commons)”3(CoE,31985:3134).1733This3‘formula’3appears3 to3have3 reconciled3 the3differences3amongst3 the3 founding3members3and3appeased3the3socialist3view3of3property3at3that3time.333Camilo3 Schutte3 informs3 us3 that3 although3 the3 Committee3 of3 Experts’3 draft3 was3unanimously3 voted3 in3 the31st3 session,3 socialist3 representatives3 appointed3 in3 the32nd3session3argued3against3it.3The3socialists3claimed3that,333(…)3 an3 economic3 right3 such3 as3 the3 right3 to3 own3 property3 ought3 not3 be3 included3 in3 a3document3dealing3with3political3rights,3or3otherwise3other3economic3rights3such3as3right3to3full3employment3should3be3included3too3(ibid,32004:316).174333The3 debate3 resulted3 in3 the3 exclusion3 of3 the3 right3 to3 property3 (as3 well3 as3 the3exclusion3of3nonHstate3entities3as3legal3persons)3in3the3final3draft3of3the3ECHR3in333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333
1723UDHR3Article3 173 (1)3Everyone3has3 the3 right3 to3 own3property3 alone3 as3well3 as3 in3 association3with3others;3(2)3No3one3shall3be3arbitrarily3deprived3of3his3property3(UN,31949).3





1950.1753However,3social3and3property3rights3remained3a3pivotal3 issue3and3quite3quickly3property3 rights3were3annexed3 to3 the3Convention3 through3P1H13 in31952.3The3specificity3of3the3adoption3of3property3rights3in3the3ECHR3was3the3extension3of3Convention3rights3to3nonHstate3legal3entities3(P1H1,3Article3343ECHR).3P1H13reads,3“Every3 natural3 or3 legal3 person3 is3 entitled3 to3 the3 peaceful3 enjoyment3 of3 his3possessions”.3The3inclusion3of3legal3persons3in3P1H13has3had3a3significant3impact3on3the3concept3of3rights3 in3Europe.3The3status3of3 legal3persons3as3rightsHholders3was3a3watershed3for3the3endorsement3of3the3human3rights3of3corporations.3In3this3way,3the3Court3has3arguably3aligned3human3rights3with3the3current3global3political3economy3defined3by3neoliberalism.333Indeed,3there3is3no3evidence3in3the3case3 law3or3 in3the3travaux(préparatoires3 that3the3 CoE3 or3 the3 ECtHR3 have3 ever3 contested3 the3 idea3 of3 corporations3 as3 human3rightsHholders.3 Marius3 Emberland3 argues3 that3 the3 drafters3 of3 the3 Convention3always3 intended3 to3 include3 corporations3 within3 the3 Convention’s3 protective3confines3 (2006:3 3H4).3 However,3 early3 into3 the3 Court’s3 history,3 Egon3 Schwelb3(1964)3argued3that3including3corporations3was3not3the3drafters’3intent3but3rather3an3interpretation3manoeuvred3by3the3Commission3in3order3to3favour3a3particular3economic3 regime.3 Schwelb3 comments3 on3 the3 terminological3 differences3 in3 the3French3and3English3versions3of3the3Convention.1763He3points3out3that3whilst3P1H13extends3 its3protection3 to3natural3and3 legal3persons3 in3both3 languages,3 there3 is3a3difference3 in3 Article3 253 (now3 Article3 34)3 between3 the3 versions3 regarding3 who3may3petition3the3Commission3and3the3Court.177333





Schwelb’s3 observations3 are3 compelling.3 In3 the3English3 version,3Article3 253ECHR3accepted3 that3 the3 Commission3 (now3 Court)3 can3 receive3 petitions3 “from3 any3person,3nonHgovernmental3organisation3or3group3of3individuals3claiming3to3be3the3victim3of3a3violation3by3one3of3 the3High3Contracting3Parties3of3 the3rights3 [of3 the3ECHR]”.3But3Schwelb3notes3that3the3French3text3renders,33 3 3“(…)3‘any3person’3by3‘toute(personne(physique’3which3seems3to3indicate3that3a3‘legal3person’3(personne( morale)3 does3 not3 have3 the3 right3 of3 petition,3 unless3 it3 also3 is3 a3 ‘nonHgovernmental3organisation’3or3a3‘group3of3individuals’.3On3the3other3hand,3the3substantive3right3to3the3peaceful3enjoyment3of3his3possessions3is3guaranteed3to3‘every3natural3or(legal(person’3 (‘toute( personne( physique( ou( morale’)3 (Art.3 13 of3 Protocol3 No.3 1).3 In3 practice,3however,3 neither3 Respondent3 Governments3 nor3 the3 Commission3 ex( officio3 have3challenged3the3locus(standi(of3legal3persons3(1964:3520).33The3specification3of3a3“physical3person”3in3the3French3version3of3Article3253ECHR3would3logically3lead3us3to3believe3that3this3would3be3an3indication3of3the3wishes3of3the3Contracting3Parties3not3 to3extend3 to3 legal3persons.3However,3 the3ECommHR3would3later3enlarge3the3scope3of3the3Article3by3applying3an3interpretation3of3the3English3“any3person”3which3paved3the3way3for3the3legal3person3to3benefit3from3the3protection3of3the3ECHR3and3the3Court.33Schwelb3 references3 early3 attempts3 by3 corporations3 to3 petition3 the3 Commission3(i.e.3Retimag,(S.A.(v(the(Federal(Republic(of(Germany,31961).3The3petitioner3was3a3JSC3under3Swiss3law.3The3petition3was3declared3inadmissible3for3nonHexhaustion3of3domestic3remedies.3However,3the3objection3that3the3company3did3not3have3the3right3of3petition3under3Article3253ECHR3was3not(raised.3Thus,3a(fortiori,3 through3this3 acceptance3 the3 Commission3 included3 corporations3 as3 rightsHholders.3Similarly,3 in3 Gudmundsson( v( Iceland3 (1960)178,3 Schwelb3 explains3 “the3 second3applicant,3the3company3in3which3the3first3applicant3had3a3majority3shareholding,3was,3it3seems,3also3a3legal3person3without3its3right3to3be3a3party3to3the3proceedings3before3the3Commission3having3been3challenged”3(1964:3ftnt38).3Schwelb’s3analysis3





of3 the3 Commission’s3 decision3 leads3 him3 to3 the3 conclusion3 that3 there3 was3 a3
détournement3 of3human3 rights3which3 is3 “(…)3demoted3 to3 the3 level3of3 furnishing3one3 more3 argument3 in3 traditional3 disputes3 of3 an3 economic3 character3 (…)3 in3deference3 to3 the3 views3 attributed3 to3 Social3 Democratic3 Governments3 that3participated3 in3 the3drafting3of3 the3Convention3and3of3Protocol31”3 (ibid:3 522).3 In3other3words,3despite3the3negotiations3between3the3Contracting3Parties3regarding3the3 issue3of3property3(detailed3in3the3travaux(préparatoires)3and3the3asymmetry3of3 the3 English3 and3 French3 versions3 of3 the3 ECHR3 and3 Protocol3 1,3 it3 was3 the3ECommHR3 that3 ultimately3 granted3 legal3 persons3 the3 same3 rights3 as3 physical3persons3 through3 its3 interpretation,3 informed3 by3 an3 economic3 inclination.3 The3issue3 of3 a3 legal3 person3 petitioning3 the3 Commission3 (and3 later3 the3 Court)3 was3never3raised3as3a3challenge3to3the3admissibility3of3the3case,3and3thus3it3has3since3become3part3of3the3legal3commonsense3of3the3European3human3rights3system.33Thus,3a3major3critique3of3the3European3system3of3human3rights3is3that3although3it3has3 provided3 important3 human3 rights3 judgements3with3 binding3 legal3 effects,3 it3has3also3been3decisive3in3institutionalising3corporate3rights3in3Europe,3and3thus3in3supporting3 market3 discipline.3 In3 other3 words,3 the3 European3 system3 of3 human3rights3 has3 conventionalised3 the3 freedoms3 necessary3 to3maintain3 and3 legitimate3particular3 forms3 of3 production3 and3 exchange3 as3 part3 of3 a3 European3 legal3commonsense.3 These3 rights3 are3 the3 negative3 rights3 associated3 with3 liberty,3security3and3property3(Evans,32005b:343;3see3also3Chapter32);3although,3recently3an3 emerging3 case3 law3 provides3 encouragement3 to3 challenges3 of3 this3 marketHoriented3 conception3 of3 rights3 (see3 e.g.3 Demir( and( Baykara( v( Turkey,( 20083discussed3at3Chapter36).17933In3 the3ECtHR’s3early3case3 law,3 the3 legal3person3referred3 to3a3variety3of3corporate3groups3such3as3trade3unions3and3associations3(e.g.3Swedish(Engine(Drivers’(Union(v(





both3 profitHmaking3 and3 notHforHprofit3 legal3 persons,3 such3 as:3 commercial3companies,3trade3unions,3religious3organisations,3political3parties,3or3charitable3or3social3 associations3 (Edel,3 2010:3 12).3 The3 wording3 of3 P1H13 was3 the3 uncontested3legal3premise3for3the3subsequent3interpretation3that3the3term3‘everyone’,3figuring3frequently3 in3the3ECHR,3also3applies3to3corporations.3The3Convention3defines3 its3application3 in3Article334:3 “The3Court3may3receive3applications3 from3any3person,3nonHgovernmental3organisation3or3group3of3individuals3claiming3to3be3the3victim3of3a3violation3by3one3of3the3High3Contracting3Parties3(…)”.3Thus,3although3the3term3“legal3 persons”3 in3 P1H13 may3 not3 have3 originally3 been3 meant3 to3 apply3 to3corporations,3the3interpretation3of3Article3343(formerly3Article325)3in3conjunction3with3 P1H13 resulted3 in3 the3 extension3 of3 the3 ECHR3 to3 protect3 corporations3 by3likening3corporations3as3legal3persons3to3NGOs.333In3 his3 study3 on3 the3 human3 rights3 of3 corporations,3 Marius3 Emberland3 (2006)3details3 the3 structure3 of3 the3 ECHR3 protection3 of3 corporations.3 The3 ECtHR,3 he3argues,3has3never3doubted3that3a3company3 is3a3 ‘nonHgovernmental3organisation’3within3 the3 meaning3 of3 Article3 34,3 and3 that3 the3 Convention’s3 system3 of3 private3litigation3 is3 therefore3 open3 for3 corporate3 persons3 (Emberland,3 2006:3 32;3 see3





On3 the3 contrary,3 Emberland3 (2005)3 argues3 it3was3 the3 intent3 of3 the3 drafters3 all3along3to3extend3human3rights3to3corporate3persons.3Whether3it3was3the3intent3of3the3 drafters,3 as3 Emberland3 argues,3 or3 the3 interpretation3 of3 the3 ECommHR3 as3Shwelb3suggests,3the3result3has3been3the3institutionalisation3of3corporate3human3rights3that3has3complemented3the3new3postHwar3global3order3(see3case3law3below;3see3also3Chapter32).333
1.2.! Human! Rights! in! the! Americas:! Shaping! the! Post1war! Global! and!
Political!Order!











II.!The!Corporation!as!Rights1Holder!3This3section3explores3the3differences3in3how3the3ECtHR3and3the3IACtHR3deal3with3corporate3 rights.3 In3 the3European3 system,3 the3 corporate3 entity3 is3 itself3 sine(qua(
non3a3rightsHholder,3upholding3the3corporate3veil3in3most3cases.3As3we3have3seen,3in3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system,3 the3 legal3 person3 was3 not3 included3 in3 the3Convention.3 Nonetheless,3 the3 Court3 has3 chosen3 in3 some3 cases3 to3 pierce3 the3corporate3 veil3 in3 order3 to3 empower3 shareholders3 to3 claim3 their3 rights3 as3individuals.3The3result3of3these3differing3mechanisms3is3less3significant3than3might3be3imagined.333The3 Courts3 converge3 on3 their3 respect3 of3 the3 corporate3 veil3 (discussed3 in3more3detail3at3Section32.1.,3see3also3Chapter33),3and3relatedly,3their3endorsement3of3the3ICJ’s3 judgement3 in3Barcelona(Traction,(Light(and(Power(Company(Ltd((Belgium(v(
Spain,31970)3(Barcelona(Traction).3In3Barcelona(Traction,3the3International3Court3of3 Justice3(ICJ)3established3the3principle3of3upholding3the3corporate3veil.3The3ICJ3launched3the3idea3that3some3obligations3are3not3just3owed3towards3a3state’s3treaty3partners3 or3 other3 individual3 states3 under3 customary3 international3 law3 (i.e.3 jus(
cogens),3 but3 that3 these3 obligations3 are3 also3 owed3 towards3 the3 international3community3of3states3as3a3whole,3i.e.3erga(omens(obligations((Klabbers,32013:3133).3The3 claim3 arose3 from3 the3 Spanish3 Court’s3 proclaimed3 bankruptcy3 of3Barcelona3










In3 what3 follows,3 a3 brief3 overview3 of3 some3 of3 the3 relevant3 case3 law3 from3 each3Court3will3 be3 considered3with3 the3 aim3of3 underlining3 the3 privileged3position3 of3corporations3and3shareholders3in3the3use3and3application3of3human3rights3in3the3regional3 systems.3Whether3 the3 corporation3 is3 granted3 access3 to3 the3 Court3 in3 its3own3right3–3as3in3the3case3of3the3ECtHR3–3or3whether3it3is3the3shareholders3who3are3ultimately3rightsHholders3–3as3in3the3case3of3the3IACtHR3–3the3bottom3line3remains3that3violations3of3human3rights3by3corporations3(as3entities3unto3themselves3as3well3as3 their3 shareholders)3 go3 virtually3 uncensored.3 In3 addition,3 the3 rights3 of3corporations3 (and3 their3 shareholders)3 are3 legitimated3 in3 both3 Courts.3 3 As3 this3chapter3will3show,3the3status3of3the3corporation3as3rightsHholder3is3a3key3example3of3how3power3is3directly3exercised3through3the3practice3of3human3rights.333
2.1.!The!Human!Rights!of!Corporations!at!the!ECtHR!3The3 following3case3discussion3examines3 the3emergence3of3 the3application3of3 the3ECHR3directly3on3companies.3These3cases3demonstrate3how3corporations3began3using3the3ECHR3against3the3exercise3of3the3regulatory3authority3of3the3state;3and3importantly,3how3they3mark3the3beginning3of3the3Court’s3acceptance3of3the3victim3status3of3corporations3in3human3rights3law.33In3the3first3few3decades3of3its3existence,3cases3dealing3with3legal3entities3referred3primarily3to3nonHstate3actors3such3as3unions3(e.g.3National(Union(of(Belgian(Police(












Others(v(UK((1981)3mark3the3beginning3of3 the3use3of3 the3ECHR3by3corporations.3These3 cases3 are3 symptomatic3 of3 the3 fruition3 and3 consolidation3 of3 corporate3personhood3within3the3European3human3rights3system.18333Although3 corporate3 responsibility3 for3 human3 rights3 has3 received3 increasing3attention3 over3 the3 past3 twenty3 years,3 the3 use3 of3 the3 ECHR3 by3 corporations3 has3inspired3little3academic3interest.1843Emberland3(2006)3claims3this3is3probably3due3to3what3he3considers3a3limited3number3of3cases3filed3by3companies.3His3research3revealed3 that3 of3 the3 33073 judgements3 delivered3 between3 1998H2003,3 1263 (or33.8%)3 originated3 in3 applications3 filed3 by3 companies3 or3 other3 persons3 clearly3pursuing3 corporate3 interests3 (Emberland,3 2006:3 13H14).1853Although3 seemingly3minor,3 this3 number3 is3 a3 weighty3 minority3 that3 consolidates3 the3 ability3 of3corporations3to3act3as3human3rights3claimants.3These3cases3filed3by3corporations3point3to3the3solicitation3of3human3rights3Courts3by3corporations3as3another3means3to3remove3barriers3to3business.3Many3of3the3cases3brought3forth3by3companies3at3the3ECtHR3under3P1H13and3Article363deal3with3patent3 law,3 intellectual3property,3and3trade/commercial3 law.3In3this3way,3there3is3a3clear3and3direct3use3of3human3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333331833These3first3corporate3human3rights3claims3in3the3European3human3rights3system3coincide3with3the3rise3of3neoliberalism3(see3Chapter32).3As3noted3earlier3 in3 the3 thesis,3 in3 the3postHwar3years,3a3class3 compromise3 was3 made3 to3 ensure3 peace3 and3 tranquillity3 that3 has3 become3 known3 as3Keynesianism3or3embedded3liberalism3(Harvey,32009:310H11;3see3also3Chapter32).3A3certain3state3interventionism3was3applied3to3control3business3cycles3and3provide3a3variety3of3welfare3systems3(education,3 health3 care,3 etc.).3By31979H1980,3 the3 tide3had3 turned3and3 the3postHwar3 compromise3began3to3break3down3in3the3wake3of3a3series3of3global3financial3and3economic3crises3(e.g.3the319743oil3 crisis).3 Neoliberalism3began3 to3 stake3 its3 claim3 on3 the3 global3 political3 stage.3 Although3 a3 clear3causality3 is3 of3 course3 untenable,3 it3 is3 worth3 bearing3 these3 circumstances3 in3 mind3 when3considering3the3development3of3corporate3human3rights3claims3such3as3AGOSI3and3Lithgow3within3the3framework3of3an3emergent3neoliberalism.331843Exceptions3 exist3 for3 example,3 Addo,3 M.K.3 (1999:3 186H197);3 Bottomley3 and3 Kinely3 (2002);3Emberland3(2006),331853The3 IACommHR3 has3 referenced3 the3 “frequent”3 petitions3 by3 corporations3 at3 the3 ECtHR.3 In3





rights3 for3 commercially3 oriented3 legal3 problems.3 The3 significance3 of3 this3corporate3 solicitation3 is3 the3 use3 of3 human3 rights3 Courts3 as3 a3means3 to3 further3bolster3 the3 protection3 of3 business3 and3 promulgates3 market3 discipline.3 A3 brief3overview3of3key3examples3from3the3case3law3will3help3elucidate3this3point.3
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In3Agrotexim,3 the3question3revolved3around3 the3capacity3of3a3 company3 that3had3already3 been3 liquidated3 to3 apply3 to3 the3 Court.3 The3 shareholders3 claimed3‘identification’187 3with3 the3 company3 to3 apply3 in3 its3 stead,3 but3 were3 denied3admissibility.3 Following3 the3 principle3 set3 out3 in3Barcelona( Traction,3 the3 ECtHR3noted3in3Agrotexim(v(Greece,333 (…)3 the3 piercing3 of3 the3 “corporate3 veil”3 or3 the3 disregarding3 of3 a3 company’s3 legal3personality3will3 be3 justified3 only3 in3 exceptional3 circumstances,3 in3 particular3where3 it3 is3clearly3 established3 that3 it3 is3 impossible3 for3 the3 company3 to3 apply3 to3 the3 Convention3institutions3through3the3organs3set3up3under3its3articles3of3incorporation3or3H3in3the3event3of3 liquidation3 H3 through3 its3 liquidators.3 (…)3This3principle3has3also3been3confirmed3with3regard3to3the3diplomatic3protection3of3companies3by3the3International3Court3of3Justice3[in3
Barcelona(Traction3(1995:3§66;3see3also3pp.3393and341,3§§356H583and366)].333It3 follows3 from3 the3 above3 judgement3 that3 under3 the3 European3 system3 an3independent3 right3 of3 shareholders3 under3 P1H13 is3 subsidiary3 to3 the3 right3 of3 the3company3 itself3 and3 will3 be3 recognized3 only3 in3 exceptional3 cases,3 for3 example3where3 the3 company3 could3 not3 pursue3 the3 claim3 itself3 (Kriebaum3 &3 Schreuer,32007:3 755).3 However,3 in3 practice3 shareholder3 rights3 are3 effectively3 enacted3through3 the3 person3 of3 the3 corporation.3 A3 corporation3 exists3 through3 its3shareholders3 within3 the3 laws3 established3 and3 protected3 by3 the3 state,3 i.e.3shareholders3effectively3own3the3company,3managers3and3directors3are3effectively3stewards3to3shareholder3interests,3and3the3corporation3as3such3exists3according3to3state3 laws3 that3define3 the3rules3of3 incorporation.3As3we3have3seen3 in3Chapter33,3the3 modern3 JSC3 assigns3 particular3 importance3 to3 shareholder3 primacy,3 which3means3that3shareholder3interests3are3prioritised;3these3interests3are3primarily3the3profitability3 of3 the3 shareholders’3 investments3 and3 for3 some3 it3 has3 even3 been3stated3 that3 the3 only3 social3 responsibility3 of3 a3 corporation3 is3 to3 maximise3shareholder3profits3(Friedman,31970).333















The3ECtHR3decided3that3the3victim,3in3this3case3the3corporate3applicant,3had3been3subjected3to3government3arbitrariness,3which3 is3contrary3to3the3Rule3of3Law.3The3Court3 interpreted3 the3 meaning3 of3 ‘home’3 to3 the3 business3 premise3 in3 order3 to3protect3 and3 promote3 the3 rule3 of3 law3 by3 combatting3 the3 arbitrariness3 of3 the3government3(Emberland,32006:3141).3This3is3a3clear3extension3of3the3Convention’s3protective3 gambit3 to3 corporations3 regarding3 an3 Article3 that3 had3 otherwise3 been3considered3admissible3only3to3human3beings.3Thus,3in3the3judgement3Société(Colas(





that3 provision33 (§81).1923The3 Court3 agreed3 with3 the3 Commission3 that3 P1H13 is3applicable3 to3 intellectual3property3 (also3Smith(Kline(and(French(Laboratories(ltd(v(
Netherlands,3 1990;3 Lenzing( AG( v( UK,3 1998).3 A3 few3 years3 later,3 the3 Court3 again3considered3a3patent3 case3 in3BritishSAmerican(Tobacco(Company(Ltd(v(Netherlands3(1996:3 §62).3 The3 company3 alleged3 that3 it3 had3 been3 deprived3 of3 its3 possessions3under3 P1H13 without3 an3 examination3 by3 an3 independent3 and3 impartial3 tribunal3(Article3 6).3 The3 Court3 agreed3with3 the3 claim3 to3 Article3 63 but3 did3 not3 consider3 it3necessary3to3examine3the3case3under3P1H1.3These3cases3illustrate3the3use3of3human3rights3law3in3relation3to3marketHoriented3ends.3The3ECtHR3has3created3an3opening3for3 the3 corporate3 use3 of3 human3 rights3 by3 recognising3 the3 corporation3 as3 an3individual3 with3 rights3 before3 the3 Court.3 This3 recognition3 raises3 questions3 of3priorities3 and3 definitions3 of3 human3 rights3 in3 Europe3 regarding3 corporations3 as3rightsHholders,3 an3 issue3 raised3 by3 a3 few3 respondents3 and3 elaborated3 upon3 in3Chapter37.3It3also3points3to3a3legal3commonsense3that3accepts3the3corporation3as3a3rightsHholder3 that3 may3 diverge3 from3 the3 popular3 commonsense3 that3 does3 not3assume3or3 accept3 that3 corporations3have3 the3 same3 rights3 as3physical3 persons.3 In3this3way,3there3are3competing3notions3of3rights3and3a3lack3of3popular3consensus3on3the3meaning3of3human3rights3(see3also3Chapter32).33In3 the3 highly3 publicised3 and3 extremely3 complex,3 multiHbillion3 Euro3 case,3 OAO(










Rezai3 (2012)3 explain3 that3 Yukos3 was3 essentially3 cut3 off3 from3 all3 international3channels3of3judicial3review3because3its3case3simply3concerned3an3internal3Russian3matter.3They3point3out3that3Yukos3could3neither3petition3to3the3ICJ3because3it3was3a3Russian3corporation3(and3thus3a3Russian3national)3and3therefore3could3not3bring3a3case3 against3 its3 own3 state,3which3was3 its3 adversary.3 Nor3 could3 it3 bring3 its3 claim3before,333(…)3an3 international3 arbitral3 tribunal3under3a3bilateral3 investment3 treaty,3because3 such3a3tribunal3 only3 has3 jurisdiction3 over3 claims3 brought3 against3 a3 state3 (i.e.3 the3 Russian3Federation3in3the3Yukos3case)3by3nationals3of3the3other3state3which3is3a3party3to3the3bilateral3investment3treaty.3Since3Yukos3was3a3Russian3corporation3(and3not3a3national3of3any3other3state),3 its3 investment3 in3 the3 Russian3 Federation3 could3 not3 be3 governed3 by3 any3 bilateral3investment3 treaty3 concluded3 by3 the3 Russian3 Federation3 with3 another3 state3 (Van3 den3Muijensenbergh3and3Rezai,32012:367).33





of3human3rights3to3corporations,3and3only3time3will3tell3whether3this3will3culminate3in3such3inalienable3rights3such3as3the3right3to3life.3In3other3words,3it3seems3that3the3steady3evolution3of3the3Court’s3case3law3“apparently3signifies3a3dynamic3process3of3the3gradual3humanisation3of3corporations”3(van3den3Muijsenbergh3and3Rezai,32012:353).33The3 next3 section3 turns3 to3 the3 ACHR3 where3 legal3 persons3 have3 been3 explicitly3excluded.3 Yet,3 the3 impact3 of3 this3 is3 not3 necessarily3 a3 more3 comprehensive3 or3dynamic3 protection3 against3 corporate3 harms.3 As3 the3 following3 section3 argues,3despite3the3wording3of3the3ACHR,3the3InterHAmerican3system3presents3a3businessHfriendly3model3similar3to3that3of3her3sister3Court3in3Europe.333
2.2.! Piercing! the! Corporate! Veil:! Shareholder! Rights! in! the! Inter1






Ledesma3 observes,3 “in3 a3 very3 broad3 interpretation3 of3 the3 Convention,3 the3Commission3has3considered3that3companies3or3‘private3juridical3persons’3may3be3assimilated3to3the3notion3of3 ‘nonHgovernmental3entity3 legally3recognised’3by3any3OAS3member3state”3(2007:3235).3In3other3words,3despite3the3explicit3language3of3the3 ACHR,3 the3 IACommHR3 has3 indicated3 clearly3 that3 it3 is3 possible3 to3 submit3 a3petition3in3the3name3of3a3company3or3 juridical3person3although3the3 legal3person3cannot3be3considered3the3victim3of3that3violation.3In3these3cases,3the3petition3is3a3third3 party3 petition3 for3 the3 victim.3 Ledesma3 explains3 that3 for3 some3 this3interpretation3is3contrary3to3what3was3expressed3in3the3ACHR,3since,3333 (…)3one3of3the3elements3of3[an3NGO]3is3precisely3being3nonHprofit.3 It3cannot3be3assumed3that3 the3 drafters3 of3 the3 Convention3 used3 this3 expression3 carelessly,3 giving3 it3 the3 same3meaning3and3scope3as3a3juridical3person3or3entities3of3private3law,3without3being3aware3of3the3special3role3of3NGOs3as3members3of3civil3society3that3articulate3the3common3interests3of3its3members,3which3are3completely3different3than3commercial3interests3(ibid:3236).33The3subtlety3 lies3 in3 the3status3of3 the3petitioner3versus3 the3holder3of3rights3or3 the3victim3(Article3443ACHR;3Commission’s3Rules3of3Procedure,3Article323).1993Lindblom3further3observes3that3the3IACommHR3allows3commercial3entities3to3lodge3petitions3although3it3cannot3formally3be3the3victim3of3a3human3rights3violation3(2005:3272).3So,3a3‘person’3may3be3“characterised3as3‘any3person3or3group3of3persons’3and3thus3qualified3 to3 present3 a3 complaint3 to3 the3 Commission”3 (Ledesma:3 2007:3 235).( A(
fortiori,3the3Commission3accepts3petitions3from3corporations3in3some3cases.333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333331993The3Rules3of3Procedure3of3the3InterHAmerican3Commission3Article323.3Presentation3of3Petitions3reads:3
Any( person( or( group( of( persons( or( nongovernmental( entity( legally( recognized( in( one( or(
more( of( the(Member( States( of( the( OAS(may( submit( petitions( to( the( Commission,( on( their(





The3 Commission3 has3 elsewhere3 recognised3 corporate3 claims3 to3 human3 rights3 by3referring3to3the3American3Declaration,3which3offers3protection3to3all3persons.3It3has3interpreted3the3Declaration3to3include3corporate3claims3for3protection3in3“ABC(Color”(
newspaper( v( Paraguay3 (1984)3 and3 Case( No.( 21373 Jehovah(Witnesses( v( Argentina3(1978),3 to3 cite3 a3 few3 examples.3 The3 ACHR,3 in3 contrast,3 specifically3 nominates3‘human3beings’3(Article31.2.),3defining3them3as3“based3upon3attributes3of3the3human3personality”3 (Preamble;3 see3 also3 BendeckSCohdinsa( (Zacarías( E.( Bendeck)( v(
Honduras,3 1999:3 §17;3 MEVOPAL( v( Argentina,3 1999:3 §17).3 These3 diverging3interpretations3 highlight3 subtle,3 but3 existing,3 internal3 struggles3 between3 the3
political3and3the3judicial3branches3of3the3InterHAmerican3Human3Rights3System,3also3alluded3to3during3the3interviews3(see3Chapter37).333As3a3result3of3the3ACHR’s3clear3stipulation3against3the3inclusion3of3legal3persons,3the3 IACommHR3 has3 an3 established3 case3 law3 that3 denies3 direct3 access3 to3 ACHR3rights3by3corporations.3However,3shareholders3are3given3access3as3 individuals3to3the3 full3 gambit3of3protection3offered3by3 the3Convention.3Taken3at3 face3value,3 this3marks3 a3 substantial3 difference3 from3 the3 ECHR;3 however,3 with3 closer3 reflection3piercing3 the3 corporate3 veil3may3be3 an3attempt3 to3 grant3 rights3 to3 the3 corporation3through3the3shareholder.33In3light3of3the3textual3precision3of3the3ACHR3against3legal3persons,3the3IACommHR3has3been3careful3with3regards3to3the3difference3between3the3petitioner3and3the3victim.3One3example3is3the3case3Tabacalera(Boquerón(S.A.(v(
Paraguay3(1997),3which3dealt3with3the3registered3trademarking3of3a3cigarette3and3claims3to3the3brand3name3(see3Appendix323for3details).3Emberland3explains3that333(…)3the3individualistic3nature3of3the3substantive3law3suggests3that3a3collective3entity,3such3as3the3company,3cannot3successfully3assert3a3claim3for3protection3of3 its3own3rights.3This3has3 been3 unanimously3 confirmed3 in3 several3 decisions.3 For3 example,3 in3 Tabacalera(










3The3IACommHR3upheld3the3rationale3of3the3distinction3between3shareholder3rights3and3 corporate3 entity3 rights3 in3 Carvallo( Quintana( v( Argentina( (2001).3 The3Commission3decided3the3admissibility3of3Mr3Carvallo’s3claims3as3an3individual,3but3denied3any3alleged3violation3against3his3company.3The3IACommHR3reinforced3the3principle3that3shareholders3cannot3claim3to3be3victims3without3demonstrating3their3rights3have3been3directly3affected3(2001:3§54).3It3further3outlined3the3existence3of3the3 protection3 of3 rights3 of3 shareholders3 under3 the3 Convention3 as3 direct3 rights3granted3 under3 domestic3 law3 and3 transposed3 to3 the3 international3 realm.3 The3Commission3 referenced3 IvcherSBornstein( v( Peru3 (2001)(where3 it3 had3 previously3invoked3 the3 distinction3 made3 in3 Barcelona( Traction3 between3 shareholders3 and3companies3as3legal3persons3(§56).3This3case3upheld3the3corporate3veil,3recognising3the3distinctiveness3of3the3legal3personality.333The3IACtHR3and3the3IACommHR3maintain,3at3least3in3theory,3that3legal3persons3are3not3 rightsHholders3 of3 the3 ACHR.3 Nonetheless,3 the3 case3 law3 has3 demonstrated3differences3 in3 interpretation3 between3 the3 two3 bodies,3 pointed3 to3 in3 the3 above3discussion.3 These3 differences3 are3 further3 illustrated3 in3 the3 cases3Cesti(Hurtado(v(





Hurtado’s3petition3at3 the3IACtHR3included3compensation3 for3pecuniary3damages3of3the3loss3of3revenue3of3his3company3during3his3imprisonment.20133The3significance3of3the3Cesti(Hurtado(Case3for3the3purposes3of3the3argument3here3is3 that3 implicitly3 the3Court3was3 solicited3by3Mr3Cesti3Hurtado3and3 requested3by3the3 Commission3 to3 consider3 not3 only3 his3 case3 as3 shareholder3 but3 also3 the3damages3 to3 the3company3Top(Security.3 Subsequently,3 the3 request3 subsumed3 the3company’s3rights3into3those3of3the3shareholder,3Mr3Cesti3Hurtado.3In3other3words,3
Top(Security(would3ultimately(benefit3 from3the3protections3of3the3ACHR3through3its3shareholder.33Disregarding3the3request3of3the3Commission,3the3IACtHR3decided,333 In3view3of3the3particularities3of3this3case3and3the3nature3of3the3reparations3requested,3they3should3be3determined3by3the3mechanisms3established3in3the3domestic3laws.3The3internal3Courts3or3 the3specialized3national3 institutions3have3specific3knowledge3of3 the3branch3of3activity3to3which3the3victim3was3dedicated.3Taking3into3consideration3the3specificity3of3the3reparations3requested3and3also3the3characteristics3of3commercial3and3company3 law3and3the3 commercial3 operations3 involved,3 the( Court( considers( that( this( determination(
corresponds(to(the(said(national(institutions(rather(than(to(an(international(human(rights(





were3committed3against3the3legal3person3or3corporation.3In3the3case3of3Cantos,3the3legal3 entity3 (the3 company)3 corresponded3 to3 the3physical3 person3 (sole3 owner3 of3the3company,3i.e.3the3‘sole3shareholder’)3who3was3protected3under3Article383ACHR3(right3to3a3fair3trial3and3access3to3Court)3and3Article3253ACHR3(right3to3an3effective3remedy)3(Hein3van3Kiepen,32011:3368).3Mr3Cantos,3the3owner3of3a3large3business3group3 and3 principal3 shareholder,3 alleged3 violations3 under3Articles3 9,3 11,3 21,3 and3252023after3 administrative3 and3 accounting3 documents3were3 seized3without3 being3inventoried.3 His3 business3 group3 suffered3 pecuniary3 damages3 due3 to3 operational3and3 fiscal3 difficulties,3 and3 he3 petitioned3 the3 Court3 for3 compensation.3 During3proceedings3before3the3Commission,3the3IACommHR3asserted3that,33 (…)3 In3 general,3 the3 rights3 and3 obligations3 attributed3 to3 companies3 become3 rights3 and3obligations3for3the3individuals3who3compromise3them3or3who3act3in3their3name.3(…)3[To3not3consider3it3so]3(…)3implies3removing3an3important3group3of3human3rights3from3protection3by3the3Convention”3(2001:3§27H28).333In3other3words,3here3again,3the3Commission3recognised3the3rights3of3the3company3
through3its3shareholder,3Mr3Cantos.333The3IACommHR3claimed3where3a3juridical3person3cannot3claim3its3rights,3such3as3a3company3under3the3ACHR,3those3rights3are3transposed3onto3the3shareholder3who,3as3 a3 physical3 person,3 can3 stake3 her3 claim3 in3 the3 corporation’s3 stead.3 Breaking3somewhat3 from3 its3 position3 in3 Cesti( Hurtado,3 during3 Preliminary3 Objections3 the3Court3concurred3with3the3Commission3asserting,33 3(…)3This3Court3considers3that,3although3the3 figure3of3 legal3entities3has3not3been3expressly3recognised3 by3 the3American3 Convention,3 as3 it3 is3 in3 Protocol3 1,3 Article3 13 of3 the3 European3Convention3 on3 Human3 Rights,3 this3 does3 not3 mean3 that,3 in3 specific3 circumstances,3 an3individual3may3not3resort3to3the3InterHAmerican3system3for3the3protection3of3human3rights3to3 enforce3 his3 fundamental3 rights,3 even3when3 they3 are3 encompassed3 in3 a3 legal3 figure3 or3fiction3created3by3the3same3system3of3law3(2001:3§29).33





The3 shareholder3 was3 ‘identified’3 with3 the3 corporation.3 In3 this3 way3 Mr3 Cesti3Hurtado’s3 individual3 Convention3 rights3 were3 exercised3 in3 place3 of3 those3 of3 the3corporation.3 Shareholder3 identification3pierces3 the3 corporate3 veil3 to3 identify3 the3shareholder3in3order3that3s/he3may3claim3his3or3her3rights.203333Nonetheless,3 shareholder3 identification3 remains3 an3 exceptional3 circumstance.3Emberland3outlines3two3criteria3for3identification3or3lifting3the3corporate3veil3with3regards3to3the3InterHAmerican3system.3He3suggests3exceptionality3must3relate3to3a)3the3individual3shareholder3and3b)3the3individual3belief3of3victimhood3(2004:3269H270).3 In3 the3 first3 case,3what3 this3means3 is3 that3 lifting3 the3 corporate3veil3 can3only3occur3in3order3to3protect3the3individual3rights3of3the3shareholder.3In3other3words,3as3Emberland3explains,3the3shareholder’s3rights3must3have3been3effectively3contested3by3the3measure3or3violated3by3the3government3action3(ibid:3269).3In3the3Cantos(case,3the3Court3reasoned3that3unless3the3corporate3veil3was3lifted3to3protect3the3rights3of3the3 individual3 shareholder3 “unreasonable3 results”3 would3 materialise3 (Cantos( v(
Argentina,32001:3§29).2043In3the3second3case,3 the3Commission3and3the3Court3must3decide3 when3 the3 individual3 rather3 than3 (only)3 the3 company3 has3 been3 directly3affected3 (Emberland,3 2004:3 270).3 In3 order3 to3 do3 this,3 the3 individual3 shareholder3must3 establish3 that3 s/he3 considers3 her/himself3 personally3 affected3 by3 the3contested3 action3 (ibid);3 or3 in3 other3 words,3 the3 shareholder3 must3 prove3 an3individual3belief3of3victimhood.3Emberland3argues3 that3 this3requirement3 is3 for3all3intents3and3purposes3identical3to3the3requirement3to3have3exhausted3all3available3domestic3 remedies3 in3 the3 underlying3 dispute3 (ibid).3 In3 the3 case3 of3 Cantos3 v(
Argentina,3the3petition3was3admitted3primarily3because3Mr3Cantos3had3personally3joined3his3company3during3the3internal3Court3proceedings3against3the3government3(Cantos( v( Argentina,3 2001:3 §30).2053However,3 what3 these3 cases3 show3 is3 that3 the333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333203 3Despite3 this,3 Marius3 Emberland3 claims3 that3 shareholder3 petitions3 for3 identification3 are3dismissed3as3inadmissible3since3they3lie3out3of3the3scope3of3the3tribunals’3jurisdiction3(2004:3265).32043The3Commission3confirmed3that3veil3piercing3can3only3occur3 in3specific3circumstances3during3the3case3Caravallo(Quintana(v(Argentina((2001)(where3it3stated3“in3principle,3shareholders3cannot3claim3to3be3victims3of3interference3with3the3rights3of3a3company3absent(showing(a(direct(effect(on(
their(rights”3 (§54,3emphasis3added;3 see3also3BendeckSCohdinsa((Zacarías(E.(Bendeck)(v(Honduras,31999:(§18H9;3also3Tabacalera3Boquerón(v(Paraguay,(1997:(§27).32053Shareholder3participation3was3also3used3in3BendeckSCohdinsa((Zacarías(E.(Bendeck)(v(Honduras3(1999:3 §18H19),3Bernard(Merens(and(Family(v(Argentina((1999:3 §3),3 and3Tabacalera(Boquerón3 v(





legal3 structure3 of3 the3 corporation3 is3 such3 that3 in3 one3 way3 or3 another3 the3corporation3or3its3shareholders3can3access3human3rights3courts.33This3 section3 has3 examined3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system’s3 practice3 regarding3corporate3 rights.3 The3 explicit3 rejection3 of3 legal3 persons3 in3 the3 Convention3 has3provided3the3legal3justification3for3dismissing3corporate3petitions.3Shareholders,3on3the3other3hand,3are3privy3 to3 the3protection3of3 the3Convention3as3 individuals.3The3section3has3highlighted3the3sometimesHsubtle3tension3between3the3Commission3and3the3Court3by3detailing3a3few3cases3where3it3was3necessary3to3identify3the3victim3as3either3the3corporation3or3shareholder.33What3became3evident3in3this3discussion3was3that3 in3some3cases3shareholder3rights3were3granted3 in3 lieu3of3 the3corporation.3 In3other3words,3 the3corporation3 in3some3cases3benefitted3from3the3protection3of3 the3Convention3through3its3shareholder’s3individual3rights.3The3cases3discussed3in3this3section3 raise3 questions3 about3 the3 responsibility3 of3 the3 shareholder.3 Perhaps3 an3unintentional3 outcome3 of3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system’s3 piercing3 of3 the3 corporate3veil3 to3 endow3 shareholders3 with3 rights3 is3 the3 identification3 of3 the3 particular3position3of3the3shareholder3who3is3otherwise3‘shielded3from3law’3(Glasbeek,32002;3see3 Chapter3 3).3 In3 other3 words,3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system’s3 piercing3 of3 the3corporate3veil3in3order3to3ensure3the3rights3of3shareholders3gives3rise3to3questions3about3 the3 comparable3 possibility3 of3 piercing3 the3 corporate3 veil3 to3 engage3shareholders’3responsibility3in3cases3of3violations3of3human3rights.33On3one3hand,3the3ACHR3explicitly3excludes3legal3persons3from3its3protection.3This3is3 a3 major3 difference3 with3 the3 ECHR,3 and3 it3 has3 had3 an3 impact3 on3 the3 cases3admitted3before3the3IACtHR.3The3concept3of3human3rights3 is3 thus3different3 form3the3 European3 system3 since3 corporations3 are3 not3 considered3 victims3 of3 human3rights3abuses.3The3formal3exclusion3of3legal3persons3is3a3concrete3mechanism3with3which3to3challenge3the3intrusion3of3business3into3the3human3rights3paradigm.3On3the3other3hand,3shareholders3are3recognised3as3potential3victims3of3human3rights3abuses3 in3 their3capacity3as3 individuals.3The3case3of3105(Shareholders(of(Banco(de(





individualised3 conception3 of3 human3 rights3 (see3 Chapter3 6). 206 3The3individualisation3of3 human3 rights3 has3 two3 implications.3 Firstly,3 the3 shareholder3has3 the3 right3 to3 claim3 a3 violation3 of3 a3 human3 right3 without3 having3 any3corresponding3 responsibility3 for3 the3 potential3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3committed3 by3 the3 company3 in3 which3 s/he3 has3 invested.3 In3 other3 words,3“[shareholders]3 have3 no3 responsibility3 for3 what3 is3 done,3 to3 whom3 or3 to3 what3injury3 is3 done.3 They3 are3 legally3 immune3 and3 socially3 irresponsible”3 (Glasbeek,32005).3Shareholder3immunity3indicates,3once3again,3a3place3where3the3law3enables3and3encourages3profit3maximisation3at3the3expense3of3accountability.207333Secondly,3 by3 generally3 not3 identifying3 the3 shareholder3 with3 the3 company,3Emberland3 (2004)3 suggests,3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system3 maintains3 a3 ‘businessHfriendly’3approach.3He3believes3the3categorical3separation3of3the3shareholder3from3the3company3does3not3always3fit3with3the3universality3of3human3rights3protection.3For3Emberland,3the3formal3distinction3between3the3shareholder3and3company3does3not3necessarily3need3 to3be3upheld3 at3 the3 level3 of3 international3 human3 rights3 law3because3it3can3result3in3what3he3considers3unreasonable3results.3Notwithstanding,3although3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system3 maintains3 the3 corporate3 veil3 stricto3 sensu3there3are3cases,3such3as3Cantos(v(Argentina,3 that3demonstrate3 the3slippery3slope3appreciation3 of3 shareholder3 identification.3 This3 confirms3 the3 argument3 that3despite3a3normatively3different3concept3of3human3rights,3the3IACtHR3as3well3as3its3Commission,3 and3 the3 ECtHR3 have3 both3 substantively3 adopted3 businessHfriendly3models3of3human3rights3law.33





corporations.3 The3 exclusion3 of3 legal3 persons3 from3 the3ACHR3 is3 significant3 and3 is3crucial3to3understanding3the3differences3between3how3the3ECtHR3and3the3IACtHR3have3 approached3 the3 question3 of3 corporate3 personhood3 and3 corporate3 human3rights.3However,3the3case3law3demonstrates3that3despite3statutory3differences3there3is3a3tendency,3in3both3Courts,3to3enlarge3the3scope3of3corporate3human3rights,3and3thus3 ultimately3 reinforce3 a3 marketHoriented3 human3 rights3 law.3 Consequently,3despite3 what3 appears3 at3 first3 glance3 to3 be3 a3 significant3 difference,3 i.e.3 the3exclusion/inclusion3 of3 legal3 persons,3 both3 the3 ECtHR3 and3 the3 InterHAmerican3human3rights3system3appear3to3be3promoting3businessHfriendly3models3of3human3rights3protection.33The3 next3 chapter3 examines3 the3 current3 mechanisms3 in3 each3 Court3 for3 dealing3with3corporate3harms3through3a3detailed3analysis3of3some3of3the3relevant3case3law3from3each3 system.3The3 existing3mechanisms3 are3 firstly,3 the3 doctrine3 of3 positive3obligations,3which3calls3on3the3state3to3act3in3order3to3protect3against,3as3well3as3to3




















Section3 II3explores3 the3mechanism3of3 the3 ‘horizontal3effect’3–3also3known3as3 the3‘third3party3effect’3or3Drittwirkung((discussed3below3at3Section3II).3The3horizontal3effect3 is3 a3 mechanism3 that3 attributes3 responsibility3 to3 the3 state3 for3 harms3 not3caused3 directly3 by3 the3 state,3 but3 by3 a3 violation3 by3 a3 nonHstate3 actor3 to3 another3individual.3 It3 is3 a3 controversial3 mechanism3 in3 both3 the3 European3 and3 InterHAmerican3 systems,3 endorsed3 under3 the3 umbrella3 of3 the3 doctrine3 of3 positive3obligations3 in3 part3 because3 it3 breaches3 the3 public/private3 divide3 by3 addressing3violations3of3human3rights3between3 individuals.3The3due3diligence3standard3and3the3 duty3 to3 prevent3 are3 explained3 and3 scrutinised3 using3 key3 cases3 from3 each3system.3 These3 cases3 are3 used3 to3 analyse3 the3 application3 of3 these3 existing3mechanisms3 and3 their3 potential3 for3 addressing3 corporate3 violations3 of3 human3rights.3Section3III3reflects3on3some3of3the3differences3and3similarities3between3the3InterHAmerican3 and3 European3 positions3 regarding3 the3 human3 rights3responsibilities3 of3 nonHstate3 actors3 and3what3 these3 differences3 and3 similarities3imply3regarding3barriers3to3corporate3responsibility.3
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1985)209 ,3 changes3 in3 administrative3 practice3 (e.g.3 Gaskin( v( UK,3 1989)210 3or3constant3 financial3 efforts3 (e.g.3 Airey( v( Ireland,3 1979) 211 3aimed3 at3 enabling3individuals3to3enjoy3their3fundamental3rights3in3practice.33





rights.3 The3 emergence3 of3 positive3 obligations3 has3 been3 a3 development3 within3human3rights,3since3originally3the3duty3of3 the3state3to3protect3human3rights3was3characterised3 as3 a3 negative3 obligation3 to3 abstain3 from3 civil3 and3 political3 rights3violations.3Through3positive3obligations,3 the3state3has3been3held3responsible3 for3acts3of3third3parties,3as3well3as3for3some3rare3cases3of3violations3of3ESC3rights3(e.g.3
Demir(and(Baykara(v(Turkey,32008).2123333The3recognition3of3some3ESC3rights3(see3also3Chapter32)3mitigated3challenges3and3pressures3 for3 change,3 and3 civil3 unrest3 due3 to3 growing3 inequalities3 and3 socioHeconomic3polarisations3in3the31970s.3ESC3rights3identify3the3additional3role3of3the3state3to3promote3and3safeguard3human3rights3not3only3from3the3government3but3also3 from3further3potential3violations3and3other3nonHstate3violators.3However,3 it3must3 be3 emphasised3 that3 ESC3 rights3 are3 only3 a3 part3 of3 the3 doctrine3 of3 positive3obligations3and3in3fact3most3cases3involving3the3doctrine3of3positive3obligations3do3










Court3 “extends3 and3 applies3 the3 Convention,3 in3 light3 of3 political3 and3 social3developments3and3changes3of3conditions3of3life,3beyond3the3original3conceptions3of3the3period3when3the3Convention3was3drafted3or3entered3into3force”3(2007:313).3In3other3words,3the3Court’s3interpretation3of3the3ECHR3evolves3or3is3supposed3to3evolve3with3the3changes3of3society3in3order3to3maintain3a3contemporary3relevance.3The3application3of3 the3dynamic3approach3has3 included3 interpreting3specific3ESC3rights3 into3 the3 Convention3 through3 some3 of3 its3 case3 law.3 Wildhaber3 has3commented3on3the3role3of3the3judge3in3expanding3the3scope3of3obligations3through3judicial3interpretation.3He3suggests3that,333 The3Court3is3understandably3wary3of3extending3its3case3law3on3positive3obligations.3It3has3first3to3be3convinced3not3only3that3there3has3been3a3clear3evolution3of3morals,3but3that3this3evolution,3where3 appropriate3 substantiated3 by3 an3 accompanying3 evolution3 of3 scientific3knowledge,3is3reflected3in3the3law3and3practice3of3a3majority3of3the3Contracting3States.3The3Court3will3 then3 interpret3 the3 terms3of3 the3Convention3 in3 the3 light3of3 that3evolution.3 It3 is3not,3 I3 would3 say,3 the3 Court’s3 role3 to3 engineer3 changes3 in3 society3 or3 to3 impose3 moral3choices3(2004:386).33However,3 the3 judicial3 interpretations3 that3 led3 to3 the3 reading3 of3 positive3obligations3 into3 the3ECHR3 indicate3 that3 there3 is3 a3 role3 for3 judges3 in3moving3 the3law3 forward.3 It3 also3 indicates3 a3diversification3 in3 strategies3of3 adjudication3 (see3Chapter313and37).33The3 role3 of3 the3 judges3 at3 the3 IACtHR3 has3 demonstrated3 a3 similar3 method3 of3interpretation3that3may3act3as3a3catalyst.3The3potential3of3 judicial3 interpretation3can3be3evidenced3 in3cases3such3as3Acevedo(Buendía(et(al.(v(Peru((2009)3wherein3the3IACtHR3considered3the3issue3of3social3security3benefits.3The3Court3decided3to3consider3 the3applicant’s3claim3under3 the3right3of3property3 instead3of3ESC3rights,3although3it3took3ESC3rights3into3account3when3deciding3on3the3content3of3the3right3to3property.2133The3IACtHR3noted3that3just3as3property3rights3can3be3limited3by3the3law,3so3too3can3ESC3rights3(Lixinski,32010:3595).3The3IACtHR3eventually3found3that3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332133The3 IACtHR3 has3 made3 several3 broad3 interpretations3 of3 the3 right3 to3 property,3 including3extending3 this3 right3 to3 shares3 in3 a3 company,3 discussed3 in3Chapters3 33 and363 (see3Case(of( IvcherS






the3failure3of3the3state3to3comply3with3its3own3constitutional3law,3which3protected3social3 security3 as3 a3 property3 interest,3 violated3 the3 ACHR3 (ibid).3 Moreover,3 as3Lixinski3points3out,3concerning3politically3sensitive3issues,3such3as3those3involving3ESC3rights3or3for3example3indigenous3issues,3the3Court3often3relies3on3internal3law3as3a3means3of3giving3content3to3the3ACHR.333Interestingly,3Lixinski3(ibid)3explains3 that3 the3IACtHR3also3relied3on3the3drafting3history3of3Article3263to3argue3that3it3suggested3a3commitment3to3the3protection3of3ESC3rights3by3the3drafting3states3that3wanted3to3give3‘certain3binding3force’3to3the3provision.3Moreover,3 the3 IACtHR3also3 recalled3 the3 indivisibility3of3human3 rights3(Acevedo(Buendía(v(Peru,3 2009:3 §101),3 as3well3 as3 the3 case3 law3of3 the3 ECtHR3on3positive3obligations2143(ibid).2153Moreover,3GonzalezHSalzberg3points3out3 that3 the3IACtHR3 declared3 that3 states3 are3 under3 the3 positive3 obligation3 of3 adopting3measures3 in3 order3 to3 guarantee3 the3 satisfaction3 of3 ESC3 rights,3 but3 that3 this3obligation3was3subject3to3the3economic3and3financial3resources3of3the3state3(2011:3132).3What3is3significant3about3this3case3is3that3the3IACtHR3stated3that3progressive3development3 may3 be3 subject3 to3 accountability3 through3 the3 Court3 (Acevedo(





lacking3due3to3the3fact3that3the3Court3differentiated3between3the3obligation3of3the3progressive3realisation3of3ESC3rights3and3the3immediate3enforceability3of3the3right3to3property.3The3IACtHR3stated3that3these3were3different3obligations3and3held3that3in3 case3 of3 Acevedo( Buendía3 only3 the3 protection3 of3 property3 had3 been3 violated.3Despite3the3final3basis3of3the3judgement3on3property3rights,3the3case3highlights3the3role3 for3 the3 judges3 to3 interpret3 the3 Convention3 in3 ways3 that3 may3 extend3 its3protection,3for3example3by3affirming3the3justiciability3of3ESC3rights.33Both3 Courts3 have3 specific3 provisions3 that3 govern3 the3 interpretation3 of3 the3application3of3the3ACHR3and3the3ECHR3in3the3private3sphere,3i.e.3Article3293ACHR3and3Article3173ECHR.3In3both3cases,3the3application3of3the3respective3Convention3in3the3private3sphere3is3an3indirect3application.2163The3state3must3ensure3the3rights3of3 their3 respective3 Convention3 are3 upheld3 between3 individuals3 as3 part3 of3 its3positive3duty3to3intervene3wherever3there3are3violations3of3human3rights3(i.e.3the3positive3obligations3doctrine).3Thus,3the3violation3of3a3human3right3by3a3nonHstate3actor3triggers3state3responsibility3for3the3violation3because3the3state3allowed3said3violation3 either3 by3 acting3 or3 omitting3 to3 act3 to3 prevent3 it.3 Attributing3responsibility3to3the3state3for3a3violation3by3a3nonHstate3actor3to3a3nonHstate3actor3victim3is3called3the3horizontal3effect.333The3horizontal3 effect3 has3been3 applied3 at3 the3ECtHR,3 although3 its3 application3 is3controversial3(below3at3Section32.1.).3The3IACtHR3has3also3applied3the3horizontal3effect3but3has3gone3 further3by3applying3 the3mechanism3of3 ‘due3diligence’,3which3not3 only3 triggers3 the3 responsibility3 of3 the3 state3 for3 the3 violation3of3 a3 right3 by3 a3nonHstate3actor,3but3also3requires3the3state3to3provide3a3remedy3 for3the3violation3(below3 at3 Section3 2.2).3 Positive3 obligations3 and3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 appear3 as3two3 sides3 of3 the3 same3 coin3 since3 Convention3 rights3 are3 mediated3 by3 the3obligations3 taken3 by3 the3 member3 states3 in3 Article3 13 ECHR2173and3 Article3 13333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332163Articles3173ECHR3and3Article3293ACHR3prohibit3the3abuse3of3Convention3rights3not3only3by3the3state3but3also3by3private3groups3or3persons.3For3rare3cases3where3this3provision3has3been3applied3at3the3ECtHR,3Spielmann3(2006:3ftnt325)3suggests3seeing3Garaudy(v(France3(2003)3and3Norwood(v(





ACHR218.3However,3 the3effects3of3different3positive3obligations3doctrines3are3not3identical.3 We3 examine3 the3 implications3 of3 these3 different3 positive3 obligations3doctrines3for3each3Court3in3more3detail3below.33
II.!Human!Rights!in!the!‘Private!Sphere’:!the!Horizontal!Effect!3There3 is3 a3 key3 difference3 between3 the3 doctrine3 of3 positive3 obligations3 and3 the3horizontal3 effect:3 positive3 obligations3 require3 the3 state3 to3 intervene3 to3 protect3human3rights3–3to3do3something.3The3horizontal3effect3makes3the3state3responsible3for3having3allowed3a3violation3by3a3third3party3to3occur.3It3places3responsibility3on3the3state3by3considering3that3a3government3may3be3involved3directly3or3indirectly3in3a3human3rights3violation3due3to3its3failure3to3prohibit,3prevent,3or3stop3human3rights3abuses3between3individuals3(i.e.3in3what3concerns3this3thesis3the3nonHstate3actor’s3 violation3 of3 the3 right3 of3 a3 physical3 individual).3 Horizontality3 is3 a3mechanism3stemming3from3a3principle3in3German3law3known3as3Drittwirkung.21933





fundamental3 or3 human3 rights3 do3 not3 apply3 between3 individuals3 directly,3 but3rather3through3the3mandatory3rules3of3private3law3and3the3general3application3of3private3 law.3 In3 this3 general3 application,3 private3 law3 must3 be3 interpreted3 in3accordance3with3human3rights.3In3the3past3twenty3years,3the3horizontal3effect3has3been3 broadly3 integrated3 into3 human3 rights3 law,3 although3 it3 remains3 a3controversial3doctrine.333
Drittwirkung3 is3 a3 highly3 complex3 concept3 in3 international3 human3 rights3 law.3Clapham3 (2006)3 specifies3 that3 it3 is3 indeed3 more3 accurately3 Drittwirkung( der(
Grundrechte,3 or3 thirdHparty3effect3of3 fundamental3 rights3 that3might3apply3 to3 the3violations3 of3 human3 rights3 by3 corporations.3 He3 explains3 that3 there3 exists3 a3difference,3 in3 the3 German3 doctrine,3 between3 mittelbare( Drittwirkung3 and3
unmittelbare( Drittwirkung.3Mittelbare3 Drittwirkung3 means3 that3 the3 values3 and3principles3surrounding3constitutional3fundamental3rights3are3to3be3considered3by3the3 Courts3when3 they3 are3 deciding3 private3 law3 cases.3 3 Rights3 are3 consequently3mediated3 through3 the3 law3 (Clapham,3 1993b:3 165;3 2006:3 521)3 –3 or3 in3 short3
mittelbare( Drittwirkung( implies3 an3 indirect3 mechanism3 of3 accountability.33
Unmittelbare( Drittwirkung3 means3 that3 national3 courts3 can3 directly3 apply3 the3rights3against3private3bodies;3the3rights3are3unmediated.3Dean3Spielmann,3current3President3 of3 the3 ECtHR,3 (1995:3 18H64)3 clarifies3 that3 this3 results3 in3 a3 direct3horizontal3 effect3 in3which3 national3 Courts3 can3 directly3 apply3 the3 Convention3 in3private3 law.3 Monist3 legal3 systems3 implement3 the3 direct3 application3 of3 human3rights3conventions,3which3incorporate3ratified3treaties3directly3into3national3law.333This3Chapter3focuses3on3mittelbare(Drittwirkung,3since3it3is3the3principle3that3has3been3applied3to3violations3of3human3rights3by3nonHstate3actors3(Clapham,32006).3The3 remainder3 of3 the3 thesis3 will3 refer3 to3 mittelbare( Drittwirkung( as3 the3‘horizontal3effect’.3Although3in3the3case3law3and3in3the3literature3horizontality3and3





Chapter;3 and3 secondly3 because3 it3 is3 argued3 here3 that3 contrary3 to3 the3 legal3literature,3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 and3 Drittwirkung( are3 not3 interchangeable.3















Opuz( case,3 the3 ECtHR3 held3 that3 the3 national3 authorities3 did3 not3 display3 due3diligence3and3 therefore3 failed3 in3 their3positive3obligation3 to3protect3 the3 right3 to3life3of3the3applicant’s3mother3within3the3meaning3of3Article323ECHR.33The3ECtHR3further3expanded3on3the3duty3to3prevent3in3A(v(UK((1998)2233when3it3noted3that,333 (…)3Article333requires3States3to3take3measures3designed3to3ensure3that3individuals3within3their3 jurisdiction3 are3 not3 subject3 to3 torture3 or3 degrading3 treatment3 or3 punishment,3including3 such3 ill3 treatment3 administered3 by3 private3 individuals.3 Children3 and3 other3vulnerable3 individuals,3 in3 particular,3 are3 entitled3 to3 State3 protection,3 in3 the3 form3 of3effective3deterrence,3against3such3serious3breaches3of3personal3integrity3(§22;3see3also3X(
and(Y(v(the(Netherlands,31985).33Ziemele3(2009)3refers3to3the3existing3comparison3between3the3IACtHR’s3notion3of3the3 obligation3 to3 prevent3 and3 the3 ECtHR’s3 approach3 to3 the3 real3 and3 immediate3risk3criterion3established3by3the3Osman3(1998)3case.3In3both3Courts,3there3exists3a3duty3 to3 prevent:3 the3 state3 has3 a3 duty3 to3 ensure3 effective3 deterrence3 and3 is3responsible3 if3 that3 deterrence3 is3 found3 wanting.3 The3 difference3 between3 the3Courts3is3that3in3the3case3of3due3diligence3at3the3IACtHR,3explained3below3at32.2.,3not3only3is3the3state3responsible3for3allowing3the3violation3to3occur,3it3also3has3the3responsibility3 to3 punish,3 even3 retroactively,3 the3 private3 party3 as3 part3 of3 its3obligation3 to3 provide3 an3 effective3 remedy.3 However,3 at3 the3 ECtHR,3 the3responsibility3 of3 the3 state3 lies3 in3monetary3 compensation3 for3 the3 victim3 and3 in3providing3 national3 remedies3 for3 the3 third3 party’s3 discriminatory3 policies3 in( the(





responsibility3 for3 the3 violation3 but3 cannot3 act3 retroactively3 to3 remedy3 the3violation.3In3other3words,3because3the3ECtHR3prohibits3retroactive3remedies,3the3potential3nonHstate3violator3 is3not3necessarily3 subject3 to3any3 liability3 (discussed3below3at3Section32.2.).33At3the3IACtHR,3states3are3under3a3general3duty3to3respect3and3ensure3the3rights3of3the3 Convention3 set3 out3 in3 Article3 1(1)3 ACHR.3 These3 general3 duties3 are3 guiding3principles3that3establish3the3framework3for3attributing3responsibility3to3the3state3under3the3ACHR.3The3general3duty3to3respect3enshrined3 in3Article31(1)3entails3a3negative3obligation3on3the3state3not3to3violate3the3rights3recognized3in3the3ACHR.3Thus,3 “[w]henever3a3 State3organ,3 official3 or3public3 entity3 violates3 [a3Convention3right],3this3constitutes3a3failure3of3the3duty3to3respect3(…)”3(VelásquezSRodríguez(v(
Honduras,3 1988:3§169).2253Moreover,3 the3general3duty3 to3ensure,3 also3enshrined3under3 Article3 1(1)3 ACHR,3 “involves3 a3 positive3 obligation3 to3 organize3governmental3 structures,3 adopt3 appropriate3 measures3 and3 take3 action3 to3guarantee3 the3 free3 and3 full3 exercise3 of3 rights”3 (RodríguezHPinzón3 and3 Martin,32006:3138).333The3 duty3 to3 ensure3 obliges3 states3 “to3 prevent,3 investigate3 and3 punish3 any3violation3 of3 the3 rights3 recognized3 by3 the3 Convention3 and,3moreover,3 if3 possible3attempt3to3restore3the3right3violated3and3provide3compensation3as3warranted3for3damages3 resulting3 from3 the3 violation”3 (GodínezSCruz( v( Honduras,3 1989:3 §175;3
VelásquezSRodríguez( v( Honduras,3 1988:3 §166).3 The3 IACommHR3 has3 also3commented3on3 the3duty3 to3prevent3noting3 that3 “the3obligation3 to3protect3 is3 the3duty3to3prevent3third3parties3from3interfering3with,3hindering3or3barring3access3to3the3 resources3 that3 are3 the3 object3 of3 that3 right”3 (Report( on( Citizen( Security( and(
Human(Rights,32009:3IV§35).3In3other3words,3Article31(1)3ACHR3imposes3a3double3obligation3upon3the3state.3In3accepting3the3Convention,3member3states3undertake3to3 “respect3 the3 rights3 and3 freedoms3 recognized3 by3 the3 Convention”3 (Velásquez(












ECtHR3 and3 the3 IACtHR,3 it3 appears3 that3 although3 in3 both3Courts3 there3 are3 some3cases3 that3 raise3 the3 horizontal3 effect,3 they3 are3 less3 likely3 to3 defend3 their3judgements3based3on3 the3doctrine3of3 the3horizontal3effect3 rather3 than3 the3more3general3concept3of3positive3obligations.33The3 European3 and3 InterHAmerican3 human3 rights3 systems3 converge3 on3 their3adherence3 to3 the3 doctrine3 of3 positive3 obligations.3 They3 promote3 the3 traditional3application3of3 international3human3rights3 law,3stipulating3that3the3responsibility3for3human3rights3falls3on3the3state,3as3opposed3to3the3individual3or3third3party.3In3other3words,3 the3 responsibility3 of3 individuals3 for3 human3 rights3 violations3 in3 an3international3 human3 rights3 Court3 is3 not3 recognised3 in3 either3 system.3 This3 is3 a3distinct3aspect3of3human3rights3 law3since3 in3other3 international3 instruments3the3emphasis3 has3 been3 on3 the3 direct3 liability3 of3 individuals,2263and3 of3 particular3relevance3 here,3 on3 corporations.3 The3 horizontal3 effect3 makes3 the3 state3responsible3 for3 the3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3 by3 third3 parties,3 both3 physical3persons3 and3 legal3 entities.3 In3 this3 respect,3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 has3 a3 unique3potential3 to3 impute3 responsibility3 upon3 states3 where3 they3 may3 be3 considered3liable3for3corporate3violations3of3human3rights.3However,3as3will3be3shown3in3the3discussion3 that3 follows,3 the3 IACtHR3 and3 the3 ECtHR3 do3 not3 always3 interpret3 or3apply3the3horizontal3effect3in3the3same3ways.333
2.1.!Negotiating! the! ‘Private’!Sphere!at! the!European!Court!of!Human!





negative3undertaking3 there3may3be3positive3obligations3 inherent3 in3 an3 effective3‘respect’3[of3the3provision]”3(§31).333The3application3of3the3ECHR3in3the3private3sphere3was3consolidated3in3a3series3of3Decisions3 and3 Judgements3 throughout3 the31980s.3 The3 case3 of3Young,( James(and(





the3right3to3counterHdemonstrate3cannot3extend3to3 inhibiting3the3exercise3of3the3right3 to3demonstrate.3The3ECtHR3emphasised3 that3all3 international3and3regional3human3rights3conventions3grant3 individuals3the3rights3to3freedom3of3association3and3peaceful3assembly,3with3certain3permissible3restrictions.3It3noted,33 Genuine,3effective3freedom3of3peaceful3assembly3cannot3(…)3be(reduced(to(a(mere(duty(on(
the( part( of( the( State( not( to( interfere:3 a3 purely3 negative3 conception3 would3 not3 be3compatible3with3the3object3and3purpose3of3Article3113[of3 the3European3Convention]3(…)3Like3Article3 8,3 Article3 113 sometimes3 requires3positive(measures3 to3 be3 taken,3 even( in( the(
sphere(of(relations(between(individuals,3if3need3be3(§32,3emphasis3added).33The3judgements3of3X(and(Y(and3Plattform(Ärzte(für(das(Leben3call3attention3to3the3Court’s3 position3 on3 the3 positive3 obligations3 of3 the3 state.3 According3 to3 these3examples,3 CoE3 member3 states3 have3 a3 duty3 to3 secure3 the3 protection3 of3fundamental3 human3 rights3 even3 in3 the3 sphere3 of3 the3 relations3 of3 private3individuals.333The3 evolution3 of3 the3 ECtHR’s3 case3 law3 is3 further3 highlighted3 in3 Soering( v( UK3(1989)3 where3 the3 Court3 considered3 whether3 extradition3 to3 the3 USA3 to3 an3American3 state3 that3 practiced3 capital3 punishment3 constituted3 a3 violation3 of3Article3 33 ECHR,3 which3 guarantees3 the3 right3 against3 inhumane3 and3 degrading3treatment.3 Although3 it3 did3 not3 use3 the3 vocabulary3 of3 positive3 obligations,3 its3reasoning3 indicates3 a3move3 away3 from3 focusing3 on3 negative3 responsibilities3 by3enlarging3the3scope3of3state3responsibility3for3breaches3of3ECHR3rights.3The3ECtHR3has3 stated3 that3 the3 Convention3 applies3 between3 individuals3 in3 some3 situations,3although3 it3 is3 explicitly3 reluctant3 to3 elaborate3 a3 set3 of3 principles3 for3 its3applicability3 in3 the3 private3 sphere.3 The3 case3 of3 Vgt(Verein( gegen(Tierfabriken( v(










3However,3Garlicki3makes3a3clear3distinction3between3positive3obligations3and3the3horizontal3effect.3He3explains3the3applicability3of3the3horizontal3effect3depends3on3the3organs3enforcing3 the3Convention,3or3 the3 interpretation3of3 the3Court3and3 the3Committee3 of3Ministers.3He3 evaluates3 the3 application3 of3 the3horizontal3 effect3 at3the3Court,3stating3that3although,333 (…)3True(horizontal(effect3does3not3occur3in3Strasbourg3(…)3this3does3not3mean3the3Court3rejects3the3idea3that3the3Convention3has3a3 ‘radiating’3effect3on3relations3between3private3actors.3 Indeed,3 in3 the3past3 thirty3years3 there3have3been3numerous3examples3of3 cases3 in3which,3 as3a3matter3of3 fact,3 the3Court3has3been3confronted3with3private3actions3violating3the3 rights3 and3 liberties3 of3 other3 persons.3 In3 many3 of3 these3 cases3 it3 would3 have3 been3possible,3 intellectually,3 to3 follow3 the3 German3 concept3 of3 ‘indirect3 third3 party3 effect’3 to3‘discover’3the3same3concept3in3the3‘living3text’3of3the3Convention3and3to3draw3from3it3some3obligations3 of3 the3 Member3 States.3 However,3 the3 new3 Court,3 following3 the3 approach3adopted3 by3 the3 earlier3 Court3 and3 Commission,3 simply( did( not( want( to( develop( the(
Convention(in(this(direction3(ibid:3142,3emphasis3added).33Garlicki3 defines3 “true3horizontal3 effect”3 as3Drittwirkung3 (refer3 to3 the3discussion3above),3 which3 was3 defined3 as3 human3 rights3 law3 binding3 individuals3 in3 their3relations3 between3 themselves.3 Articles3 3,3 8H113 and3 13,3 he3 argues,3 point3 to3 the3possibility3of3judicial3manoeuvring3through3more3generous3interpretations3of3the3ECHR3 into3 the3 sphere3 of3 private3 persons.3 Instead3 of3 formally3 integrating3 the3horizontal3 effect,3 he3 claims,3 the3 Court3 has3 assumed3 these3 provisions3 may3 be3interpreted3to3impose3positive3obligations3“not3only3on3Member3States,3but3also,3indirectly,3 on3 private3 persons”3 (ibid:3 132).3 In3 this3 way,3 some3 judges3 have3attempted3to3negotiate3the3horizontal3effect3into3the3Court’s3case3law3by3making3violations3of3one3individual’s3rights3by3another3individual3imputable3to3the3state3by3its3actions3or3omissions3to3guarantee3the3right3or3prevent3the3violation.33





Taking3a3more3decisive3position,3Spielmann3has3maintained3 that3on3 the3basis3of3the3Convention’s3textual3indications,3i.e.3the3ECHR,3particularly3at3Article31,3and3its3Protocols.3Spielmann3asserts3that3the,333 (…)3Court3has3developed3its3positive3obligations3doctrine3which3has3constituted3a3robust3tool3for3the3enforcement3of3the3Convention3rights,3in3conferring3indirect3horizontal3effect3on3the3substantive3provisions3[of3the3Convention]3(2007:3428).333Nonetheless,3he3points3out,3private3actors3do3not3have3direct3obligations3that3stem3from3the3Convention,3even3 though3they3may3violate3 it3by3 infringing3 the3rights3 it3protects.3For3example,3if3a3company3rejects3the3candidacy3of3an3individual3based3on3sexual3orientation3 it3has3 infringed3 the3ECHR3rights3of3 the3 individual,3but3 the3company3 is3 not3 responsible3 for3 a3 human3 rights3 violation.3 However,3 the3 Court3emphasised3in3Osman(v(UK3(1998)3that33 Having3regard3to3the3nature3of3 the3right3protected3by3Article323(…)3 it3 is3sufficient3 for3an3applicant3to3show3that3the3authorities3did3not3do3all3that3could3be3reasonably3expected3of3them3 to3 avoid3 a3 real3 and3 immediate3 risk3 to3 life3 of3 which3 they3 have3 or3 ought3 to3 have3knowledge3(§1163emphasis3added).33Thus,3based3on3the3legal3mechanisms3available3or3lacking3under3national3law,3the3ECtHR3 will3 decide3 whether3 the3 case3 triggers3 the3 horizontal3 effect.3 That3 is,3 the3Court3must3decide3whether,3 if3by3 its3actions3or3omissions,3 the3state3allowed3 the3violation3 to3 occur.3 In3 practice,3 responsibility3 is3 imputed3upon3 the3 state3when3 it3has3failed3to3enact3or3enforce3legislation3that3could3have3prevented3or3remedied3the3violation.33There3 is3 case3 law3 demonstrating3 that3 the3 ECtHR3 does,3 in3 some3 cases,3 directly3mediate3the3terms3of3dealing3with3human3rights3violations3between3individuals.3It3has3recognized3that3Convention3rights3may3exert3a3much3more3profound3impact3on3the3relationships3between3private3parties,3even3under3private3 law.3 In3 J.A.(Pye(





still3apply.3With3the3increasing3privatization3of3goods3and3services,3the3horizontal3effect(may3be3one3way3 for3 the3ECtHR3 to3negotiate3 its3 jurisdiction3where3human3rights3 violations3 occur3 between3 human3 and3 legal3 persons.3 This3 approach3indicates3 a3 space3 for3 the3 judicial3 imagination3 to3 develop3 human3 rights3 law3 for3corporate3accountability.333The3 judicial3 recognition3of3state3responsibility3 for3 third3parties3 is3extensive3and3has3remained3consistent3in3the3ECtHR’s3case3law.3In3the3case3of3CostelloSRoberts(v(
UK( 3 (1993)3 regarding3 the3 corporal3 punishment3 of3 a3 sevenHyearHold3 child,3 the3Court3confirmed3that,3“(…)3the3state3cannot3absolve3 itself3 from3responsibility3by3delegating3its3obligations3to3private3bodies3or3 individuals”3(§27,3see3also3A(v(UK,31998).3The3ECtHR3again3 considered3 the3 relationship3between3private3parties3 in3the3 case3 of3Woś(v(Poland3 (2005).3 This3 case3 dealt3with3 a3 legislation3 change3 that3interfered3with3the3applicant’s3compensation3for3forced3labour3during3the3Second3World3War.3The3ECtHR3considered,333 (…)3that3the3fact3that3a3state3chooses3a3form3of3delegation3in3which3some3of3its3powers3are3exercised3 by3 another3 body3 cannot3 be3 decisive3 for3 the3 question3 of3 state3 responsibility3
ratione( personae.3 In3 the3 Court's3 view,3 the3 exercise3 of3 state3 powers3 which3 affects3Convention3 rights3 and3 freedoms3 raises3 an3 issue3 of3 state3 responsibility3 regardless(of( the(
form( in( which( these( powers( happen( to( be( exercised,( be( it( for( instance( by( a( body( whose(





doctrine3 of3 positive3 obligations3 (Garlicki,3 2005:3 132).3 Nonetheless,3 there3 is3enough3 evidence3 in3 the3 ECtHR3 case3 law3 to3 demonstrate3 that3 its3 applicability3 is3possible3 and3 worthwhile.3 The3 mechanism3 of3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 is3 potent3because3 it3 empowers3 judges3 to3 interpret3 the3ECHR3 to3provoke3a3 response3 from3the3state3for3violations3occurring3in3the3‘private3sphere’.3By3so3doing,3the3case3may3result3 in3 changes3 in3 national3 legislation3 and3 in3 this3 way3 perhaps3 even3 address3some3legislative3gaps.33This3 section3 has3 discussed3 the3 subtleties3 of3 how3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 works3within3the3doctrine3of3positive3obligations3at3the3ECtHR.3It3has3done3so3using3the3Court’s3case3law3to3point3out3how3the3two3mechanisms3are3used3in3different3ways3and3 for3 different3 purposes.3 The3 horizontal3 effect3 can3 have3 powerful3 political3consequences3 since3 it3 places3 responsibility3 on3 the3 state3 for3 the3 actions3 or3omissions3 of3 third3 parties.3 Consequently,3 the3 state3 must3 act3 (i.e.3 positive3obligation)3 to3 ensure3 human3 rights3 protection3 along3 with3 its3 traditional3responsibility3 to3 refrain3 from3human3 rights3 violations3 (i.e.3 negative3 obligation).3The3 next3 section3 examines3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 and3 the3 positive3 obligations3doctrine3in3the3InterHAmerican3System.33
2.2.!Horizontality!in!the!Inter1American!System!of!Human!Rights!3The3horizontal3effect3in3the3InterHAmerican3system3has3received3less3attention3in3the3 literature3 than3 the3 European3 human3 rights3 system.3Nevertheless,3 there3 is3 a3jurisprudence3 and3 case3 law3 demonstrating3 the3 incorporation3 of3 the3 horizontal3effect3at3 the3 IACtHR.3Moreover,3 some3IACtHR3 judges3have3directly3endorsed3 the3horizontal3 effect,3 and3 the3 forms3 that3 these3 endorsements3 have3 taken3 will3 be3explored3 below.3 The3 form3 of3 horizontality3 in3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system3 is3identifiable3 through3 the3 doctrine3 of3 ‘due3 diligence’3 and3 the3 recognition3 of3 erga(
omnes(obligations.322833The3due3diligence3doctrine3recognises3that3a3violation3of3a3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332283In3Judge3Cançado3Trindade’s3Concurring3Opinion3on3IACtHR’s3Advisory3Opinion3on3the3Juridical(





human3 right3 by3 a3 private3party3 can3be3 attributed3 to3 the3 state3 if3 it3 cannot3 show3sufficient3measures3were3taken3to3prevent3the3violation.33The3doctrine3places3the3onus3on3the3state3 to3protect3citizens3against3violations3of3human3rights3by3 third3parties3before3they3happen.3In3this3way,3there3is3a3manifest3correlation3between3the3responsibility3of3the3state3and3the3violation.3The3state’s3responsibility3includes3providing3 redress3 for3 the3 victim,3 and3where3 possible3 pursuing3 the3 violator,3 i.e.3providing3a3remedy.3Thus,3the3state3 in3the3InterHAmerican3system3has3a3positive3obligation3to3intervene3in3the3private3sphere3where3a3nonHstate3actor3has3violated3the3right3of3another3nonHstate3actor3and(the3state3must3provide3a3remedy3for3the3violation.333The3concept3of3due3diligence3goes3beyond3the3horizontal3effect3as3it3is3understood3at3 the3ECtHR3because3 it3provides3 for3 the3 legal3pursuit3of3 the3nonHstate3actor3 for3violations3of3human3rights.3The3due3diligence3standard3requires3states3to3prevent,3prosecute3and3sanction3violations3of3human3rights3by3nonHstate3actors.3Thus,3 in3theory3providing3for3the3responsibility3of3the3state3for3allowing3or3not3preventing3the3violation3by3a3nonHstate3actor;3as3well3as,3 the3responsibility3of3 the3nonHstate3actor3even3retroactively.3Thus,3the3state3is3responsible3for3ensuring3legislation3to3guarantee3the3rights3enshrined3in3the3ACHR3and3to3prevent3possible3violations3of3those3 rights.3 If3 no3 such3 legislation3 exists,3 and3 a( fortiori3 no3 enforcement3mechanism,3 then3 the3 state3 can3 be3 considered3 responsible3 before3 the3 Court3 for3deficient3legislation3and3lack3of3due3diligence.3In3other3words,3a3government3may3be3 considered3 responsible3 for3 a3 violation3 of3 a3 human3 right3 either3 directly3 or3indirectly,3 by3 failing3 to3prohibit,3 prevent,3 or3 stop3human3 rights3 abuses3between3individuals.333











governments3 and3 paramilitaries,3 who3 exert3 violence3 against3 Indigenous3populations3 to3 protect3 corporate3 activity.2303According3 to3 Dinah3 Shelton,3 InterHAmerican3Commissioner,3the3protection3of3corporate3projects3“is3a3cause3of3death,3forced3 internal3 displacement,3 and3 the3 like.3 [Indigenous]3 lands3 are3 being3appropriated3 by3 ‘legal’3 companies3 backed3 by3 paramilitary3 violence3 in3 order3 to3develop3their3agroHindustrial,3mining,3or3infrastructural3projects”3(2010:333).33She3goes3on3to3say3that,333With3 respect3 to3 the3 duty3 of3 the3 State3 to3 protect3 the3 right3 to3 life3 with3 respect3 to3 the3Indigenous3peoples,3the3InterHAmerican3Court3has3reiterated3that3 ‘the3States3must3adopt3any3 measures3 that3 may3 be3 necessary3 to3 create3 an3 adequate3 statutory3 framework3 to3discourage3 any3 threat3 to3 the3 right3 to3 life;3 (…)3 and3 to3 protect3 the3 right3 of3 access3 to3conditions3that3may3guarantee3a3decent3life.’3In3this3regard,3the3State3has3the3duty3to3take3positive,3 concrete3 measures3 geared3 toward3 fulfilment3 of3 the3 right3 to3 a3 decent3 life,3especially3 in3 the3case3of3persons3who3are3vulnerable3and3at3risk,3whose3care3becomes3a3high3priority3(ibid:334).33Several3communities3have3“los[t]3their3lands,3their3liberty,3their3identities,3and3too3often3 their3 lives”3 (ibid:3 33)3 in3 cases3 of3 stateHcorporate3 collusion3 against3Indigenous3 communities3 across3 the3Americas.3 The3 specificity3 of3 the3 Indigenous3populations3 in3 the3 Americas3 is3 thus3 a3 unique3 context3 that3 has3 its3 own3 set3 of3human3rights3considerations,3which3the3InterHAmerican3human3rights3system3has3had3 to3 address.3 This3 specificity3 has3 forced3 the3 IACommHR3 and3 IACtHR3 into3contact3 with3 cases3 of3 corporate3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3more3 often3 than3 in3Europe;3and3the3InterHAmerican3judges,3were3often3more3forthcoming3with3their3personal3and3professional3positions3regarding3this3 issue,3which3will3be3explored3below3in3the3next3Chapter.333





The3 horizontal3 effect3 and3 the3 due3 diligence3 standard3 were3 elaborated3 in3 the3landmark3 case3 Velásquez( Rodríguez( v( Honduras3 (1988)231,3 which3 dealt3 with3 a3disappearance3 by3 the3 Honduran3 secret3 police3 aided3 by3 civilians3 acting3 under3police3orders.3The3IACtHR3stated3the3breach3of3the3ACHR,33(…)3 Is3 independent3 of3 whether3 the3 organ3 or3 official3 has3 contravened3 provisions3 of3internal3law3or3overstepped3the3limits3of3his3authority:3under3international3law3a3state3is3responsible3 for3 the3 acts3 of3 its3 agents3 undertaken3 in3 their3 official3 capacity3 and3 for3 their3omissions,3 even3when3 those3 agents3 act3 outside3 the3 sphere3 of3 their3 authority3 or3 violate3internal3law3(§170).23233The3Court3went3on3to3detail3that3a3human3rights3violation,33 (…)3 initially3 not3 directly3 imputable3 to3 a3 state3 (for3 example,3 because3 it3 is3 the3 act3 of3 a3private3 person3 or3 because3 the3 person3 responsible3 has3 not3 been3 identified)3 can3 lead3 to3international3responsibility3of3 the3state,3not3because3of3 the3act3 itself,3but3because3of3 the(
lack( of( due( diligence( to3 prevent3 the3 violation3 or3 to3 respond3 to3 it3 (…)3 (§172,3 emphasis3added).33Former3judge3at3the3IACtHR3A.3A.3Cançado3Trindade3has3explicitly3indicated3that3international3responsibility3may3arise3from3acts3by3third3parties3(i.e.3individuals,3groups3of3 individuals,3and3corporations)3not3attributable3 to3 the3state,3due3 to3 the3failure3 of3 governments3 to3 fulfil3 their3 positive3 obligations3 under3 international3human3rights3law3(Dissenting3Opinion3Personas(haitianas(y(dominicanas(de(orígen(
haitiano(en(La(Republica(Dominicana,32000:3§25).333The3 IACtHR3 thus3 established3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 in3 Velásquez( Rodriguez3 by3holding3 that3 the3 violation3 of3 a3 human3 right3 between3 individuals3 was3 the3responsibility3of3the3state3by3virtue3of3Article31(1)3ACHR.3The3Court3specified3that,333










Due3diligence3is3interpreted3by3the3IACtHR3as3a3mechanism3that3“may3lead3to3the3punishment3of3those3responsible3and3the3obligation3to3indemnify3the3victims3for3damages”3 (ibid:3 §175). 233 3These3 statements3 by3 the3 InterHAmerican3 judiciary3acknowledge3 a3 kind3 of3 horizontality3 with3 the3 potential3 to3 be3 a3 powerful3mechanism3to3uphold3state3responsibility3and3even3corporate3accountability.333Cançado3Trindade3has3consistently3appealed3for3the3evolution3of3the3law3to3deal3with3violations3of3human3rights3by3nonHstate3actors.33 In3Haitians(and(Dominicans(
of(Haitian(Origin(in(the(Dominican(Republic(v(Dominican(Republic,2343he3concluded3his3Opinion3for3the3request3of3Provisional3Measures3stating,33 It3 is,3 moreover,3 urgent3 to3 conceptually3 develop3 the3 law3 regarding3 the3 international3responsibility,3in3a3way3to3also3include,3at(par(with(the(state,(the(responsibility(of(nonSstate(
actors.3From3the3perspective3of3 the3protection3of3human3rights,3 this3 is3one3of3 the3major3failures3of3public3power3and3of3the3juridical3sciences3in3this3‘globalised’3world3in3which3we3live3(2000:3§25,3translated3by3author3from3Spanish,3emphasis3added).235333Cançado3 Trindade’s3 statement3 is3 a3 critique3 of3 the3 lack3 of3 imagination3 and3arguably3the3lack3of3resolve3both3from3the3judiciary3and3the3legislative3regarding3the3 advancement3 of3 human3 rights3 protection3 by3 recognising3 ‘new’3 violators3 of3human3rights3and3therefore3dealing3with3the3violations3that3occur.333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332333Moreover,3 the3 Court3 has3 emphasised3 a3 state’s3 duty3 to3 investigate3 the3 violation3 must3 be3undertaken,33(…)3 In3 a3 serious3 manner3 and3 not3 as3 a3 mere3 formality3 preordained3 to3 be3 ineffective.3 An3investigation3must3have3an3objective3and3be3assumed3by3the3state3as3its3own3legal3duty,3not3as3a3step3taken3by3private3interests3that3depends3upon3the3initiative3of3the3victim3or3his3family3or3upon3their3 offer3 of3 proof3 without3 an3 effective3 search3 for3 the3 truth3 by3 the3 Government3 (Bámaca(
Velásquez(v(Guatemala3at3§212).32343This3 case3 involved3 a3 request3 for3 Provisional3Measures3 in3 order3 to3 avoid3 the3 deportation3 or3expulsion3of3the3petitioners3and3to3enable3them3to3return3immediately3to3the3Dominican3Republic3to3 be3 reunited3with3 their3 children.3 Interestingly,3 Úbeda3 de3 Torres3 (2011:3 208)3 points3 out,3 that3these3 Provisional3 Measures3 differ3 somewhat3 from3 those3 developed3 by3 the3 ECtHR.3 Unlike3 the3ECtHR,3 the3 IACtHR3 does3 not3 require3 the3 existence3 of3 a3 risk3 of3 torture3 or3 of3 inhuman,3 cruel3 or3degrading3 treatments3 before3 granting3 Provisional3 Measures.3 This3 flexibility3 has3 allowed3 the3IACtHR3to3grant3Provisional3Measures,3for3example3in3several3cases3involving3Colombia,3not3only3to3 protect3 the3 lives3 and3 physical3 integrity3 of3 the3 populations3 but3 also3 to3 prevent3 their3 forced3displacement,3or3 if3 they3had3already3been3displaced,3 to3organise3 their3return3whenever3possible3(see3 Order3 for3 the3 Provisional3 Measures3 in3 the3 matter3 of3 the3 Indigenous( People( of( Kankuamo3
regarding(Colombia,32000;3Order3 for3Provisional3Measures3 in3 the3matter3of3 the(Jiguaminadó(and(






The3 horizontal3 effect3 has3 been3 deemed3 by3 some3 judges3 at3 the3 IACtHR3 as3 a3necessary3means3to3ensure3the3protection3of3human3rights3under3the3ACHR.3In3a3Concurring3 Opinion3 in3 the3 Peace( Community( of( San( José( de( Apartadó3 (2002)2363concerning3 Colombia,3 Cançado3 Trindade3 suggested3 the3 state’s3 obligation3 erga(
omnes(to3protect3all3persons3subject3to3its3jurisdiction,3333 (…)3 requires3 a3 clear3 recognition3 of3 the3 effects3 of3 human3 rights3 in3 the3 American3Convention3visHàHvis3third3parties3(Drittwirkung)3without3which3the3obligations3to3protect3under3 the3 Convention3 are3 reduced3 to3 little3 more3 than3 a3 dead3 letter3 (§5,3 translated3 by3author3from3Spanish).237333The3resolution3adopted3by3the3Court3in3Comunidad(de(Paz(de(San(José(de(Apartadó3established3 that3 the3 legal3 development3 of3 the3 erga( omnes( obligations3 of3protection3had3to3assume3a3greater3 importance3because3of3 the3diversification3of3the3 sources3 of3 human3 rights3 violations.3 The3 formal3 acknowledgement3 of3 the3spectrum3of3offenders3is3also3an3informal3recognition3of3the3incapacity3for3human3rights3law3to3deal3with3the3abuses.333In3the3Opinion3noted3above,3Cançado3Trindade3draws3attention3to3the3vertical3and3horizontal3dimensions3of3erga(omnes3human3rights3obligations.3He3references3his3Concurring3 Opinion3 in3 the3 IACtHR’s3 Advisory3 Opinion3 OCH183 on3 the3 Juridical(
Condition( and(Rights( of( Undocumented(Migrants3 (2003),3 which3 has3 become3 the3leading3case3for3the3horizontal3effect3at3the3IACtHR.333 3(…)3The3obligations3erga(omnes3of3protection,3 in3a3horizontal3dimension,3are3obligations3pertaining3to3the3protection3of3the3human3beings3due3to3the3international3community3as3a3whole.2383In3 the3 framework3 of3 conventional3 international3 law,3 they3 bind3 all3 the3 States3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332363In3December31997,3the3IACommHR3requested3the3adoption3of3preventive3measures3on3behalf3of3 the3members3 of3 the3 Peace3 Community3 of3 San( José(de(Apartadó.3 The3 request3 came3 after3 the3killings3of3433members3of3the3Community,3which3had3declared3its3neutrality3in3the3armed3conflict3in3Colombia3that3same3year.3In32000,3the3president3of3the3IACtHR3requested3Provisional3Measures3for31893members3of3the3community.332373The3 quotations3 from3 this3 case3 have3 been3 translated3 from3 the3 Spanish3 version3 of3 the3 case3





Parties3 to3 human3 rights3 treaties3 (obligations3 erga( omnes( partes),3 and,3 in3 the3 ambit3 of3general3 international3 law,3 they3 bind3 all3 the3 states,3 which3 compose3 the3 organized3international3 community,3whether3or3not3 they3 are3Parties3 to3 those3 treaties3 (obligations3
erga(omnes(lato(sensu).3 In3a3vertical3dimension,3the3obligations3erga(omnes3of3protection3bind3both3the3organs3and3agents3of3(State)3public3power,3and3the3individuals3themselves3(in3the3interHindividual3relations).333In3this3Opinion,3Judge3Cançado3Trindade3noted3that3human3rights3protection3erga(
omnes3 encompasses3 all3 the3 parties3 for3 whom3 the3 legal3 norms3 were3 intended3(omnes),3whether3 they3be3members3 of3 the3public3 organs3of3 the3 state3 or3private3persons3 (§76).3 Moreover,3 as3 emphasized3 by3 Judge3 Pesantes3 in3 his3 Concurring3Opinion3 for3 the3 Juridical( Condition( and( Rights( of( Undocumented( Migrants((2003),2393the3 importance3of3 the3Advisory3Opinion3 is3 in3 “establishing3clearly3 the3effectiveness3 of3 human3 rights3 with3 regard3 to3 third3 parties,3 in3 a3 horizontal3conception3 (…)3 (Drittwirkung)”3 (§17).3 Pesantes3 goes3 on3 to3 warn,3 “[t]he3environment3of3 free3will3 that3prevails3 in3private3 law3cannot3become3an3obstacle3that3dilutes3the3binding3effectiveness3erga(omnes(of3human3rights”3(§18).333In3 the3 Advisory3 Opinion3 on3 the3 Juridical(Condition(and(Rights( of(Undocumented(
Migrants((1999),3the3Court3declared3that3fundamental3rights3are3direct3limits3on3the3 actions3 of3 the3 state3 and( of3 individuals.3 In3 a3 powerful3 reminder3 of3 state3responsibility3 for3 human3 rights3 in3 Mariela( Morales( Caro( et( al.( (La( Rochela(





The3 relationship3 between3 the3 state3 and3 nonHstate3 actors3 regarding3 the3responsibility3 of3 human3 rights3 is3 here3 made3 clear.3 The3 state,3 under3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system3 fails3 to3 fulfil3 its3 duty3 where3 it3 has3 not3 taken3 the3 necessary3precautions3 to3 protect3 human3 rights3 (duty3 to3 prevent3 harm3 or3 effective3deterrence),3including3violations3between3private3persons.24033It3 is3worth3noting,3 the3Court3 has3 referred3 to3 ‘third3parties’3 ‘private3 individuals’,3‘private3persons’3or3‘private3groups’,3but3has3yet3to3refer3directly3to3corporations3in3 its3 judgements.3 This3 omission3 is,3 however,3 mitigated3 by3 Judge3 Cançado3Trindade’s3Concurring3Opinion3on3the3Kichwa(Peoples(of(the(Sarayaku(community(
and( its(members(/(Matter(of( the( Indigenous(Community(of( the(Sarayaku(People(v(
Ecuador3(2005;3hereafter(Kichwa3Peoples(of(Sarayaku).2413Unlike3in3similar3cases,3where3the3violations3were3committed3by3paramilitaries,3this3case3referred3to3the3violations3 of3 human3 rights3 by3 a3 corporation.3 Cançado3 Trindade3 reasoned3 that,3“‘states3 have3 the3 obligation3 erga( omnes3 to3 protect3 all3 persons3 under3 their3jurisdiction;3 an3obligation3 that3 involves3not3only3 the3 relationship3with3 the3 state3but3also3with3the3actions3of3third3parties’.3In3[his]3point3of3view,3this3involves3any3third3 party,3 including( individuals( that( constitute( businesses( or( commercial(
enterprises”3(§14,3emphasis3added,3 translated3 from3Spanish3by3the3author).3This3Opinion3 is3 an3 active3 recognition3 of3 the3 role3 of3 corporations3 in3 human3 rights3violation3and3a3reminder3of3the3role3the3state3has3in3reigning3in3corporate3power.3It3is3a3clarification3loaded3with3potential3for3the3Court3to3interpret3the3ACHR3and3begin3 the3 task3 of3 developing3 the3 law3 in3 relation3 to3 achieving3 more3 effective3human3 rights3 protections3 for3 corporate3 violations.3 Ultimately,3 in3 its3 20123Judgement,3 the3 Court3 found3 violations3 to3 the3 right3 to3 prior3 consultation,3 prior3





consent,3 community3 Indigenous3 lands,3 cultural3 identity,3 life3 and3 personal3integrity.33The3 InterHAmerican3 human3 rights3 system3 has3 been3 confronted3 time3 and3 again3with3cases3of3human3rights3abuses3by3third3parties.3These3cases3have3most3often3dealt3with3paramilitary3violence3attributable3to3the3protection3of3the3interests3and3privileges3of3the3wealthy3and3powerful3(Hristov,32009;3Martin3Ortega,32008).3The3most3notorious3of3 these3cases3have3dealt3with3 the3violations3of3human3rights3of3Indigenous3 populations3 across3 the3 Americas,3 usually3 with3 reference3 to3 the3extraction3 of3 natural3 resources3 or3 other3 land3 issues3 that3 have3 lead3 to3 further3violations,3 e.g.3Mapiripán(Massacre( v(Colombia3 (2005,3 discussed3 below);3Pueblo(
Bello( Massacre( v( Colombia3 (2006) 242 ,3 Santo( Domingo( Massacre3 v( Colombia3(2002)243.3 In32000,3the3UN3Special3Rapporteur3on3Indigenous3Populations3noted3in3her3Final3Working3Paper,333 In3the3Working3Group,3numerous3speakers3have3pointed3to3the3forced3expulsion3of3native3peoples3from3their3lands3so3that3Governments3could3increase3logging3and3oil3concessions3to3 multinational3 corporations.3 Others3 have3 spoken3 of3 removal3 purportedly3 to3 protect3Indigenous3communities3from3military3manoeuvres3or3armed3conflict3(UN,32000a:3§71).33The3 Indigenous3 populations3 of3 the3 Americas3 have3 suffered3 from3 multiHtiered3stateHcorporate3exploitation.3A3few3of3these3cases3are3discussed3here3to3highlight3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332423On3 143 January3 1990,3 603 armyHbacked3 paramilitaries3 travelling3 in3 two3 lorries3 entered3 the3community3of3Pueblo3Bello.3The3IACtHR3established3that3the3paramilitaries3belonged3to3the3“Los(










educators,3 journalists,3human3rights3activists,3and3intellectuals3(ibid:378).3Martin3Ortega3similarly3argues3that,333 The3reality3is3that3over3the3last3303years3the3paramilitaries3have3acted3as3private3security3forces3for3elites3and3landowners3and3[have3been]3used3to3suppress3social3protest3in3rural3areas.3 These3 services3 have3 allegedly3 been3 provided3 to3 companies3 too.3 In3 this3 sense,3certain3multinational3 corporations3 have3 been3 involved3 in3 the3 use3 of3 these3 paramilitary3groups3to3resolve3labour3disputes,3but3also3allegedly3have3used3their3terrorising3power3to3displace3 entire3 local3 populations3 in3 order3 to3 use3 their3 land3 for3 their3 investments.3 The3displacement3 of3 the3population3has3 generally3 followed3military3 campaigns3by3 the3 army3and3 paramilitary3 groups3 against3 guerrilla3 groups,3 which3 resulted3 in3 the3 coercion3 of3peasants3 into3 selling3 their3 land3 or3 their3 direct3 expulsion3 through3 threats,3 intimidation,3and3even3summary3executions.3Banana3companies3and3more3recently3palm3growers3(…)3followed3the3vacation3of3the3land3to3establish3their3plantations3(2008:36,3emphasis3added).33Ortega’s3 comment3 emphasises3 the3 direct3 corporate3 involvement3 in3 abuses3 that3have3 been3 supported3 by3 state3 military3 actions.3 The3 IACtHR3 has3 established3 a3unique3case3law3in3light3of3the3circumstances3of3its3member3states.3The3Court3has3interpreted3 the3 due3 diligence3 standard,3 discussed3 above,3 in3 order3 to3 impute3responsibility3 directly3 on3 the3 state3 for3 violation3 itself.3 As3 such,3 the3 IACtHR3 has3considered3the3state3as3one3of3the3principal3actors3in3the3violation3along3with3the3third3party.333In3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system,3 some3 of3 the3 most3 salient3 examples3 of3 positive3obligations3 and3 due3 diligence3 stem3 from3 cases3 addressing3 the3 exploitation3 of3Indigenous3 lands3 or3 other3 violations3 against3 Indigenous3 peoples.3 Examples3 of3cases3regarding3the3exploitation3of3Indigenous3lands3are3cited3in3the3Third(Report(





The3Commission3noted3the3individual3petition3of3the3U’wa3Indigenous3community,3“(…)3in3relation3to3exploration3which3international3oil3companies,3in3cooperation3with3the3Colombian3State3oil3company3(ECOPETROL),3seek3to3carry3out3on3their3traditional3 lands”3 (X:3 §32).3 In3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system,3 Indigenous3 peoples3have3a3“right3to3consultation”3regarding3their3land3(IACommHR,32009:3IX).32443With3regard3to3the3right3to3consultation,3the3Commission3further3stated,33 The3Indigenous3community3alleges3that3it3was3not3properly3consulted3when3ECOPETROL3granted3a3license3to3the3international3oil3companies3to3begin3exploration3of3the3area3with3a3 view3 to3 oil3 drilling3 in3 the3near3 future3 (…)3 if3 proper3 consultations3were3 carried3out,3 it3would3 be3 come3 clear3 that3 oil3 drilling3 cannot3 take3 place3 on3 their3 land3 without3 causing3irreparable3damage3to3their3religious,3economic3and3cultural3identity3and3rights.33The3 Commission3 ultimately3 recommended3 that3 the3 parties3 pursue3 a3 friendly3settlement.2453The3 international3 community3 began3 using3 mediation3 to3 pursue3friendly3 settlements3 of3 disputes3 involving3 human3 rights3 violations3 shortly3 after3establishing3the3international3human3rights3regime3in3the3late31940s.3However,3as3Standaert3(1999)3points3out,3the3horrific3nature3of3human3rights3violations3raises3questions3about3 the3ability3of3mediation3to3encourage3respect3 for3human3rights,3assign3 responsibility3 to3 abusers,3 and3 bring3 a3 sense3 of3 justice3 to3 the3 victims.3Moreover,3 the3 appropriateness3 of3 friendly3 settlements3 in3 human3 rights3 cases3 is3questionable3and3is3discussed3below.3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332443The3 idea3 of3 consent3 refers3 to3 a3 threeHpronged3 test3 outlined3 by3 the3 InterHAmerican3 Court3regarding3violations3of3property3rights3of3Indigenous3peoples3that3was3set3out3in3Saramaka(People(





3Although3 initially3 it3 appeared3 as3 though3 oil3 exploration3 had3 stopped,3 the3Colombian3 government3 along3with3 Oxy3 soon3 continued3 drilling3 on3 U’Wa3 lands,3demonstrating3a3lax3or3even3nonHexistent3commitment3on3the3part3of3the3state3to3protect3Indigenous3lands.2463Lillian3Aponte3Miranda3points3out3that333 While3Occidental3ultimately3abandoned3the3oil3drilling3project3due3to3its3inability3to3find3sufficient3 oil3 to3 render3 continuation3 of3 the3 project3 economically3 worthwhile,3 other3multinational3corporations3continue3to3lobby3the3Colombian3government3for3the3rights3to3drill3oil3on3U’Wa3traditional3lands”3(2007:3662).333The3 persistent3 threat3 to3 U’Wa3 traditional3 lands,3 despite3 the3 IACommHR’s3 and3IACtHR’s3 decisions3 in3 favour3 of3 the3 U’Wa,3 highlights3 the3 inability3 of3 the3international3 human3 rights3 regime3 to3 take3 effective3 action3 when3 dealing3 with3stateHcorporate3 violations3 (Miranda,3 2006).3 Miranda3 persuasively3 argues3 that,3“meaningful3 legal3 accountability3 against3 a3 corporate3 actor3 engaged3 in3 a3 joint3stateHcorporate3 enterprise3 often3 proves3 elusive”3 (2006:3 654).3 The3 international3human3rights3regime3recognises3the3responsibility3of3 the3state3and3relies3on3the3state3 to3 hold3 the3 corporation3 accountable3 (see3 discussion3 on3 the3 stateHcentred3approach3Chapter32),3but3it3has3proved3insufficient3to3protect3human3rights3from3corporate3wrongs.3This3is3a3good3example3of3the3potential3positive3impact3the3UN(





possibility3of3mandated3“recommendations”,3publication3of3a3negative3report,3or3an3unfavourable3ruling3from3the3Court3with3which3it3must3comply3(Article368(1)3ACHR).3However,3Standhaert3argues3that3there3is3a3contradiction3in3using3friendly3settlements3 for3 human3 rights3 cases.3 She3 focuses3 her3 analysis3 on3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system.3She3points3out3 that3 the3 IACommHR’s3position3has3not3always3looked3favourably3upon3friendly3settlements3since3historically,3 the3IACommHR’s3role3 was3 to3 investigate3 human3 rights3 violations3 that3 it3 perceived3 not3 to3 be3conducive3 to3 friendly3 settlements.3 The3 ACHR’s3 friendly3 settlement3 procedures3were3written3using3a3different3philosophy3that3viewed3human3rights3violations3as3capable3of3being3resolved3in3a3‘friendly’3manner3(ibid:3524).333Standhaert3 (1999:3 524)3 argues3 that3 the3 IACommHR’s3 initial3 reluctance3 and3concern3with3 the3 propriety3 of3 its3 new3 role3 as3mediator3 is3 demonstrated3 in3 the3first3 case3 it3 submitted3 to3 the3 contentious3 jurisdiction3 of3 the3 Court:3 VelásquezS
Rodríguez3 (1988).3Upon3submission3of3 the3case3 to3 the3Court3by3 the3 IACommHR,3the3Honduran3government3complained3that3there3had3been3a3breach3of3procedure3claiming3 the3 IACommHR3 had3 ignored3 the3 friendly3 settlement3 provision.3 The3IACommHR3 argued3 that,3 “the3 special3 circumstances3 of3 this3 case3 made3 it3impossible3 to3 pursue3 such3 a3 settlement”3 (VelásquezSRodríguez,3 1994:3 §43).3However,3 following3a3 challenge3 to3 the3 IACommHR’s3discretionary3power3by3 the3government3of3Colombia3in3Caballero(Delgado(and(Santana(v(Colombia((1994),3the3IACtHR3ruled3that3the3IACommHR3must3ask3the3parties3if3they3have3an3interest3in3pursuing3 a3 friendly3 settlement.3 As3 a3 consequence3 of3 Caballero( Delgado( and(










frameworks.3 However,3 there3 are3 incremental3 changes3 taking3 place.3 Increasing3numbers3of3petitions3are3being3filed3at3the3IACommHR3and3cases3presented3to3the3IACtHR3concerning3violations3of3Indigenous3land3rights.3The3proliferation3of3these3cases3is3an3indication3of3the3number3of3these3violations,3but3not3only.3The3growing3numbers3 also3 show3 that3 Indigenous3 peoples3 are3 using3 human3 rights3 Courts3 in3attempts3 to3defend3 themselves3against3corporate3 incursions3on3 their3 traditional3lands,3 and3 their3 plight3 is3 being3 made3 visible3 and3 garnering3 public3 support.3Indigenous3 peoples’3 struggles3 against3 corporate3 land3 concessions3 are3 being3waged3at3the3international3level3using3international3human3rights3law.333In3 the3 Case3 of3 Community( Mayagna( (Sumo)( Awas( Tigni( v( Nicaragua3 (19983IACommHR;3 2001,3 IACtHR)3 the3 state3 had3 rented3 Indigenous3 land3 to3 a3 Korean3corporation3 for3 extraction3 of3 natural3 resources.3 The3 petition3 alleged3 that3 the3Government3violated3the3ACHR3due3to3the3lack3of3measures3needed3to3guarantee3the3Community’s3rights3over3its3traditional3lands,3including3the3lack3of3procedures3for3demarcation3or3titling3of3land,3and3for3the3granting3of3a3logging3concession3in3those3 lands3 to3 the3 company3 Sol3 del3 Caribe,3 S.3 A.3 (SOLCARSA).3 The3petition3 also3alleged3 that3 Nicaragua3 violated3 the3 ACHR3 in3 failing3 to3 guarantee3 an3 effective3judicial3 remedy3to3respond3to3 the3Community’s3claims3over3 its3 traditional3 lands3and3 natural3 resources.3 In3 its3 Report3Mayagna( (Sumo)( Awas( Tigni( v( Nicaragua3(1998)3the3Commission3concluded3a3violation3of3a3combination3of3rights.3It3stated,333 (…)3 the3 state3of3Nicaragua3 is3 actively3 responsible3 for3violations3of3 the3 right3 to3property3(…)3by3granting3a3concession3to3 the3company3SOLCARSA3to3carry3out3road3construction3work3and3logging3exploitation3on3the3Awas3Tigni3lands,3without3the3consent3of3the3Awas3Tigni3Community3(§142,3translated3from3Spanish3by3author).33
(The3IACtHR3went3further3in3its3judgement3finding3that333 Members3 of3 the3 Awas3 Tigni3 Community3 have3 the3 right3 that3 the3 state3 abstain3 from3carrying3 out,3 until3 (…)3 delimitation,3 demarcation,3 and3 titling3 [of3 the3 Community’s3territory]3 ha[s]3 been3 done,3 actions3 that3 might3 lead3 agents3 of3 the3 state3 itself,3 or( third(





3The3 IACtHR3 found3 that3 Nicaragua3 had3 a3 positive3 obligation3 and3 an3 obligation3under3 due3 diligence3 to3 prevent3 corporate3 actors3 engaged3 in3 stateHcorporate3enterprises3 from3 infringing3 the3 land3 rights3 of3 the3 Awas3 Tigni3 (Miranda,3 2007:3171).33
(The3 Awas( Tigni( Case3 is3 a3 clear3 example3 of3 stateHcorporate3 collusion3 and3 has3become3 a3 landmark3 case.2483The3 Commission3 lodged3 the3 case3 with3 the3 IACtHR3after3 delivering3 its3 Report3 and3 the3 Court3 found3Nicaragua3 guilt.3 It3was3 the3 first3time3the3Court3found3a3state3guilty3of3violating3the3ACHR3because3it3failed3to3adopt3effective3measures3 to3 secure3 the3 rights3 of3 the3 community3 to3 its3 ancestral3 lands3and3resources,3as3well3as3a3failure3to3engage3in3any3meaningful3consultation3with3the3community3(see3Appendix32).(It3is3worth3noting3however,3that3the3IACtHR3has3been3 reluctant3 to3 engage3 in3 reparations.3 For3 example,3 although3 the3 Court3recognised3the3state’s3responsibility3for3allowing3the3violation3of3U’Wa3land3rights3by3SOLCARSA,3the3Court3was3unwilling3to3engage3in3a3reparations3phase3(Anaya,32004:269);3 and3 although3 the3mechanism3 of3 due3 diligence3 requires3 remedy,3 the3Court3 limited3 reparations3 to3 a3modest3monetary3 reparation3 and3minor3 sums3 to3cover3 recoverable3 costs3 incurred3 by3 the3 Awas3 Tigni3 during3 the3 lengthy3 legal3process3(ibid).333Other3 cases3 in3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system3 dealing3 with3 state3 concessions3 to3corporations3 in3 the3 extractive3 industry3 include3 the3 Kichwa( Peoples( of( the(
Sarayaku( (2004,3 IACommHR;3 2012,3 IACtHR),3 the( Yakye( Axa( Indigenous(





General3 de3 Combustibles3 (a3 subsidiary3 of3 Chevron3 in3Argentina),3 and3 Petrolera3Ecudardo3San3Jorge,3S.A.,3allowing3these3companies3to3begin3seismic3exploration3within3 the3 Sarayaku3 people’s3 territory.3 No3 consultation3 was3 sought3 with3 the3Sarayaku3and3their3consent3was3not3granted.333Similarly3in3the3case3of3the3Yakye(Axa3(2005)3the3Court3concluded3Paraguay3had3violated3 the3rights3 to3property3and3Court3protection,3as3well3as3 the3right3 to3 life,3since3 it3 had3 prevented3 the3 community3 from3 access3 to3 its3 traditional3 means3 of3livelihood.3 Again,3 in3 the3 Yanomami( (1985)( case,3 the3 Commission3 stated3 that3Brazil’s3approbation3of3the3development3in3the3Amazonian3region3caused3various3life3 and3cultureHthreatening3harms3 to3 the3Yanomami3population,3 including3 their3displacement,3the3breakHup3of3social3organisation,3the3introduction3of3prostitution3and3disease,3and3the3destruction3of3encampments.3In3the3Pueblo(Indígena(Kichwa(
de(Sarayaku((Kichwa(Peoples(of(the(Sarayaku)((2012),3the(Yakye(Axa((2005)3case,3and3 the3Yanomami((1985)3 case,3 the3 respective3 states3were3held3 responsible3 for3having3 allowed3 corporations3 to3 carry3 out3 activities3 on3 the3 ancestral3 lands3 of3Indigenous3peoples3without3their3consent.3The3IACtHR3held3that3the3states3lacked3due3diligence3and3found3the3states3guilty3of3failing3to3adopt3adequate3measures3to3ensure3 their3 respective3domestic3 law3guaranteed3 the3 community's3 effective3use3and3 enjoyment3 of3 their3 traditional3 land,3 thus3 threatening3 the3 free3 development3and3transmission3of3Indigenous3culture3and3traditional3practices.333In3Mayas( Indigenous( Community( of( the( Toledo( District( v( Belize( (2004),3 another3case3 dealing3 with3 concessions3 to3 oil3 and3 timber3 companies,3 the3 IACommHR3reaffirmed3the3responsibility3of3states3 for3violations3committed3by3third3parties,3i.e.3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 (§165(5).3 This3 case3 dealt3 with3 the3 logging,3 oil,3 and3hydroelectric3 concessions3granted3by3Belize3 to3 several3different3 corporations3 in32001.3The3concessions3denied3Mayan3farmers3access3to3their3ancestral3land.3The3Commission3concluded3that,333 (…)3 the3 right3 to3use3and3enjoy3property3may3be3 impeded3when3 the3 state3 itself,3 or3 third(





3The3 Mayas( Indigenous( Community,3 the3 Awas3 Tigni3 and3 the3 U’Wa( cases3 are3evidence3of3a3growing3jurisprudence3at3the3IACommHR3and3a3growing3case3law3at3the3IACtHR3that3is3recognising3the3violation3of3human3rights3by3third3parties.3The3acknowledgement3of3the3violation3of3human3rights3in3all3of3the3aboveHmentioned3cases,3coupled3with3the3application3of3the3horizontal3effect,3is3an3indication3of3the3potential3 for3 human3 rights3 law3 to3 provide3 a3 means3 of3 struggle3 for3 corporate3accountability.33However,3the3IACtHR3has3no3coercive3mechanisms3for3ensuring3state3compliance3with3 its3 judgements,3 which3 leads3 to3 questions3 about3 the3 effectiveness3 of3 the3IACtHR3judgements,3i.e.3to3what3extent3states3implement3or3abide3by3judgements3of3 the3 Court,3 states’3 rates3 of3 recidivism,3 etc.3 Of3 course,3 there3 are3 examples3 of3compliance3 (e.g.3 Cesti( Hurtado( v,( Peru,3 1999;3 Loayza( Tamayo( v( Peru,3 1997:3 §5;3





rights.3 It3has3attributed3these3barriers3 to,3 in3part,3 the3 lack3of3political3will3of3 the3OAS3 member3 states.3 The3 IACommHR3 outlined3 its3 position3 in3 the3 early3 1990s3during3 a3 time3when3 it3was3 receiving3 increasing3numbers3 of3 petitions3 regarding3violations3of3human3rights3by3guerrilla3warfare3and3militia3groups.3Thus,3at3 that3time,3the3IACommHR3began3having3to3deal3more3directly3with3violations3of3human3rights3in3the3private3sphere.333In3its31992H19933Annual3Report,3the3Commission3asserted,333 One3 should3 bear3 in3 mind3 that3 the3 primary3 function3 of3 the3 Commission3 is3 ‘to3 promote3respect3for3and3defence3of”3human3rights3which3members3of3the3OAS3have3undertaken3to3respect3in3the3terms3set3forth3in3the3American3Declaration3of3the3Rights3and3Duties3of3Man,3and3 the3American3Convention3on3Human3Rights.3Though3 the3Commission3 is3willing3 and3
anxious3 to3 expand3 its3 focus,3when3 relevant,3 to3 deal3with3 any3 violation3 of3 human3 rights,3nothing3may3be3done3that3could3possibly3minimize3 its3primary3function3(V:3 II,3emphasis3added).33 In3this3Report,3the3Commission3alluded3to3the3political3barriers3that3have3limited3its3mandate3to3only3consider3issues3related3directly3to3states.3In3other3words,3the3OAS3 member3 states3 have3 deliberately3 and3 consistently3 sought3 to3 limit3 the3Commission’s3 investigations3 into3 violations3 by3 third3 parties.3 The3 IACommHR3reiterated3its3position3in319993in3its3Third(Report(on(the(Human(Rights(Situation(in(





3The3Commission3also3points3to3its3active3role3in3investigating3human3rights3claims.3The3 Commission3 has3 recognised3 the3 importance3 of3 continuing3 to3 address3violations3in3the3private3sphere,3despite3its3inability3to3pursue3investigations3into3the3acts3of3third3parties.33To3conclude3this3overview3into3the3case3law3of3the3European3and3InterHAmerican3systems3of3human3rights3in3the3soHcalled3private3sphere,3the3final3section3points3to3where3 the3 two3 Courts3 intersect3 and3 where3 they3 differ3 on3 how3 they3 attribute3liability3for3third3party3violations.3333
III:!Divergences!and!Convergences!at!the!ECtHR!and!the!IACtHR!3Extending3 the3 responsibility3 for3 human3 rights3 into3 the3 private3 sphere3 is3 a3politically3delicate3 issue.3The3Courts3 and3 the3Commission3 are3mandated3 to3deal3with3certain3rights,3 in3certain3ways.3 3The3 indirect3approach3to3the3responsibility3for3 human3 rights3 violations3 in3 the3 private3 sphere3 differs3 from3one3Court3 to3 the3other.3In3this3brief3analysis3of3the3case3law,3we3can3identify3four3major3differences3in3the3two3systems.333Firstly,3there3is3a3difference3in3the3robustness3of3the3position3regarding3the3effects3of3human3rights3on3third3parties.3The3IACtHR3categorically3declares3its3use3of3the3horizontal3effect3as3part3of3a3state’s3positive3obligation,3although3it3does3not3go3so3far3as3to3attack3the3structural3issues3that3enable3corporate3violations.3The3IACtHR3has3stated3it3is3“the3positive3obligation3of3the3state3to3ensure3the3effectiveness3of3the3protected3human3rights3gives3rise3to3effects3 in3relation3to3third3parties3(erga(





American3 system,3 individuals3 are3 bound3 to3 ACHR3 obligations3 erga( omnes3(Advisory3 Opinion3 OCH18/03).3 3 At3 the3 ECtHR,3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 remains3 a3contested3mechanism.3Its3application3has3been3dependent3on3the3makeup3of3the3Chambers3deciding3cases,3although3it3is3now3generally3accepted3that3there3is3some3kind3of3horizontal3effect3in3Strasbourg3at3least3through3positive3obligations.33Secondly,3although3in3both3systems3only3a3state3can3be3condemned3for3a3violation3of3 its3 respective3 Convention3 (i.e.3 the3 stateHcentred3 approach),3 in3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system3 the3 state’s3 responsibility3 addresses3 the3 prior3 violation3 of3 an3individual’s3 right3 by3 another3 individual3 (González,3 2008:3 21).3 In3 other3 words,3there3 is3 a3 retroactive3 effect3 to3 state3 responsibility3 for3 violations3 in3 the3 private3sphere.3 In3 the3 European3 system,3 the3 state3 is3 responsible3 for3 insufficient3 or3deficient3 legislation3 or3 its3 enforcement3 ex3 post3 facto.3 Positive3 obligations3 have3become3 embedded3 in3 both3 systems;3 however,3 the3 ECtHR3 and3 IACtHR3 have3interpreted3 them3 slightly3 differently.3 The3 horizontal3 effect3 allows3 for3 a3 certain3consideration3of3violations3of3human3rights3in3the3private3sphere,3but3the3IACtHR3has3 developed3 the3 concept3 of3 due( diligence3 that3 moves3 beyond3 this.3Complementing3 state3 responsibility3 for3 prior3 violations3 of3 human3 rights,3 due(
diligence3 does3 not3 just3make3 the3 state3 responsible3 for3 the3 violation,3 it3makes3 it3





2012)250,3 the3 Court3 cannot3 enforce3 this3 duty3 unless3 the3 victim3 petitions3 it.3 The3IACtHR,3 on3 the3 contrary,3 has3 reaffirmed3 the3 proactivity( of3 the3 InterHAmerican3system,3 e.g.3 the3 Commission3 can3 investigate3 human3 rights3 violations3 without3necessarily3 being3 petitioned3 to3 do3 so.3 The3 IACtHR3 has3 also3 insisted3 that3 states3must3 be3 proactive3 in3 protecting3 human3 rights3 under3 the3 ACHR.3 It3 outlined3 the3state’s3role3in3Velásquez(Rodríguez((1988):33(…)3An3investigation3must3have3an3objective3and3be3assumed3by3the3state3as3its3own3legal3duty,3 not3 as3 a3 step3 taken3 by3 private3 interests3 that3 depends3 upon3 the3 initiative3 of3 the3victim3or3his3family3or3upon3their3offer3of3proof,3without3an3effective3search3for3the3truth3by3the3government.3(…)3Where3the3acts3of3private3parties3that3violate3the3Convention3are3not3seriously3investigated,3those3parties3are3aided3in3a3sense3by3the3government,3thereby3making3 the3 state3 responsible3 on3 the3 international3 plane3 (…)3 (1988:3 §177;3 see3 also3





regards3to3the3rights3heretofore3reserved3for3physical3persons3(see3the3discussion3at3Chapter353on3 the3Concurring3Opinion3 for3Comingersoll(S.A.(v(Portugal,3 2000).3Nonetheless,3 certain3 Convention3 rights3 are3 still,3 for3 the3 moment,3 exclusive3 to3human3beings3(see3van3den3Muijsenbergh3and3Rezai,32011:349H51).3Even3so,3 the3businessHfriendly3attitude3towards3human3rights3at3the3ECtHR3is3incontestable.3In3contrast,3 the3 InterHAmerican3system3does3not3 recognise3 the3entitlement3of3 legal3persons3to3the3rights3enshrined3at3Article31.2.3ACHR3(see3Tabacalera(Boquerón(S.A.(
v(Paraguay,31997).3 In3 the3 InterHAmerican3system,3shareholders3are3protected3 in3lieu3of3the3corporation3itself3(see3Chapter353for3a3nuanced3critique).333Despite3 their3 differences,3 the3 Courts3 converge3 on3 applicability3 of3 the3 doctrine3 of3positive3obligations3 in3human3rights3 law.3 It3 is3now3 incontestable3 that3states3have3both3 negative3 obligations,3 i.e.3 to3 abstain3 from3 committing3 violations,3 but3 also3positive3obligations,3i.e.3the3duty3to3protect3and3guarantee3human3rights.3Both3the3IACtHR3and3the3ECtHR3have3developed3their3case3law3in3ways3that3demonstrate3a3favourable3attitude3towards3applying3the3horizontal3effect.3Most3importantly,3both3Courts3 have3 concluded3 that3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3 take3 place3 in3 the3 private3sphere3and3are3perpetrated3by3third3parties.3The3recognition3of3violations3of3human3rights3in3the3private3sphere3has3led3the3IACtHR,3on3the3one3hand,3to3develop3the3due3diligence3standard,3and3the3ECtHR,3on3the3other3hand,3to3expand3upon3the3duty3to3prevent.3 Thus,3 the3 doctrine3 of3 positive3 obligations,3 the3 horizontal3 effect,3 the3 due3diligence3standard3and3the3duty3to3prevent3are3existing3human3rights3mechanisms3at3the3IACtHR3and3the3ECtHR3that3can3be3applied3to3cases3dealing3with3corporate3violations3of3human3rights.33














Introduction!3This3 Chapter3 analyses3 interviews3 with3 a3 total3 of3 fifteen3 judges3 from3 both3 the3ECtHR3(93judges)3and3the3IACtHR3(63judges).3Further3details3of3the3profile3of3those3interviews3and3the3methods3used3are3fully3outlined3in3Chapter31.3The3aim3of3the3Chapter3 is3 to3probe3 the3perspectives3of3 the3 judges3on3applying3human3rights3 to3corporate3 responsibility.3The3 judges’3 comments3on3many3of3 the3 issues3 raised3 in3the3 interviews3indicate3differing3perspectives3on3the3way3that3human3rights3 law3and3human3rights3Courts3might3be3used3to3improve3corporate3accountability.3The3Chapter3 will3 analyse3 the3 points3 of3 consensus3 amongst3 the3 majority3 of3 the3respondents.3It3will3also3unveil3dissenting3opinions3in3the3sample,3by3focusing3on3the3often3subtle,3but3sometimes3radical,3differences3in3the3interviews.333The3chapter3is3organised3around3seven3themes:3judicial3appreciation3and3interest3in3 corporate3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3 (Section3 I);3 the3 dynamic3 approach3 and3views3on3judicial3activism3(Section3II);3the3conceptual3application3of3human3rights3to3 legal3persons3 (Section3 III);3 the3 judicial3awareness3of3developments3regarding3corporate3 accountability3 for3 human3 rights3 violations3 (Section3 IV);3 the3 practical3difficulties3 faced3 by3 the3 Courts3 (section3 V);3 questions3 of3 jurisdiction3 and3extraterritoriality3 (section3 VI);3 and3 the3 alternative3 venues3 for3 corporate3accountability3suggested3by3the3respondents3(section3VII).333
I.! Judges’!Appreciation!and! Interest! in!Corporate!Violations!of!Human!






























which3 for3 the3 human3 rights3 Courts3 is3 unlikely3 in3 the3 near3 future;3 or,3 the3development3of3the3law3through3judicial3 interpretation3so3that3it3can3respond3to3these3 ‘new’3 corporate3 violations3 in3 contemporary3 society,3 i.e.3 the3 dynamic3approach.3The3next3section3will3detail3the3interview3discussions3of3this3possibility.33
II.!The!Dynamic!Approach!!3The3 dynamic3 approach3 is3 an3 interpretative3 technique3 that3 is3 somewhat3comparable3to3the3concept3of3judicial3activism,3although3it3does3not3seem3to3have3the3 negative3 overtones3 that3 have3 plagued3 the3 latter3 in3 the3 United3 States.2513A3respondent3at3the3ECtHR3referred3to3these3negative3overtones,3stating,333I3don’t3 like3the3word3 ‘activism’3because3it3gives3a3negative3connotation3in3the3sense3that3the3Court3is3trying3to3get3involved3in3issues3that3have3nothing3to3do3with3its3role.3(…)3Here,3the3judge3interprets3the3Convention3in3light3of3presentHday3conditions”3(ECtJ1).333The3Black's3Law3Dictionary3defines3judicial3activism3as,333A3judicial3philosophy,3which3motivates3judges3to3depart3from3strict3adherence3to3judicial3precedent3 in3 favour3 of3 progressive3 and3 new3 social3 policies,3 which3 are3 not3 always3consistent3with3the3restraint3expected3of3appellate3judges.33





Judicial3activism3is3a3polemic3issue3discussed3extensively3in3relation3to3domestic3law3 and3 the3 United3 States3 in3 particular,3 but3 much3 less3 with3 regards3 to3international3 tribunals3 (Zarbiyev,32012:3250H251).3 It3 is3 sometimes3 considered3a3threat3to3democracy,3and3sometimes3a3necessary3counterweight3to3political3laxity.3Most3 respondents3 from3 the3 ECtHR3 dismissed3 ‘judicial3 activism’3 at3 the3 Court,3whilst3the3majority3of3respondents3from3the3IACtHR3expressed3a3certain3necessity3for3it.3This3necessity3was3described3by3these3respondents3as3“fundamental”3(IAJ4)3to3 the3 development3 of3 the3 law3 since3 “the3 Court3 opens3 conceptual3 roads,3establishes3 general3 principles3 and3 norms”3 (IAJ4)3 for3 human3 rights.3 One3respondent3commented3that,3 “(…)3without3[the3dynamic3approach]3we3wouldn’t3have3the3developments3that3we’ve3had3(…)3And3I3 think3we3need3that3 in3the3 law.3Otherwise3it3is3static”3(IAJ1).3Thus,3these3respondents3at3the3IACtHR3endorse3the3dynamic3 approach3 as3 a3 way3 for3 the3 judges3 to3 develop3 the3 law3 to3 ensure3 its3relevance3to3and3ability3to3respond3to3violations3of3human3rights.333During3 the3 interviews,3 the3 dynamic3 approach3 and3 judicial3 activism3 were3discussed3as3separate3issues;3however,3it3became3clear3through3the3respondents’3explanations3 and3 descriptions3 of3 these3 concepts3 that3 judges3 use3 the3 terms3 to3mean3the3same3thing3and3sometimes3use3them3virtually3interchangeably.3For3this3reason,3 as3 well3 as3 for3 coherency3 throughout3 this3 chapter,3 the3 judicial3 role3 in3developing3the3law3will3be3referred3to3as3the33“dynamic3approach.”3The3dynamic3approach3 is3 thus3 a3 tool3 of3 interpretation.3 At3 the3 ECtHR,3 it3 has3 become3 a3fundamental3 concept3 related3 to3 the3 belief3 that3 the3 Convention3 is3 “a3 living3instrument”33(see3also3Chapters313and35).2523The3Court’s3earliest3reference3to3the3dynamic3approach3was3made3in3Tyrer(v(UK((1978).3It3is3a3mechanism3that3refers3to3the3application3and3interpretation3of3the3ECHR3to3modern3day3circumstances.3Loukis3Loucaides,3former3judge3at3the3ECtHR,3explains3that3the3dynamic3approach3means3the3Court,333




















Many3 of3 the3 respondents3 were3 against3 developing3 human3 rights3 law3 using3 the3dynamic3approach3if3 it3was3to3expand3the3Convention3to3include3ESC3rights.3One3respondent3 insisted3 that3 this3was3 “going3 too3 far”3 [ECtJ6];3 another3 asserted3ESC3rights3 should3 be3 kept3 “under3 control”3 [ECtJ9].3 Despite3 the3 cautiousness3 with3which3the3majority3of3respondents3at3the3ECtHR3addressed3the3application3of3the3dynamic3 approach3 to3 integrate3 ESC3 rights3 –3 and3 thus3 their3 outlook3 to3 consider3corporate3violations3of3human3rights3–3there3were3a3 few3respondents3who3were3willing3 to3consider3 it.3The3reasoning3was3explained3 in3one3 interview,3where3 the3respondent3 stated3 that,3 “one3 cannot3 strictly3 divide3 the3 social3 and3 economical3rights3from3the3civil3and3political3rights.3From3time3to3time3they3cross3each3other3or3 they3 are3 connected3 somehow”3 (ECtJ7;3 see3 Chapter3 23 for3 a3 discussion3 on3 the3ideological3 division3 of3 rights).3 Although3 it3 is3 a3 minority3 of3 judges3 who3may3 be3willing3 to3consider3developing3the3ECHR3to3 include3some3ESC3rights,3 there3have3nonetheless3been3a3few3symbolic3cases3through3judicial3interpretation3(e.g.3Demir(






In3these3cases,3there3was3a3strategic3justification3in3the3judgements3that3some3ESC3rights3can3be3interpreted3directly3from3the3Convention.257333It3 has3 been3 stated3 above3 that3 almost3 all3 of3 the3 respondents3 equated3 corporate3violations3of3human3rights3as3violations3of3ESC3rights,3and3that3this3influenced3the3viewpoint3of3the3respondents3regarding3the3potential3of3the3dynamic3approach3to3consider3 corporate3 violations3 of3 human3 rights.3 Some3 of3 the3 respondents3demonstrated3a3conservative3approach3on3the3question3of3corporate3violations3of3human3rights:333[Human3 rights3 judges]3 are3 vested3 with3 such3 power3 to3 see3 what3 is3 done3 as3 far3 as3 the3convention3is3concerned.3And3these3are3already3fantastic3powers.3If3we3were3to3use3that3also3to3invent3ourselves3as3the3legislators3of3Europe,3hmmm,3we3are3judges,3then3I3think3we3go3three3steps3too3far.3[Corporate3accountability]3is3social3rights3and3[at3this3Court]3we3have3classical3human3rights3[e.g.3civil3and3political3rights].3We3are3not3the3ones3who3are3vested3with3 the3authority3 to3extend3 from3our3own3motions3 this3 [view]3 to3 the3European3Convention.3(…)3We3should3not3 impose3our3opinions3too3heavily.3This3 is3not3our3task3as3far3as3I’m3concerned.3It3is3possible3[to3use3the3dynamic3approach]3in3the3important3fields,3but3 to3extend3 the3Convention3without3 the3 contracting3 states3having3expressly3agreed3 is3one3door3to3watch!3(ECtJ6).33 We3 have3 colleagues3who3would3 like3 to,3 hmmm3how3 should3 I3 put3 it,3 energise3 or3 add3 to3every3 convention3 right3 a3 social3 component3 or3 more3 energy;3 you3 can3 literally3 feel3 the3energy3around3it3to3make3it3more3potent,3but3I3don’t3see3it3like3that.3I3think3that3there3are3clearly3social3rights3included3in3some3of3the3articles3of3the3convention,3but3I3think3that3we3should3be3very3careful3about3it.3I’m3rather3conservative3in3that3respect.3It3isn’t3the3purpose3of3the3convention3and3again3I3don’t3think3that’s3what3states3want.3(…)3But3there3are3judges3who3 see3 and3 think3 different[ly].3 Judicial3 activism,3 hmmm,3 (…)3 of3 course3 it3 depends3 on33333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333include3some3ESC3rights.3The3case3dealt3with3Article3113ECHR3and3the3right3to3engage3in3collective3bargaining.3 It3 affirmed3 the3 fundamental3 right3of3workers3 to3 engage3 in3 collective3bargaining3 and3take3 collective3 action3 to3 achieve3 that3 end.3 The3 Court3 confirmed3 an3 inherent3 right3 to3 collective3bargaining3within3 the3 freedom3of3association.3Given3 the3accession3of3 the3European3Union3 to3 the3Court3with3Protocol314,3a3certain3conciliation3of3case3law3between3the3ECJ3and3the3ECtHR3will3have3to3occur.3The3ECJ3has3limited3the3right3to3collective3bargaining3in3International(Transport(Workers(




























(…)3 Once3 you3 are3 a3 judge3 of3 the3 Court3 you3 have3 to3 think3 independently3 and3 apply3 the3principles3and3uphold3the3rights3of3individuals3and3that’s3it!3(…)3I3have3been3told3that3one3










judges3are3nonetheless3bound3to3the3law;3thus,3in3Europe,3for3example,3access3to3the3 ECtHR3 and3 the3 protection3 of3 the3 Convention3 is3 an3 unquestionable3 right3 for3legal3persons.3In3several3interviews,3it3was3clear3that3the3respondents3did3not3see3any3problem3or3contradiction3with3the3legal3status3of3corporations3and3other3legal3entities3as3persons.3However,3there3were3a3few3judges3who3either3did3not3agree3at3all3with3 granting3 human3 rights3 to3 corporations3 or3who3were3 at3 least3willing3 to3question3its3propriety.3The3next3section3considers3the3respondents’3views3on3the3corporate3personality,3as3well3as3the3position3of3the3respondents3on3how3human3rights3law3applies3to3corporations.333





3.1.!Legal!Persons!as!Rights1Holders!3The3 considerable3 differences3 between3 the3 conventions’3 definition3 of3 rightsHholders3 was3 addressed3 in3 Chapter3 4,3 where3 it3 was3 explained3 that3 the3 ECHR3guarantees3 convention3 rights3 to3 legal3 persons3 whilst3 the3 ACHR3 does3 not.3 This3difference3 explains,3 in3 part,3 the3 different3 perspectives3 of3 the3 respondents3 from3both3Courts.3Discussions3with3 respondents3 from3 the3ECtHR3are3 first3 considered3before3moving3on3to3the3interviews3with3the3IACtHR.33The3 inclusion3 of3 legal3 persons3 as3 rightsHholders3 in3 the3 ECHR3 is3 a3 paradoxical3feature3of3the3ECHR.3In3its3travaux(préparatoires,3there3is3no3indication3of3a3debate3concerning3 the3 inclusion3 of3 legal3 persons3 in3 P1H13 (see3 Chapter3 5),3 a3 detail3 that3prompted3lively3discussions3in3some3interviews3at3the3ECtHR.3Many3respondents3found3no3problem3with3the3law3granting3corporations3the3same3protections3as3any3other3 individual.3 They3 equated3 the3 situation3 of3 corporations3 claiming3 human3rights3 with3 other3 rich3 and3 powerful3 physical3 individuals,3 such3 as3 the3 Von(
Hannover( v( Germany3 (2004)2673case,3 and3 so3 did3 not3 see3 any3 conflict.3 These3respondents3remarked3that,33 In3ninetyHnine3percent3of3cases3in3which3some3corporation3is3involved,3it3is3rather3a3case3where3 the3 corporation3 is3 a3 claimant3 before3 this3 Court3 and3 then,3 [the3 judges’]3 only3question3 is3 how3must3we3 protect3 them.3 (…)3 [So3 because3 of3 Protocol3 1,3 Article3 13 of3 the3Convention]3quite3a3large3degree3of3protection3should3be3offered3[to3them]”3(ECtJ8).333(…)3The3transnational3corporation,3even3as3powerful3as3McDonald’s,3is3a3private3person.3If3we3consider3the3company3its3claim3is3against3the3state3(…)3because3the3individual3needs3protection.3 Individuals3need3 tribunals3 like3ours.3 It3 is3 in3 the3 situation3of3 their3 inferiority3visHàHvis3the3state.3Human3rights3are3there3for3that,3to3protect3the3weak.3So3in3the3case3of3
Steel(and(Morris(v(UK2683it3was3McDonald’s3versus3the3state3[in3the3national3case];3and3(…)3








































Respondents3 from3 the3 ECtHR3 pointed3 to3 current3 examples3 of3 the3 Court’s3development3of3the3law3with3regard3to3cases3involving3the3delegation3of3authority,3as3well3as3related3issues3of3effective3control,3e.g.3Bankovic(v(Belgium,32001269;3Al(
Skeini(v(UK,32010270;3Al(Jedda(v(UK,320112713(also3discussed3at3Section3VI).3These3examples3 illustrate3 how3 the3 Court3 is3 using3 existing3mechanisms,3 as3well3 as3 the3dynamic3 approach,3 to3 develop3 its3 human3 rights3 law3 in3 ways3 that3 respond3 to3present3day3circumstances.3These3cases3highlight3a3potential3for3the3development3of3 corporate3 responsibility3 in3 analogous3 ways.3 At3 the3 IACtHR,3 respondents3referred3more3often3to3the3disconcerting3role3that3corporations3have3been3given3with3 the3 advent3 of3mass3 privatisations.3 The3 respondents3 specifically3 pointed3 to3the3human3rights3 challenges3presented3by3 the3privatisation3of3 services,3 coupled3with3 the3 complicity3 in3 human3 rights3 violations3 between3 states,3 paramilitary3groups,3and3corporations3in3Latin3America.3The3IACtHR3has3not3yet3dealt3directly3with3 the3 issue3 of3 the3delegation3of3 authority3per3 se.3However,3 the3delegation3of3authority3and3issues3of3effective3control3are3relevant3to3human3rights3protection3in3 the3 jurisdiction3 of3 the3 IACtHR3 since3 private3 actors3 are3 now3 in3 control3 of3services3hitherto3reserved3for3the3state.333In3 what3 follows,3 the3 analysis3 will3 explore3 the3 significance3 of3 the3 delegation3 of3authority3 and3 related3 issues3 of3 effective3 control3 for3 the3 discussion3 of3 human3rights3 and3 corporate3 accountability.3 In3 order3 to3 do3 so,3 the3 next3 section3 draws3upon3 the3 viewpoints3 of3 the3 respondents3 on3 the3 quasiHpublic3 status3 of3corporations.3In3this3way,3it3seeks3to3scrutinise3the3opinions3of3the3respondents3on3the3impact3of3privatisation3on3human3rights.333






3.2.! The! Impact! of! the! Delegation! of! Authority! on! Corporate!

























3During3 many3 interviews3 it3 became3 clear3 that3 the3 issue3 of3 the3 delegation3 of3authority3 and3 the3 quasiHpublic3 status3 of3 corporations3 was3 understood3 by3 the3respondents3as3being3related3to3the3deficiency3of3international3law3to3address3the3problem.3The3next3section3explores3the3views3and3awareness3of3the3respondents3visHàHvis3the3international3developments3in3debates3on3corporate3accountability.33
IV.! Judicial!Awareness!of! International!Developments!With!Regards!to!




















V.!Practical!Obstacles!at!the!Courts:!Backlog!and!Finances!3The3 Courts3 are3 facing3 major3 challenges3 that3 cause3 trepidation3 amongst3 some3judges3 towards3 expanding3 the3 realm3 of3 human3 rights3 to3 consider3 new3 areas3 of3law,3 including3 corporate3 violations.3 A3 recurring3 point3 of3 tension3 during3 the3interviews3 revealed3 significant3 exterior3 pressures3 on3 the3 Courts3 (referred3 to3 in3Section3 I),3 including3 the3 massive3 caseload3 backlog3 at3 the3 ECtHR3 and3 the3 weak3finances3at3 the3 IACtHR.3This3section3addresses3 the3 implications3of3 the3problems3the3 Courts3 are3 facing3 on3 the3 possibilities3 for3 corporate3 accountability3 using3human3 rights3 law.3 The3 panHEuropean3 jurisdiction3 of3 the3 ECtHR3 has3 led3 to3 the3exponential3 multiplication3 of3 its3 caseload,3 generating3 problems3 including3questions3of3 its3 legitimacy.3The3 IACtHR3 faces3 financial3problems3and3difficulties3arising3 from3 its3 lack3 of3 jurisdiction,3 which3 has3 put3 pressure3 on3 the3 judges3regarding3the3adjudication3of3cases3and3Advisory3Opinions.333The3 international3 consensus3 on3 human3 rights3 postH1990,3 together3 with3 the3spread3of3neoliberal3globalisation3has3instrumentalised3human3rights3as3a3means3to3 expand3marketHoriented3 policies3 and3 practice,3 as3 well3 as3 to3 extend3 the3 geoHpolitical3power3of3 the3dominant3states3 (Fitzpatrick,32004:3126;3see3also3Chapter32).2763In3Europe,3the3process3of3tying3human3rights3to3trade3has3developed3a3new3symbolic3position3for3the3ECtHR,2773and3with3its3success,3the3ECtHR’s3caseload3has3risen3exponentially3every3year.3In32012,3the3Court3had3a3backlog3of3over31500003cases.3The3backlog3at3the3ECtHR3has3had3an3impact3on3the3legitimacy3of3the3Court,3particularly3 regarding3 issues3 such3 as3 the3 length3 of3 time3 for3 hearing3 and3 its3efficiency.3 Several3 respondents3 referred3 to3 the3 pressures3 judges3 are3 facing3because3of3the3everHgrowing3caseload3and3the3burden3it3has3become3for3the3Court.3They3explained3that,33





I3think3with3the3limited3resources3that3the3Court3has,3I3think3it3could3be3debated3whether3[corporations]3 should3 have3 the3 same3 access3 [as3 victims].3 But,3 my3 view3 of3 the3 whole3problem3as3it3is3now,3with3the3fact3that3we3can’t3deal3with3the3cases3we3get,3is3that3I3think3that3 the3Court3 should3 go3 in3 the3direction3of3being3more3 a3 constitutional3Court3with3 the3right3to3pick3and3choose3and3leaving3all3the3rest3either3for3another3human3rights3Court,3or3in3the3best3of3worlds3for3the3domestic3Courts3to3deal3with3(ECtJ3).333You3 see,3 to3 speak3 frankly,3 our3Court3 is3overburdened3with3 thousands3and3 thousands3of3applications3coming3from3private3persons3against3states.3We3only3deal3with3applications3against3 states.3 We3 also3 have3 some,3 a3 few3 cases3 where3 the3 applicant3 is3 a3 corporation3against3the3state.3And3there3has3been3a3development3here3to3accept3such3cases.3And3this3has3to3do3with3the3connection3between3the3Convention3and3EU3law3(ECtJ5).33The3 backlog3 was3 thus3 a3 major3 preoccupation3 for3 the3 judges3 regarding3 the3feasibility3of3an3active3judicial3impetus3to3use3existing3mechanisms3at3the3Court3to3establish3a3practice3of3corporate3accountability.3The3ECtHR’s3backlog3presented3a3practical3 obstacle3 that3 they3 cited3 as3 one3 of3 the3 pivotal3 reasons3why3 the3 ECtHR3could3not3be3a3suitable3venue3(suggestions3for3alternative3fora(explored3below3at3Section3VII).333However,3in3a3strong3appeal3to3the3legal3imagination,3Ineta3Ziemele3(2009),3judge3at3the3ECtHR,3has3argued3that3there3is3a3possibility3of3connecting3the3company3to3the3 state3 in3 certain3 circumstances,3 despite3 institutional3 independence.3 She3proposes3that,33 The3question3of3the3access3to3the3European3Court3of3Human3Rights3should3(…)3be3looked3at.3 In3 this3 context,3 the3 issues3 of3 jurisdiction3 and3 imputability3will3 have3 to3 be3 solved.3A(





Connecting3 the3 company3 to3 the3 state3 –3 or3 the3 violation3 of3 a3 human3 right3 by3 a3company3 to3 the3negligence3of3 the3state3–3might3open3up3 the3possibility3of3using3what3 Ziemele3 refers3 to3 as3 a3 “legislative3 framework”3 to3 make3 these3 cases3justiciable3in3already3existing3human3rights3Courts,3such3as3the3ECtHR.3Ziemele’s3position3is3exactly3the3kind3of3judicial3imagination3that3is3working3within3the3law3and3with3the3law3to3consider3ways3to3make3corporations3accountable3for3human3rights3violations.3Section3 3VI3will3 return3 to3Ziemele’s3discussion3with3relation3 to3questions3 of3 jurisdiction3 and3 the3 relevance3 of3 extraterritoriality3 to3 corporate3accountability3debates.33333One3respondent3suggested3that3 in3order3to3create3a3space3at3the3ECtHR3to3apply3existing3mechanisms3 in3ways3 that3might3 allow3 for3 corporate3 accountability,3 the3Court3would3have3to3be3considered3as3analogous3to3a3constitutional3Court.3What3this3means3is3essentially3that3the3Court3would3disentangle3itself3from3what3Greer3and3Wildhaber3have3referred3to3as3the3constraints3of3“the3still3 important3role3of3state3 consent”3 (2012:3 670).2783They3 argue3 that3 the3 ECtHR3 should3 have3 more3control3over3 its3case3docket,3although3 this3 is3highly3controversial3 since3 it3would3mean3 rejecting3 the3 principle3 of3 unrestricted3 individual3 access.2793And3 that3 the3Court3 should3 adjudicate3 their3 cases3 in3 a3 more3 ‘constitutional’3 or3 principled3manner3–3“that3is3to3say3by3seeking3the3best,3and3most3consistent,3interpretation3of3 the3Convention3as3a3whole3and3with3a3view3to3maximising3the3effects3of3each3judgement3 both3 in3 the3 respondent3 state3 and3 in3 the3 Council3 of3 Europe3 states3generally”3 (ibid:3 686).3 During3 the3 interview,3 the3 respondent3 referred3 to3 this3possibility3of3the3constitutionalisation3of3the3ECtHR,3proposing3that,333 [Judges]3pick[ing]3and3choos[ing]3the3cases3we3want3to3deal3with3(…)3and3in3this3way3[the3judges3will]3never3have3too3many.3(…)3Once3we3get3there,3then3the3question3of3extending3the3cases3to3include3issues3like3corporations3may3arise,3because3then3judges3will3have3all3




















During3 the3 interviews3at3 the3 IACtHR,3 there3was3an3overwhelming3apprehension3that3it3would3be3taking3on3too3much3if3it3started3considering3corporate3violations3of3human3rights.3The3worry3was3that3the3Court3would3become3a3victim3of3its3own3success,3 like3 the3 ECtHR3 to3 which3 the3 respondents3 referred.3 Indeed,3 all3 of3 the3respondents3 across3 both3 Courts3 referenced3 the3 backlog3 at3 the3 ECtHR3 as3substantiating3 the3 argument3 against3 using3 human3 rights3 Courts3 to3 consider3corporate3violations3of3human3rights;3 as3one3 respondent3 remarked,3 “so3 that3we3don’t3 fall3 into3 the3 problems3 that3 the3 European3 system3 is3 facing,3 that3 is3 an3overburdening3 of3 cases”3 (IAJ3).3 Thus,3 for3 these3 reasons3 the3 judges3 may3 be3conditioning3 themselves3 to3 refrain3 from3 exercising3 their3 legal3 imaginations3 not3because3they3do3not3consider3it3important3or3worthwhile3but3rather3because3they3do3not3think3they3have3the3practical3capacity3to3respond.333The3interviews3suggested3that3there3is3no3conceptual3barrier3to3applying3human3rights3 law3 to3 corporate3 violations,3 but3 there3 are3 real3 practical3 limitations.3Respondents3at3the3ECtHR3elucidated3the3point3that3the3burden3of3pending3cases3has3now3become3an3oppressive3force.3The3financial3limitations3at3the3IACtHR3are3a3source3of3political3pressure3that3means3that3the3judges3have3very3little3breathing3room.3All3of3the3respondents3rejected3the3idea3that3these3burdens3may3affect3their3judicial3 decisionHmaking3 regarding3 either3 the3 admissibility3 of3 cases3 (e.g.3considerations3 to3 widening3 interpretation3 to3 include3 ESC3 rights),3 or3 regarding3more3 dynamic3 interpretations3 of3 the3 horizontal3 effect3 to3 consider3 corporate3accountability.3However,3many3respondents3noted3 that3 they3are3under3pressure3either3 to3 deal3 with3 the3 growing3 pending3 cases3 or3 be3 wary3 of3 their3 financial3limitations.3An3issue3that3came3up3in3both3Courts3regarding3the3potential3of3using3human3 rights3 law3 for3 corporate3 accountability3was3 the3 question3 of3 jurisdiction.3The3 next3 section3 is3 dedicated3 to3 the3 respondents’3 views3 on3 the3 issue3 of3jurisdiction.333





under3 two3 categories:3 first,3 the3 stateHcentred3 approach,3 which3 fixes3 its3jurisdiction3to3claims3against3member3states3and3not3against3individuals3(see3also3Chapters32,333&34);3and3second,3territoriality,3which3limits3the3Court’s3jurisdiction3to3 claims3 falling3 within3 the3 geographical3 territory3 of3 the3 member3 states3 (e.g.3
Bankovic(and(Others(v(Belgium(and(Others,32001).3The3 focus3of3 this3section3 is3on3issues3 of3 territoriality3 since3 the3 stateHcentred3 approach3 has3 been3 discussed3throughout3 the3 chapter3 (see3 Section3 6.1.).3 The3 question3 of3 jurisdiction3 at3 the3IACtHR3 focused3 more3 on3 the3 internal3 dynamics3 of3 the3 OAS3 and3 the3 missing3ratifications3of3the3ACHR3that3weaken3the3authority3of3the3Court3(SubHSection36.2).333





their3 jurisdiction,3 but3 violating3 human3 rights3 abroad,3 concerned3 their3 Court.3These3 respondents3 believed3 that3 Europe3 is3 less3 burdened3 with3 corporate3violations3of3human3rights3than3developing3nations,3and3therefore3it3followed3for3the3respondents3that3the3issue3was3not3one3that3concerned3them.33Extraterritoriality3is3a3sensitive3issue3at3the3ECtHR.3Perhaps3its3most3controversial3judgement3 regarding3 extraterritoriality3was3 the3 heavily3 criticised3Bankovic(and(
Others(v(Belgium(and(Others((2001).2833Part3of3the3controversy3and3significance3of3





the3opportunity3to3fix3the3jurisprudence”3(ECtJ2,3emphasis3added).3Ineta3Ziemele,3judge3at3the3ECtHR,3has3put3forth3the3argument3that3a3jurisdictional3nexus3can3be3established3where3state3agents3are3in3control3of3individuals3in3other3states3(2009:321).3She3suggests3that3there3is3a3way3to3bring3the3actions3of3PMCs3within3the3scope3of3the3ECHR3by3combining3two3principles:3the3principle3that3the3state3must3ensure3effective3 deterrence3 (see3 A( v( UK3 1998)286 3–3 meaning3 taking3 the3 necessary3measures3 to3 ensure3 the3 protection3 of3 human3 rights3 within3 the3 jurisdiction3 of3member3states3–3and3the3principle3that3member3states3should3not3support3abroad3what3 they3 do3 not3 support3 at3 home.3 3 Similar3 issues3 have3 arisen3 at3 the3 ECtHR3regarding3 the3 obligations3 for3 the3 protection3 of3 human3 rights3 from3 comparable3processes3 of3 privatisation3 from3 other3 state3 functions,3 e.g.3 private3 prisons,3discussed3above3in3Section33.2.3(see3Ziemele,32009).287333The3precise3connection3between3the3states’3responsibility3regarding3territoriality3was3coined3in3Bankovic(and(Others(v(Belgium(and(Others3as3“effective3control”,2883which3was3deduced3and3reinterpreted3from3previous3case3law.2893The3applicants3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332863The3 applicant3 was3 a3 young3 boy3 beaten3 by3 a3 stick3 by3 his3 stepfather.3 The3 stepfather3 was3acquitted3before3a3jury3after3claiming3the3defence3of3reasonable3punishment.3The3ECtHR3held3that3the3applicant’s3right3to3Article333ECHR3was3violated3by3his3stepfather’s3abuse,3which3constituted3“inhuman3or3degrading3punishment”,3and3that3then3applicable3UK3domestic3law3failed3to3provide3adequate3protection.3In3other3words,3the3ECtHR3reasoned3that3the3state3failed3to3protect3“children3and3 other3 vulnerable3 individuals”3 (§22),3 despite3 its3 positive3 obligation3 in3 the3 form3 of3 effective3deterrence,3from3such3forms3of3ill3treatment.32873In3her3article3on3the3human3rights3violations3by3private3entities,3Ineta3Ziemele3(2009),3judge3at3the3ECtHR3has3noted3that3the3UN3Human3Rights3Committee3(HRC)3has3defined3the3obligation3of3the3state3regarding3 the3actions3and3omissions3of3private3military3companies3 (PMCs).3Ziemele3points3out3that3the3HRC3has3resolved3that3the3actions3of3the3military,3whether3privately3contracted3or3in3public3service,3are3within3the3state’s3jurisdiction3and3therefore3subject3to3its3obligations3under3the3ICCPR.32883Supra(ftnt326032893Breaking3from3Bankovic(v(Belgium3(2001),3the3ECtHR3has3shifted3its3consideration3of3‘effective3control’3 from3 a3 spatial3 interpretation3 (i.e.3 the3 member3 state’s3 control3 territory)3 to3 a3 personal3interpretation3(i.e.3 the3exercise3of3control3of3 the3person3 in3question)3 (e.g.3Öcalan(v(Turkey,320053§91;3Issa(and(Others(v(Turkey,32004:3§68;3AlSSaadoon(and(Mufdhi(v(UK,32009:3§§86H89;3Medvedyev(
and(Others.(France,32010:(§67).3In3Bankovic3the3ECtHR3had3held3that,33(…)3[T]he3exercise3of3extraHterritorial3jurisdiction3by3a3Contracting3State3is3exceptional:3it3has3done3so3 when3 the3 respondent3 State,3 through3 the3 effective( control( of( the( relevant( territory( and( its(
inhabitants3abroad3as3a3consequence3of3military3occupation3or3through3the3consent,3invitation3or3acquiescence3 of3 the3 Government3 of3 that3 territory,( exercises( all( or( some( of( the( public( powers(





in3Bankovic(and(Others(v(Belgium(and(Others3argued3that3the3extent3to3which3the3state3exercised3some3form3of3extraterritorial3control3should3define3the3extent3of3its3obligation3to3guarantee3Convention3rights3(Miller,32010).3This3line3of3argument3was3 rejected3 by3 the3 Grand3 Chamber,3 which3 insisted3 that3 state3 jurisdiction3was3primarily3 territorial3 –3 a3 judgement3 that3 has3 since3 caused3 polemic3 within3 the3ECtHR3and3within3 legal3and3academic3circles.2903The3significance3of3Bankovic(for3cases3 involving3corporations3 is3 that3 it3 forced3 the3Court3 to3scrutinise3 its3position3on3extraterritorial3jurisdiction3and3gave3rise3to3a3series3of3cases3that3have3sought3to3clarify3its3position.3For3example,3in3the3judgement3Issa(v(Turkey((2004),3where3the3Court3summarised3its3understanding3of3the3notion3of3jurisdiction.3It3declared3that,333 [A]3 State3 may3 also3 be3 held3 accountable3 for3 violation3 of3 the3 Convention3 rights3 and3freedoms3of3persons3who3are3 in3 the3 territory3of3 another3State3but3who3are3 found3 to3be3under3 the3 former3 State’s3 authority3 and3 control3 through3 its3 agents3 operating3 –3whether3lawfully3 or3 unlawfully3 –3 in3 the3 latter3 State.3 (…)3Accountability3 in3 such3 situations3 stems3from3the3fact3that3Article313of3the3Convention3cannot3be3interpreted3so3as3to3allow3a3State3party3to3perpetrate3violations3of3the3Convention3on3the3territory3of3another3State,3which3it3could3not3perpetrate3on3its3own3territory3(Issa(v(Turkey,32004:3§§68,371).333The3Court’s3position3on3 jurisdiction3outlined3 in3Issa(v(Turkey3 is3a3watershed3for3cases3involving3private3parties.3The3implications3of3the3Court’s3position3on3cases3involving3private3parties3is3neatly3summarised3by3Ziemele3(2009).33Ziemele3 draws3 attention3 to3 the3 fact3 that3 the3 Court3 did3 not3 directly3 address3 the3question3of3 its3 jurisdiction3over3human3rights3violations3allegedly3committed3by3legal3persons3abroad3and3the3imputability3of3their3acts3to3the3States3Parties3to3the3Convention3 (2009:3 21).3 However,3 she3 convincingly3 argues,3 the3 judgment3 in3 the3
3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333situation3 of3 that3 individual.3 In3 this3 sense,3 therefore,3 the3 Convention3 rights3 can3 be3 “divided3 and3tailored”3(§137).32903The3 applicants3 argued3 against3 the3 territorial3 definition3 of3 jurisdiction3 by3 invoking3 previous3case3law,3namely3Soering(v(UK3(1989)3and3Loizidou(v(Turkey3(Preliminary3Objections,31995)3where3the3Court3had3accepted3that3the3jurisdiction3of3the3ECHR3was3not3strictly3territorial.3(In3Bankovic(v(


























Bankovic,3Roxstrom3et(al.3(2005)3insisted3that3by3limiting3Convention3rights3to3the3territorial3 boundaries3 of3 ‘Europe’3 the3 Court3 reconstructed3 the3 Convention3 itself3and3misconstrued3its3own3case3law.3Roxtrom3et(al.3highlight3the3contradiction3in3Western3 human3 rights3 law3 and3 Courts3 that3 contend3 the3 universality3 of3 human3rights3 but3 then3 implement3 a3 limited3 and3 parcelled3 human3 rights3 protection3depending3on3 “membership3 in3 a3particular3 class3of3persons”3 (2005:362).3 In3 this3way,3 they3 point3 out3 a3 major3 contradiction3 inherent3 in3 the3 hegemonic3conceptualisation3of3human3rights3law.33





not3expand3on3the3matter.3In3response3to3the3former,3a3common3approach3taken3by3 the3 respondents3was3 that3 the3 responsibility3 for3 a3 violation3 of3 human3 rights3occurring3in3a3state3that3has3accepted3the3jurisdiction3of3the3Court3falls3on3the3host3state,3and3neither3on3the3corporation3nor3its3country3of3origin,3which3is3contrary3to3a3growing3tendency3in3the3ECtHR3(see3Section36.1.;3also3Ziemele,32009).33Although3questions3of3extraterritoriality3have3not3arisen3in3the3IACtHR’s3case3law,3there3 have3 been3 examples3 at3 the3 Commission.3 The3 existence3 of3 cases3 involving3extraterritoriality3 at3 the3 Commission3 is3 in3 part3 because3 of3 the3 ambiguity3 of3 the3American3 Declaration’s3 Article3 II,3 which3 has3 no3 express3 jurisdictional3 scope3(Bankovic3 v(Belgium,3 2001:3 §78).3 This3 lack3 of3 an3 express3 jurisdictional3 scope3 is3relevant3 since3most3 of3 the3 examples3 from3 the3 InterHAmerican3 system,3 involving3the3 extraterritorial3 application3 of3 its3 human3 rights3 instruments3 concern3 the3United3 States,3 which3 has3 not3 ratified3 the3 ACHR3 and3 therefore3 is3 not3 under3 the3jurisdiction3of3 the3Court.3However,3 the3Commission3 considers3 the3United3States3subject3 to3 the3 American3 Declaration3 (Cernes,3 2006:3 2).3 Moreover,3 in3 the3Coard3










case).2953The3tension3between3the3Court3and3the3Commission,3mentioned3in3subHsection33.1,3means3communication3between3the3two3bodies3remains3aloof.333There3 is3 a3 jurisdictional3 obstacle3 for3 the3 IACtHR,3which3means3 that3 despite3 the3mechanism3of3due3diligence,3 states3 that3have3not3 ratified3 the3Convention3 evade3responsibility.3 3 In3 other3 words,3 for3 those3 states3 that3 have3 not3 ratified3 the3Convention,33including3the3USA,3there3can3be3neither3application3of3the3horizontal3effect3nor3any3possibility3of3raising3questions3of3due3diligence.3As3one3respondent3commented,3 “this3 [jurisdiction3 and3 extraterritoriality]3 will3 be3 for3 states3 [to3decide]3 –3 (…)3maybe3 then3 they3will3 go3 to3 the3 OAS3 and3 amend3 the3 Convention.3Until3then,3our3hands3are3tied”3(IAJ1).33




















































The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it. 
 
-Karl Marx, 1845 3











the3Court3to3protect3the3corporation.3Ultimately,3the3significance3of3the3differences3in3 how3 the3 Conventions3 consider3 legal3 persons3 is3 that3 it3 unmasks3 an3 elemental3problem3 with3 the3 corporate3 form3 itself;3 a3 problem3 that3 cannot3 be3 reduced3 to3questions3of3inclusion3or3exclusion3of3nonHstate3entities3as3legal3persons3in3human3rights3conventions.3The3problem3of3inclusion3of3corporations3is3thus3much3greater3than3the3formulation3of3P1H13ECHR,3Article31.2.3ACHR3or3the3procedural3application3of3Article3343ECHR.3It3requires3rethinking3about3an3international3human3rights3law3that3is3entrenched3in3a3capitalist3framework.3Simultaneously,3the3problem3reveals3the3need3to3challenge3the3corporate3form,3as3a3site3of3 irresponsibility3through3the3separation3of3managers3and3shareholders3(see3Chapter33),3with3the3ultimate3aim3of3dismantling3the3modern3corporation3altogether.333There3 has3 been3 a3 critical3 failure3 to3 address3 corporate3 accountability3 in3 any3meaningful3 way3 at3 the3 international3 level.3 This3 failure3 is3 illustrated3 by3 the3nonfulfillment3 of3 ESC3 rights3 at3 the3 international3 level3 (see3 Evans3 and3Hancock,31998);3the3preHeminence3of3 ‘consensusHbuilding’3during3the3UN’s3Ruggie3Process3(see3Chapter32);3 the3 “deHradicalisation”3of3CSR3(Shamir,32004a);3 the3 importance3placed3 upon3 voluntary3 codes3 of3 conduct3 and3 other3 nonHintrusive3 CSR3 schemes3rather3 than3 formally3 binding3 mechanisms3 for3 corporate3 responsibility3 (e.g.3Khoury3 and3 Whyte,3 forthcoming).3 The3 lack3 of3 binding3 norms3 remains3symptomatic3of3 states’3 role3 in3buttressing3neoliberal3 capitalism3and3 reflects3 the3dominance3of3the3hegemonic3international3human3rights3law3discourse,3which3has3acted3as3a3barrier3to3investigating3the3causes3for3human3rights3violations3(Evans,32005b:353).3The3result3of3these3failures3of3international3law3is3that3human3rights3effectively3 act3 as3 a3 businessHfriendly3 paradigm.3 The3 UN3 embraced3 Ruggie’s3
Guiding(Principles((2011),3which3was3not3surprising3when3viewed3in3 light3of3 the3international3 community’s3 repeated3 rejections3on3 imposing3 legal3 obligations3on3corporations3 for3 the3 respect3 and3 guarantee3 of3 human3 rights3 (see3 UN,3 2005).29633The3 UN’s3 support3 of3 Ruggie’s3 approach3 is3 indicative3 of3 this3 businessHfriendly3human3 rights3 paradigm3 (see3 Introduction3 and3 Chapter3 2)3 since3 it3 reinforced3





voluntarism3 for3 the3 human3 rights3 responsibilities3 of3 corporations3 and3incorporated3the3business3community3into3the3policy3discussions.333Despite3 these3 bleak3 prospects,3 the3 businessHfriendly3 paradigm3 of3 international3human3rights3law3has3also3been3a3rallying3point3for3some3important3resistances2973(e.g.3 Indignados3 and(Occupy3Wall3 Street;2983protests3 against3 the3WTO3 in3 Seattle,3USA3in31999;2993protests3against3the3Free3Trade3Area3of3the3Americas3 in3Québec3City,3Canada3in32001;3003protests3against3the3G83in3Genoa,3Italy3in32001301).3These3campaigns3 have3 succeeded3 in3 raising3 awareness3 about3 the3 nefarious3 effects3 of3neoliberal3 globalisation3 and3 neoliberalism3 more3 generally,3 as3 well3 as3 raising3questions3about3whether3 the3conception3of3 ‘rights’3embraced3by3 the3majority3of3the3world3is3in3fact3the3same3as3that3expressed3in3international3law3(Evans,32005:352).333
Section!II.!Alternative!Uses!of!Law!3





The3empirical3 research3 for3 this3 thesis3has3also3 focussed3on3 the3potential3 for3 the3ECtHR3and3the3IACtHR3to3use3existing3mechanisms3of3human3rights3law3in3cases3involving3 corporate3 violations3 of3 human3 rights3 through3 a3 detailed3 case3 law3analysis3and3semiHstructured3interviews3(see3Chapter31).3The3analysis3of3the3case3law3 (Chapters3 53 and36)3 and3 the3 interviews3 (Chapter3 7)3 has3 argued3 that3 human3rights3law3can3be3used3to3challenge3the3harmful3effects3of3corporations,3although3it3is3unlikely3that3it3is3able3to3change3it3fundamentally.3Human3rights3law,3so3far,3has3been3 unable3 to3 challenge3 the3 corporate3 veil3 in3 any3 meaningful3 way.3 In3 cases3where3the3corporate3veil3is3identified3it3has3been3in3order3to3pierce3the3corporate3veil3 to3 uphold3 the3 rights3 of3 shareholders3 (e.g.3 Cantos( v( Argentina,3 2001;3 see3Chapter35).333Chapter3 63 explored3 the3 ECtHR’s3 and3 the3 IACtHR’s3 case3 law3 to3 scrutinise3 the3potential3 of3 applying3 existing3 mechanisms3 in3 cases3 of3 corporate3 violations3 of3human3rights,3developing3the3concepts3of3the3horizontal3effect3and3due3diligence.3The3complicity3between3states3and3corporations3provide3the3basis3for3exploiting3the3 potential3 of3 linking3 responsibility3 from3 the3 corporation3 to3 the3 state,3 and3where3applicable3to3the3home3state3and3head3office.3The3case3law3data3explicated3examples3 where3 the3 Courts3 have3 used3 these3 mechanisms3 to3 establish3 state3responsibility3for3corporate3harms,3e.g.3Guerra(v(Italy((1998),3LópezSOstra(v(Spain((1994),3 Comunidad( Mayagna( (Sumo)( Awas( Tingni( v( Nicaragua( (2005),3 Kichwa(
Peoples( of( the( Sarayaku( (2004),3 Mayas( Indigenous( Community( of( the( Toledo(
District(v(Belize((2004),3Third(Report(on(the(Human(Rights(Situation( in(Colombia3




















maintains3 the3 power3 and3 responsibility3 of3 the3 nationHstate3 in3 a3 global3 society3(Tombs3 and3Whyte,3 2003c:3 11H13).3043This3 finding3 points3 to3 the3 importance3 of3continuing3the3research3into3including3the3perspectives3and3imagination3of3judges3for3a3specialised3Court3to3deal3with3corporate3violations3of3human3rights.333The3 IACtHR3 has3 developed3 its3 case3 law,3 discussed3 in3 Chapter3 6,3 to3 respond3 to3violations3 of3 human3 rights3 by3 paramilitary3 groups3 through3 the3 concept3 of3horizontality3 and3 due3 diligence3 (e.g.3 Velásquez( Rodríguez( v( Honduras,3 1988;(
Godínez(Cruz(v(Honduras,(1989).3David3Weissbrodt,3author3of3the3UN3Norms3(see3Introduction3 and3 Chapter3 2),3 points3 out3 “in3 observing3 that3 the3 ACHR3 sets3 out3positive3 obligations3 to3 prevent3 and3 remedy3 human3 rights3 violations,3 the3 Court3suggested3 state3 responsibility3 extends3 to3omissions3by3nonHstate3 actors”3 (1998:3184).3 Indigenous3 peoples3 have3 begun3 drawing3 on3 these3 developments3 for3analogous3cases3involving3corporate3violations3and3thus3using3the3IACtHR3to3try3to3 respond3 to3 stateHcorporate3 harms.3 Examples3 of3 these3 uses3 of3 human3 rights3Courts3include3the3U’Wa3Peoples3struggle3against3Oxy3Petroleum3in3Colombia3(see3





has3 been3 argued,3 demonstrate3 the3 feasibility( and3 the3 practicability3 of3 using3human3 rights3 law3 in3 creative3 ways.3 The3 analysis3 of3 existing3 mechanisms3demonstrates3a3 compatibility3with3 the3 traditional3notion3 in3 international3 law3of3the3 primacy3 of3 state3 responsibility3 and3 the3 complementary3 responsibility3corporations3for3violations.3053It3has3been3argued3throughout3the3thesis3that3one3of3 the3 key3 problems3 in3 human3 rights3 law3 is3 that3 it3 accepts3 and3 reinforces3 the3corporate3veil3as3part3of3a3general3buttressing3of3neoliberal3capitalism.3In3light3of3this,3 it3 is3 not3 enough3 to3 rely3 on3 simply3 research3 to3 continue3 to3 explore3 the3emancipatory3potential3of3law,3although3this3is3an3essential3part3of3the3struggle.3In3the3(near)3future,3we3may3need3to3consider3how3to3break3down3the3corporate3veil3in3 a3 more3 fundamental3 way3 before3 we3 can3 truly3 undertake3 changes3 to3 human3rights3 law3–3or3at3 least3we3will3need3 to3deal3with3 the3corporate3veil3and3human3rights3law3simultaneously.33
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APPENDIX(1.(Description(of(the(Judges!!In!order!to!guarantee!anonymity!and!confidentiality,!the!description!of!the!respondents!is!limited!to!a!first!table!that!includes!the!date!and!place!of!the!interview!by!Court.!A!second!table!presents!some!statistical!information!regarding!the!gender!of!the!respondents,!their!academic!or!pedagogic!affiliations,!and!the!number!of!years!of!experience!of!the!respondents.!!As!a!general!reminder,!all!of!the!judges!sitting!on!the!InterAAmerican!Court!at!the!time!of!the!interviews!were!from!Latin!American!and!Caribbean!countries.!None!were!of!the!same!nationality.!They!have!all!published!widely!on!human!rights!and!have!all!taught!or!teach!at!the!university!level.!The!respondents!from!the!European!Court!were!from!both!Western!and!Eastern!European!countries.!As!per!the!rules!and!regulations!of!the!Court,!none!were!of! the!same!nationality.!Some!of! the!respondents!had!a!pedagogical!background!and!continue! to! lecture!and!publish!widely!on!issues!of!human!rights.!!!
Table!1!
1.1.!Inter-American!Court!of!Human!Rights!Respondents!
Code% Date% Place%IAJ1! 23/11/2010! Judge’s!Office!San!José,!Costa!Rica!IAJ2! 07/04/2010! The!Hague,!Netherlands!IAJ3! 22/11/2010! Judge’s!Office!San!José,!Costa!Rica!IAJ4! 24/11/2010! Judge’s!Office!San!José,!Costa!Rica!IAJ5! 25/11/2010! Judge’s!Office!San!José,!Costa!Rica!IAJ6! 25/11/2010! Judge’s!Office!San!José,!Costa!Rica!
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1.2.!European!Court!of!Human!Rights!Respondents!
Code% Date% Place%ECtJ1! 22/02/2010! Judge’s!Office!Strasbourg,!France!ECtJ2! 05/03/2010! Judge’s!Office!Strasbourg,!France!ECtJ3! 05/03/2010! Judge’s!Office!Strasbourg,!France!ECtJ4! 23/04/2010! Judge’s!Office!Strasbourg,!France!ECtJ5! 06/09/2010! Judge’s!Office!Strasbourg,!France!ECtJ6! 25/02/2010! Judge’s!Office!Strasbourg,!France!ECtJ7! 25/02/2010! Judge’s!Office!Strasbourg,!France!ECtJ8! 24/02/2010! Judge’s!Office!Strasbourg,!France!ECtJ9! 04/03/2010! ECtHR!Cafeteria!Strasbourg,!France!
Table!2!




# Case&Name Respondent&State Year Convention&Articles Case&Reference Brief&Summary&and&Relevance&for&Corporate&Accountability





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time), the applicants
complained of the length and the unfairness of the compensation proceedings following the
expropriation of their land. They also complained, under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of
property), of an infringement of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions on account of
the time taken to pay them the expropriation compensation and the effect of the entry into force
during the proceedings of domestic law. SIGNIFICANCE: The Court should intervene only where the
domestic authorities fail in the task of implementing and enforcing the rights and freedoms of the











The applicants submitted that the searches and seizures, which had been conducted by the
investigating officers without any supervision or restriction, amounted to trespass against their
"home". SIGNIFICANCE: the ECtHR, relying on its own case law, extended the scope of rights to
corporations&for&rights&heretofore&reserved&for&physical&individual&applicants.





The case concerns the imminent extradition of the applicant from the United Kingdom to the United
States of America, where he fears that he will be sentenced to death on a charge of capital murder
and subject to the "death row phenomenon". SIGNIFICANCE: The Court holds that the primary
responsibility for implementing and enforcing the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Convention is laid on the national authorities. The machinery of complaint to the Court is thus
subsidiary&to&national&systems&safeguarding&human&rights&(§140).)





The two applications related to the effects of longJterm expropriation permits and prohibitions on
construction on the Estate of the late Mr. Spörrong and on Mrs. Lönnroth, in their capacity as
property owners. The ECtHR has recognised that the right to property is not absolute and that states
can in certain legitimate cases limit the right to property. As such, the right to property is regarded as
a more flexible right than other human rights. SIGNIFICANCE: The Court held that it should intervene
only where the domestic authorities fail in the task of implementing and enforcing the rights and
freedoms of the Convention. When the ECtHR finds a state guilty of violating a human right, it is
the&state&that&is&responsible&for&deciding&how&to&remedy&the&breach.
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Source:! Council! of! Europe! (Oct.! 2010)!The! Conscience! of! Europe:! 50! years! of! the! European!Court! of!Human!Rights.!London:!Third!Millennium!Publishing!Ltd.!p.67'
Examination)by)the)Committee)of)Ministers
Satisfactory)measures)taken)by)State)7))))))))))))))))))Case)concluded
Final)Resolution)7)Case)concluded
Measures)taken)by)State)not)satisfactory)(no)existing)enforcement)mecahnism)
Referral)to)the)Committee)of)Ministers
Obligations)of)the)state)in)question
Adoption)of)general)measures)(legislative)reform) Adoption)of)individual)measures(restitution,)reopening)of)domestic)proceedings…)Payment)of)compensation(just)satisfaction)
Judgement)finding)a)violation)7)case)concluded
Admissibility)decision
Judgement)finding)no)violation)7)))))))))Case)concluded
Applicant)has)suffered)a)significant)disadvantage
Inadmissibility)decision)7)))))))))))))))))))))))Case)concluded
Proceeding)at)national)level
Dispute
Proceedings)before)the)national)courts
Exhaustion)of)domestic)remedies
Final)domestic)decision
Application)against)a)Party)
Admissibility)criteria
67month)time)limit
Initial)analysis
Examination)of)the)admissibility)and)merits
Judgement)finding)a)violation
Request)for)re7examination)of)the)case
Request)accepted)7)referred)to)the)Grand)Chamber
Complaint)compatible)with)Convention)and)not)manifestly)ill)founded
Judgment)finding)no)violation)7))))))))))))Case)concluded
Inadmissibility)decision)7)))))))))))))))))))))))Case)concluded
Exhaustion)of)domestic)remedies
Execution*of*judgment
Proceedings*before*the*European*Court*of*Human*Rights
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Measures'taken'by'State'not'satisfactory'(no'existing'enforcement'mecahnism)Satisfactory'measures'taken'by'State'8'Case'concluded
Execution*of*judgmentObligations'of'the'State'in'question
Payment'of'compensation(just'satisfaction) Adoption'of'general'measures(legislative'form) Adoption'of'individual'measures(restitution,'reopening'of'domestic'proceedings…)
Compensation'awarded'8'Case'concluded
Proceeding'at'national'level
Dispute
Proceedings'before'the'national'courts
Exhaustion'of'domestic'remedies
Final'domestic'decision
Proceedings*before*the*Inter6American*Court*of*Human*Rights
Settlement'8'Case'concluded State'challenges'Commission'Case'referred'to'IACtHR Commission'refers'to'Court
Inadmissibility'decision'8'Case'concluded Judgment'finding'a'violation Judgment'finding'no'violation'8'Case'concluded
Examination'of'the'admissibility'and'merits
Application'against'a'Party'before'the'Inter8American'Commission'on'Human'Rights
Admissibility'criteria
Attempt'at'a'settlement Recommendation'to'the'State'in'question Complaint'compatible'with'Convention'and'not'manifestly'ill8founded
II.!The!Inter7American!Court!of!Human!Rights!!!!!!!
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APPENDIX!4:"Constellations"of"Subsidiaries!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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!
ource:!Huffington!Post!Online,!27th!April!2012,!http://huffingtonpost.tumblr.com/post/21936372365/theseC10CcompaniesCbasicallyCcontrolCeverythingCw!
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